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Blasting operations form a central part of any hard rock metal mining operation and are, given its inherent 
hazards, critical in ensuring safe mine working environments. In order to improve workplace safety in such 
operations, it is important to select the right explosives and technologies, to issue rules and procedures and to 
offer adequate training. Because multinational mining companies work under different jurisdictions, they have to 
comply with different rules with different regulators. Given that the aim is to have no Lost Time Injuries (LTI’s) 
at any operation within New Boliden, it is important to develop working practices that both comply with 
various legal requirements, are practically usable and lead to a safe working environment. The aim of the 
research is therefore to identify applicable legal requirements, technologies and working methods, in order to see 
if different working practices are compliant with these legal requirements, and whether these requirements and 
practices can help to meet the requirements of different regulators and Boliden’s mission objectives.  
This research has identified the legal requirements applying to mining operations in Sweden, Finland and 
Ireland, and compared working practices in several mines, operated by Boliden Mineral AB in these countries. 
With a comparable number of relevant legal sources, the legal structure on explosives safety requirements is 
generally similar. However, Nordic legislation puts more generic responsibilities on the employer, whereas Irish 
regulations are more specific. Blasting requirements in Finland and Sweden are mostly similar and apply to 
underground and surface mining operations and civil engineering, whereas Irish legislation is tailored specifically 
to underground mining operations. Significant differences can be seen when comparing explosives handling, in 
particular explosives storage, Ireland has a very different approach in this respect. 
Technologies influencing the explosives handling and blasting safety performance are considered to be the 
initiation systems used, the reliability of explosives and successful implementation of a digital track&trace 
system. No events leading to human injury have occurred following the utilisation of explosive materials in 
Boliden Mines in the past ten years. Using both Boliden and international data, it was found that the main types 
of explosives- and blasting related incidents are misfires, flyrock, toxic fumes and early detonation. Fault Tree 
Analysis, adapted forms of reliability modelling and the bow-tie method have been used to identify critical parts 
of the explosives handling and blasting process. Critical activities are these surrounding evacuation of the 
blasting area, material failures and explosives materials being unguarded. Most incidents appear to be caused by 
failures in communication between different departments and insufficient awareness of safety procedures.  
Considering that there is overlap between the various operations in terms of legal requirements and practices, it 
is judged to be useful to more closely align these practices, since learning from each other’s practices might 
improve safety levels. Also, alignment of track&trace systems, and the adoption of electronic initiation systems 
are recommended. It is deemed less useful to align more national requirements and practices, such as permitting 
and licensing procedures. In order to exchange best practices, company-wide safety guidelines and reporting 
based on a clear distinction of responsibilities per activity are recommended. The main conclusion is that 
alignment of existing safety practices and technology use is achievable given the various legal and operational 
constraints and is expected to ensure a zero-LTI explosives handling and blasting safety performance. 
N+.;%,J-&&Mining, Risk Engineering, Blasting, Safety, Health & Safety, Law, Regulations 
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Glossary 
 
Word   Meaning 
Act   See Statute 
Blasthole  Hole drilled in rock to be filled with explosive material 
Blasting   To blow up rocks by explosion. 
Blasting Agent  Substance that in order to transport, handle and store safely is separated from the
   other substance together with whom it forms an explosive material. 
Blasting Cap  See Detonator 
Case Law  Law introduced by the judicial branch of government. 
Charge   Filled Blasthole. 
Code   See Regulation 
Convention  See Treaty 
Deflagration  Subsonic form of combustion 
Detonation  Supersonic form of combustion 
Detonator Component of an initiation system, used to turn a low-energy pulse into a 
detonation. Usually equipped with a delay. 
Drillhole See Blasthole 
Explosion  Rapid expansion of matter into a volume much larger than the original. 
Explosive  Material intended to quickly expand and release energy when initiated 
High Explosive  Explosive with a detonation speed faster than the speed of sound. 
Initiation  Commence a detonation 
Jurisdiction  Practical authority granted to a legal body to administer justice within a  
   defined area of responsibility. 
Law   Set of rules and customs that have binding force in a certain jurisdiction. 
Loading Either putting blasted material in a truck or charging a blasthole with an emulsion 
Low Explosive  Explosive with a detonation speed slower than the speed of sound. 
Muck   Loose rock material, produced by blasting. 
Nitrate   Agent in a blasting mixture that serves as the fuel for the explosive reaction. 
Oxidiser  Agent in a blasting mixture that provides the oxygen component. 
Primary Explosive Explosive that is sensitive to detonators 
Primer   See primary explosive 
Pyrotechnics  Explosive material based on a burning process 
Regulation  Law introduced by the executive branch of government. Usually more  
   specified, but of lower legal weight, than a statute. 
Round   Two or more shots fired in one operation. 
Safety   Being protected against natural events or accidents 
Secondary Explosive Explosive that requires a primary explosive to detonate 
Security   Being protected against intentional threats 
Shot   Explosion of a single unit of explosives 
Statute   Law introduced by the legislative branch of government, usually in   
   collaboration with the executive branch. 
Treaty   Binding international agreement between sovereign states.  
Winze   (Usually small) vertical connection in a mine of small size without a  
   winding system, when constructed upwards usually called a raise, when  
   constructed downwards a sump. 
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1.! Introduction 
 
This chapter will shortly discuss the utilisation of explosives in mining, and the relevance of explosives 
safety and legislation in this field. It defines the problem that will be analysed, followed by a definition of 
objectives and research questions.  
 
!Explosives Handling and Blasting Safety in Mining 
Traditional extraction and development operations in hard rock mining use explosives to loosen and 
fragment rock masses. This technique is relatively cheap for the given environment, and the knowledge of 
and experience with explosive usage makes it a solidly proven method. Safety always remains a central 
concern however, given the extremely hazardous nature of the materials used. 
 
Prevention of unwanted explosions is one of the major factors in the selection of an explosive, together 
with reliability when working in the physically challenging mining environment. Since explosives are in 
themselves a safety hazard, special care is necessary regarding storage, transport, charging and blasting itself. 
Explosives safety does also influence overall mining operations however, for example, areas where 
explosives are used may not be accessible for certain types of equipment or operations, and it is in some 
cases even necessary to evacuate an entire mine during blasting. For these reasons, safety measures around 
explosives utilisation play an important role in mining operations since these, partially determine the overall 
technical and economic performance of a mine, and the extent to which people working in a mine are 
exposed to workplace hazards.  
 
Considering the major hazards involved in the storage, transportation and usage of explosives, public 
authorities are setting standards and overseeing its use to ensure safe working environments. As early as in 
the 19th century, when workplace safety law was still a rare phenomenon, workplace regulations where 
adopted around the world on various levels of government regarding mine safety, and explosives safety in 
particular (Karmis, 2001, p. 2). Nowadays, every stage in the utilisation of explosives is subject to safety 
policies and regulations. Both national and international legislators and mining authorities, and also private 
organisations, have developed extensive regulations and standards that aim to set safe standards explosive 
usage and blasting in mining. 
 
!Problem Analysis 
The approaches taken regarding explosives safety vary per country, and may also vary from mine to mine. 
Given the many different sources of legislation, it may not always be clear what the legal requirements are, 
and when they apply and when not. This also raises the question to what extent safety standards overlap, 
and where they are different. It would be useful information, especially for companies operating in different 
(legal) environments such as Swedish miner Boliden Mineral AB, to get a better overview of these 
conditions, because this would make it easier to develop uniform policies and monitor compliance and 
possible incidents and other deviations at different mine sites.  
 
Given that it is the aim of Boliden to have “zero accidents resulting in absence from work (LTI, Lost Time 
Injury) at all units by 2018” (New Boliden, 2017, p. 8) it is essential to ensure a very high level of workplace 
safety, compliant with all applicable safety requirements. 
 
Subsequently the question is how these legal requirements can best be applied, learning from other 
jurisdictions and operations. Boliden already has internal policies issued by the Health, Safety and 
Environment (HSE)-department, but this one has only been based on Swedish legislation and practical 
conditions so far. Since Boliden is a multinational company, it would be practical to find out if different 
jurisdictions and operations have very different standards, or that they could be combined more easily.  
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!Objectives and Research Questions 
The objective of this thesis is to find out what is legally required of mining companies operating in Sweden, 
Finland and Ireland regarding explosives safety, in what way the different Boliden mines apply, and comply 
with, these requirements, and if it is possible to formulate a consistent blasting policy that applies to all the 
countries and mines that Boliden operates. 
 
The main research question of this project is: 
 
Is it possible to align multinational legal safety requirements on explosives and blasting and will this help to meet Boliden’s 
safety mission objective? 
 
In order to answer this main question, several sub-questions have to be answered: 
 
Objective 1: Find out what legal requirements apply to explosives safety in Boliden mines. 
 
Sub-research question 1.1: What law is applicable to mining operations in Sweden, Finland and Ireland 
regarding explosives safety? 
Sub-research question 1.2: What do international and national regulations in Sweden, Finland and Ireland 
require regarding explosives safety in mines? 
Sub-research question 1.3: Is it possible to align the explosives and blasting safety legislation of Sweden, 
Finland and Ireland? 
 
Objective 2: Identify the main issues relevant to explosives safety in mining, the way in which Boliden 
mines take care of these issues and the complications that occur with this implementation. 
 
Sub-research question 2.1: What are the key safety issues and prevention and mitigation measures and 
practices when storing, transporting and using explosives in mining? 
Sub-research question 2.2: What rules, guidelines and practices does Boliden have regarding explosives 
safety? 
Sub-research question 2.3: What are practical complications and incidents that pose a threat to the 
fulfilment of safety requirements? 
 
Objective 3: Find a way to develop an explosives and blasting safety policy for Boliden mines of the highest 
standards compliant with legal and safety requirements and practical conditions. 
 
Sub-research question 3.1: How can legal requirements, existing and recommended practices be aligned to 
ensure no LTI’s occur in Boliden’s blasting operations? 
 
!Methodology 
First, a literature study is undertaken in order to understand the main safety issues surrounding usage of 
explosives in mining. The goal of this literature study is to identify the main types of explosives and 
detonation systems used in mining, and the associated safety hazards. Also, general data regarding explosive 
usage specifically used in Boliden will be gathered, in order to see in what environment and in what quantity 
the explosives are used.  
 
Subsequently, a legal analysis is carried out to map applicable legislation and its requirements. The sources 
used for this research will be legal literature, specific legislation provided by government authorities and if 
necessary inquiries at relevant authorities. The objective of this study is to clearly define what the specific 
legal rights and obligations are for explosives usage and blasting in mining in the studied jurisdictions. The 
focus of this assessment will be to map whether the legal requirements in the different studied jurisdiction 
are the same, whether some may require higher or more precise standards or whether they even contradict 
each other. 
 
In order to find out about the application of explosives safety in practice, staff overseeing safety and 
working with explosives in Boliden will be interviewed, and internal documents will be studied. This is done 
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in order to get a good insight in the internal policies that have been defined already on a corporate level 
and by mines individually. The aim of this is to see what practices exist and whether these vary significantly 
from mine to mine. 
 
Some of the mines considered will also be visited, and if this is not feasible longer interviews will be 
undertaken, in order to find out in greater detail what the practices in place are and to what extent this 
practical application is comparable with theory. Materials provided and experiences shared by professionals 
in the field of health & safety and blasting will be used to get a clear and detailed overview of the reality, 
and main difficulties surrounding compliance with the given legislation that face people working with 
explosives and blasting in mining, such as blasting engineers, chargers and other miners.  
 
The results of this field research are then finally compared with the findings of the legal study, in order to 
answer the final research sub-questions and research main question. The goal of this part is to critically 
assess what the main challenges would be in the drafting and implementation of a company-wide internal 
explosives safety policy. See Figure 1 for a diagram of the research structure. 
 
!Outline 
This work is divided in four main parts; the introductory part laying out the engineering and legal 
environment is the first part. This is also a useful part for people who are either not yet familiar with either 
health and safety regulation or explosives- and blasting practices. Then, a detailed legal analysis, intended 
to clearly define the legal standards that apply to this topic follows. In the third part a study of the 
application of safety standards in practice composed of two chapters is discussed.  
In the fourth, and final, part a synthesis with a comparison of legal requirements and existing mining safety 
practice is made. Suggestions on how to achieve a uniform explosives policy that is in accordance with the 
various legal requirements and practical implications concludes the research. This final part is composed of 
three chapters. 
 
An overview of the specific chapters and their function in this thesis is given below; the first four chapters 
serve to introduce the reader to the respective topics, chapters 5-7 form the legal study and chapters 8-10 
form the study of actual blasting techniques, practices and its complications. Chapter 11 combines the 
findings of the previous chapters, and chapter 12 gives the conclusion of the research. 
 
 
  
FIGURE 1: RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
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1 Introduction  
The current chapter; definition of the objective and scope of the research, definition of the research 
questions, the way in which the research will be structured. 
 
2 Introduction to Explosives and Blasting 
An overview of general explosives theory, commonly used explosives and detonation systems and the types 
of safety hazards that are associated with the usage of explosives in mining. 
 
3 Utilisation of Explosives in Boliden Mines 
General characteristics of explosives utilisation in Boliden Mines are given; the goal is to find out what the 
practical engineering environment of explosives utilisation in the studied mines is, to consider what legal 
requirements and practical conditions are relevant for the subsequent legal and practical assessments. 
 
4 Regulatory Framework of Mining Safety 
This chapter will provide an introduction to law and the legal framework regarding workplace safety in 
which mining companies operate in Sweden, Finland and Ireland. 
 
5 Law Applicable to Explosives Safety in Mining 
It is identified what the relevant sources of law applying to explosives- and blasting safety are for the three 
studied jurisdictions, and the extent to what they apply to the studied mines. 
 
6 Comparison of Requirements on Explosives Safety per Stage 
Outlining the specific legal requirements with regards to explosives- and blasting safety in the studied 
countries, on the basis of the different aspects in the process of the storage, internal transportation of 
explosives and blasting. Based on this outline, a comparison of the compatibility of these legal requirements 
can be made. 
 
7 Recommended Explosives Safety Practices 
Methods recommended and techniques available to ensure safe storage, handling and blasting of explosives 
are considered in the context of the mines studied, in order to make an assessment whether hazards can 
effectively be prevented and/or mitigated.  
 
8 Application of Explosives Safety Policies in Boliden Mines 
It will be determined what safety rules, guidelines and practices are in place in Boliden mines. It will be 
established whether and if so in what way the applied safety policies of the different mines differ, what the 
background of these differences is, and how they relate to the legal requirements. 
 
9 Complications and Incidents 
In order to find out if there are matters that deserve special attention, or would even require a completely 
different approach it is studied what matters typically cause problems, or even have led to incidents. 
 
10 Suggestions for a Boliden Explosives Safety Policy 
This chapter suggestions will be given on how explosives and blasting safety policies in the various mines 
can be improved, by both establishing the highest legal standard and learning from the various different 
practices.    
 
11 Conclusion and Recommendations  
Finally, the most important findings of this research will be presented in the final chapter. Comments on 
the research, recommendations to take and suggestions for further research will be given as well. 
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!Scope and Limitations 
Based on the objectives of this research and the questions that have to be answered, the quality and 
availability of sources and data, the main difficulties that were expected prior to the research and the time 
given, the boundaries of this work have been defined.   
 
In general, working environment safety legislation and its application regarding explosives from the 
moment the explosives enter the mine site to the moment right after blasting is discussed. The research 
includes the following topics: 
 
•! Working environment hazards associated with explosives usage. 
•! International law applicable to explosives safety. 
•! National legislation applicable to explosives safety. 
•! Agreements between mining authorities and researched mines on explosives safety requirements. 
•! Inventory of explosives and related materials used by Boliden. 
•! Internal policies of Boliden regarding explosives safety. 
•! Application of explosives safety policies by Boliden staff. 
•! Compliance of explosives safety policies and practice with relevant law. 
•! Best practices used to ensure safe explosive utilisation. 
 
This research does not address: 
 
•! Legislation regarding acquisition of explosives and transportation to the mine site. 
•! Environmental law regarding explosives usage. 
•! Explosives safety legislation applicable to non-mining purposes. 
•! Ventilation and air quality requirements following blasting. 
•! Private law regarding liability for damage and injury due to explosives use. 
•! Fields of working environment legislation that do not apply to explosives safety. 
•! Legislation and practice regarding explosives and techniques that are not used by Boliden mines. 
•! Blasting performance optimization insofar not directly affecting safety levels. 
•! Drilling processes prior to blasting, unless it directly affects the blasting process. 
•! Legal comparison with mines not part of Boliden. 
•! Economic analysis of various blasting methods. 
•! Safety issues that may be an issue for people involved with explosives handling and blasting 
activities but are not particular to these operations.  
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2.! Introduction to Explosives and Explosives Safety 
 
In order to familiarize the reader of this research with some of the underlying physical and chemical 
characteristics of explosives and the terminology used, this chapter gives a brief overview of the main 
aspects of explosives theory. The most important aim of this is to provide definitions of the terminology 
used, since this can have important consequences for both legal requirements and its practical application. 
Definitions given in this chapter will be consistently used throughout the whole research, even if different 
terminology is used locally in practices or legislation, in order to ensure consistency. Also, general 
approaches to deal with explosives in a safe manner are discussed, in order to give a short background of 
the regulations in the next chapter. 
 
!General Theory and Use of Explosives 
An explosive is a substance that tends to explode under certain condition. An "explosion" is "The action 
or an act of bursting or flying into pieces with extreme violence and noise; ..." (Brown, 1993), or "any rapid 
expansion of matter into a volume much larger than the original" (Persson, et al., 1994). In a mining context, 
the purpose is to get rock masses, that are otherwise hard to loosen and extract, to be "flying into pieces" 
so that they can be excavated and possibly processed. An “explosive” is “any chemical compound, mixture, 
or device, the primary objective of which is to function by explosion” (Hopler, 1998, p. 742). The activity 
of using explosives to fragment rock for extraction purposes is called "blasting", the verb in this context 
literally means "to blow up (rocks etc.) by explosion; ..." (Brown, 1993). As such, the handling of explosives 
to blast rock lies at the heart of any hard rock mining operation.  
 
In order for an explosion to occur, it is necessary that energy is released at a very high rate, leading to the 
expansion of gases and usually a loud bang. An explosion can be caused by many different sources, and 
also occurs incidentally in nature. Examples of various kinds of explosions include nuclear explosions, 
caused by the splitting of unstable atoms in atomic bombs; physical explosions such as sudden phase 
changes from water to vapour, as for example occurs with the outburst from a steam boiler; or chemical 
explosions, such as the sudden explosion of kerosene (a fossil fuel) after a plane crash. It is noteworthy that 
in all cases it is also possible to have a similar energy release process, where the air also expands, but at a 
slower rate. Examples would be nuclear electricity production, the regular functioning of a steam engine 
and the slow burning of coal respectively. The difference is speed of the energy release, which can make 
the process uncontrollable. From a safety perspective, it is clear that in two of the three examples explosions 
are undesired by the operator. In the mining context however, explosions are desired, but only at a specific 
time and location, and with certain precisely described expected results. Also, mining explosives used are 
always of the chemical explosion category, which means that there will always be a reaction between 
different elements that cause the sudden energy release.  
 
Explosives will be "charged" into boreholes that have been drilled in the rock to be blasted. For safety 
reasons, this charge will require a detonator and primer to explode. The detonator turns a relatively low 
energy pulse into a detonation. A primer then bridges the gap between the detonator and insensitive 
explosives used for the charge. The process of inserting the detonator and primer into the blasthole is 
referred to as “priming”. A single explosion is called a "shot". Usually, more than one shot is fired in an 
operation, this is called a blasting round. There are four main effects of blasting in a mining context 
(Tamrock, 1999), rock fragmentation, rock displacement, ground vibration and an air blast. For mining 
FIGURE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF SAFE EXPLOSIVES 
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purposes the selection of explosives therefore primarily depends on its effectiveness in blasting rock, but 
also on practical considerations such as its workability in wet environments and, perhaps most importantly, 
safety requirements. The main parameters that determine the impact, safety and usability of an explosive in 
mining are its effective energy, velocity of detonation, detonation pressure, sensitivity and water resistance 
(Tamrock, 1999). 
 
!Types of Explosives and Initiation Methods 
Whereas traditionally gunpowder was used for this purpose, more advanced and safer explosives have been 
developed over the years, such as dynamite, Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO) and other slurries and 
emulsions. In this part, the various ways to classify different types of explosives are discussed. This 
classification intends to give a quick look on the advantages, disadvantages and typical risks associated with 
the types of explosive materials discussed. 
 
2.2.1.!"Low" vs "High" Explosives 
A main distinction between types of explosives can be made between "low" and "high" explosives. Low 
explosives are explosives of which the blast wave travels slower than the speed of sound. This process is 
called deflagration, which compares to a regular burning process. The most famous example of this type of 
explosive is gunpowder. High explosives are explosives of which the shock wave, which is defined as a 
blast wave moving faster than the speed of sound (Anderson, 1984), in the medium from ignition travels 
faster than the speed of sound. This process is called "detonation". Examples of these type of explosives 
are dynamite, TNT and the emulsions used commonly in mining nowadays.  
 
When a wave travels at exactly the speed of sound, a so-called "sonic boom" will occur, since the sound 
waves that have been released at times t1 to t6 will all reach the same point at the same time as the actual 
shock wave causing the sound waves. The best-known example of this phenomenon are airplanes breaking 
the sound barrier. See Figure 3. The reason that high explosives have a sharper bang, distinct from low 
explosives, is this sonic effect. It is important to distinguish the different waves associated with the 
detonation of high explosives; Apart from the shock wave, the blast wave in general and the sound wave 
there   is the detonation wave, which is the wave throughout the explosive medium itself. In Chapter 7  the 
importance of an understanding of the interference of different waves will be discussed in further detail. 
2.2.2.!Categories of Explosives 
The three main categories that are therefore distinguished are propellants, which are materials used to 
propel bullets and rockets, pyrotechnics, which are primarily used in various forms of fireworks and other 
artistic uses and high explosives, the main category of interest for mining purposes. See Figure 4. The legal 
classification of explosives is discussed in Chapter 5. Another distinction is made between civil and military 
explosives; each explosive material has a certain “expiry date”, because of the components reacting to states 
of lower energy. Since military explosives are used in smaller quantities, but generally need to be stored 
much longer and may involve more difficult and different sorts of logistics and working conditions they 
will generally have much longer half-life’s and much more expensive. Composite explosives are therefore 
the main field of interest for mining purposes.  
 
Depending on the requirements at a given mine site, different explosives are commonly used. The most 
commonly used explosives nowadays are ANFO, slurries and emulsions. Given more difficult conditions,  
 
FIGURE 3: DEFLAGRATION VS DETONATION 
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the use of emulsions has increased (Tamrock, 1999). Emulsions consist of two components, a super-
saturated oxidiser solution component, which is dispersed in an oil phase. A gaseous component is mixed 
with this liquid, on a micro-droplet scale. The small droplets ensure close physical connection, which leads 
to a high velocity of detonation. It is inherently safe, since the mixing is carried out just before charging (or 
loading, as it is referred to in this report, to avoid confusion with the charging process in general), this 
makes the emulsion harmless until that point. Also, mixing just prior to loading allows for adjustment of 
the density of the emulsion and thereby power of the blast, by varying the amount and type of gassing 
agents added, ensuring that blast designs can be executed more precisely (Zhao, et al., 2000, p. 121).  
 
2.2.3.!Initiation of Explosives 
Initiation system consist of several parts; the blasting machine sending out the electrical signal or pulse; the 
wire or cord, which connects the blasting machine to the detonator, and the detonator or cap, which 
initiates the actual detonation (Jimeno, et al., 1987, p. 123). Various different systems of combinations of 
wires and detonators exist, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. For the purpose of this 
research, three types of detonators are judged to be most relevant; electrical-, NONEL- and electronic 
detonators. As seen in Figure 5, there are fundamental differences in the way the initiation is turned into 
detonation. To the left is a section view of an electrical detonator, then section views of a NONEL-
detonator and to the right an example of an electronic detonator is given. The initiation is carried by an 
electric pulse in the case of electrical detonators, by a detonation in the cord in the case of NONEL-
detonators and by a digital signal in the case of electronic detonators. Electrical- and NONEL-detonators 
both have powder to ensure the required delay, whereas electronic detonators use digital delays. Therefore 
electronic detonators have significantly smaller delay time deviations. Their advantages and disadvantages 
are listed in Table 1 (Persson, et al., 1994, p. 171). Since the initiation methods to a great extent influence 
workability and safety performance this topic will be discussed more detailed in Chapter 7. 
 
TABLE 1: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DETONATOR TYPES 
 Electrical  NONEL Electronic 
Risk for unwanted detonation -- + + 
Fragmentation - - ++ 
Check prior to blast + - + 
Costs + + -- 
FIGURE 4: CATEGORISATION OF EXPLOSIVES 
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!Topics in Explosives Utilisation Safety in Mining 
The ultimate goal of this research, by means of the legal requirements in place and technologies and 
methods available, is to improve explosives handling and blasting safety. To this extent, it seems useful to 
have a more functional approach, which can later be used to compare both the legal requirements and 
practices of the different stages in the blasting process, and the inherent risks.  
 
2.3.1.!Safety Risks  
The hazard of using explosives in a mining operation leads to various risks. Three main risk types are 
unintended detonation, detonation failure and unintended damage following blasting. There can be many 
different root causes to these problems; since each chain is as strong as the weakest link, all these possible 
roots will have to be addressed. Therefore, a structure will be outlined; a more specific outline with possible 
causes for safety risks per blasting stage has been given below. 
 
2.3.2.!Structure of Topics 
In order to ensure safe working with explosives, different aspects of explosives utilisation need to be taken 
into account. For the purpose of this research, a classification has been made, based on the structure of 
applicable legislation and the underlying theory on explosives safety. The purpose of this classification is to 
make it possible to compare the various legal safety requirements among themselves and their applications 
in practice in a structured manner, and also to serve as a basis for the definition of a uniform safety policy 
in such a way that it is easy to understand what rule is relevant to which person. The following categories 
have been defined: 
 
•! Responsible Persons 
Since it is in the end the people working with explosives and related topics that determine the safety of 
the operation there are certain requirements on these people, in terms of their qualifications and 
experience. Other people, such as the employer or governmental authorities, can have certain 
requirements they should meet as well. The assignment of responsibilities should also be very clear. 
 
•! Explosives Standards 
Explosives safety starts with the characteristics of an explosive; this is primarily the responsibility of 
the manufacturer, but since a mining company has to work with the product it is important to be aware 
what the characteristics of a utilised explosive are, and what standards are to be followed. This includes 
markings and traceability of explosives, to avoid confusion. 
 
•! Storage 
Hazards of unintended ignition during storage should be dealt with in a responsible way. Furthermore, 
knowing how much and what type of explosive materials are stored is important, given capacity 
restraints and security risks of theft. In general, unauthorised access is to be avoided. 
 
•! Transportation 
Moving the explosives into the mine and through the mine poses a safety hazard, given the risk for 
accidents, contact with other hazardous materials or loss of materials. 
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Figure 5 1. Alfred Nobel's first igniter cap for nitroglycerin consisted of an enclosed 
wooden capsule containing finely-powdered black powder, ignited by a black powder 
fuse. 
effective rock blasting explosive than black powder. This was long before the concept of 
detonation had become clearly understood. The wooden capsule was an important first 
step toward the epoch-making invention of the detonator, and marked the breakthrough 
to the first use of detonating high explosives m rock blasting. Without the invention of 
the detonator, nitroglycerin was useless for rock blasting. 
Further developments, described in a later (1865) Nobel patent for the detonator, 
made use of a small quantity of a primary explosive, mercury fulminate, pressed mto 
a copper capsule which was crimped to the end of the black powder fuse. Of course, 
mercury fulminate, being a primary explosive, had the ability to burn to detonation 
very quickly. Figure 5.2 shows some present-day detonators that are now m large-scale 
use in rock blasting. In the following, we wil l outline the developments that led to these 
detonators, and also to newer developments that are still in the early experimental and 
testing stage. u J. i .,.fV, 
About 1900 came the electrically initiated fuse-head. Connected to a short lengtn 
of black powder fuse, in its turn connected to an ordinary detonator, this constituted 
the first electric delay detonator. Later, about 1920, came the instantaneous electric 
detonator in which a thin electrically-heated bridgewire set on fire a minute charge ot 
a fiame-producing compound. This in turn initiated a small quantity of primary explo-
sive such as lead styphnate or lead azide. The primary explosive detonated, mitiatmg 
detonation in the main charge - usually about half a gram of a relatively sensitive 
secondary explosive such as PETN, Tetryl, or R D X / T N T . 
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Figure 5.2. Detonators: (a) ordinary d tonator fo  initiation by black powder fuse; 
(b) electric delay detonator; (c) N O N E ! delay detonator. 
5.2 Delay Detonators without a Primary Explosive 
Non-primary explosive detonators (NPED) have up to now been used mainly in 
military applications. By using a specially prepared secondary explosive, a new civifian 
detonator containing no primary explosive has been developed. When incorporated 
with the electric detonation of the NONEL system, this new detonator is xpected to 
increase safety in the fields of civil engineering and mining. 
5.2.1 Introduction 
In the first Nobel patent for the detonator in 1865, a copper shell filled with a pri-
mary explosive, mercury fulminate, was crimped to the end of the black powder fuse. 
A primary explosive such as mercury fulminate has the ability to transform from burning 
to detonation extremely quickly. 
At the beginning of the 20*^ ^ century, a combination of primary and secondary 
explosives began to be used in detonators. This concept is still commonly used world-
wide in detonators manufactured for civilian use. 
During the last part of this century, significant progress in detonator technology 
has made it possible to transfer the ignition energy to the detonator in a variety of 
ways via electric wires and fuse heads, or via the NONEL tube. Pyrotechnic delay 
elements with a wide span of high-precision burning rates have een developed. Practical 
experience has guided the development toward the delay times most appropriate for 
different specific applications. 
 FIGURE 5: DETONATOR TYPES (PERSSON, ET 
AL., 1994) 
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1 Base charge ( P E T N ) 5 Capacitor 
2 Primary explosive ( l ead azide) 6 Overvoltage protection circuitry 
3 Matchhead with bridgewire 7 Lead-in wires 
4 Integrated circuit chip 8 Sealing plug 
Figure 5.26. Electronic detonator. 
Different electronic detonator systems can be selected based upon the customc 
requirement for flexibility. Demands for a high degree of safety against accidental in' 
ation lead to similarities in the (different) designs produced by different manufactur( 
Typical characteristics for the electronic detonator include: 
a. The detonator initially has no initiation energy of its own. 
b. The detonator cannot be made to detonate without a unique activation co 
c. The detonator receives its initiation energy and activation code from the blcj 
ing machine. 
d. The detonator is equipped with over-voltage protection. Low excess loads 
dissipated via internal safety circuits. Higher voltag s (>1000 V) are l imi 
by means of a spark-gap. Large excess loads wi l l burn a fuse in the detona 
which incapacitates i t , without making it detonate. 
e. T e initiation system op rates with ow voltages (<50 V) , which is a gr 
advantage considering the risk of current leakage from the lead-in wires. 
Blasting Machine 
The blasting machine constitutes the central unit of the initiation system. I t si 
plies the detonators wi h energy and determines the delay time to be llocated to e<i 
period number. The unit is microcomputer controlled and its mode of operation < 
thus be altered with various control programs, while it can be uniformly designed f r 
a hardware point of view. This gives part of the flexibility of the system. 
The objective is that the operator at the blasting site should have a simple a 
well-known system to handle. Therefore, the controls for initiation of the round w 
designed to appear as conventional as possible in spite of the advanced internal des: 
of the unit. A panel with lamps indicates what is happening and gives the go-ah( 
signal when the round is ready to be flred. I f any errors are found, they are indicai 
on the panel and the blasting machine resets the system. 
Delay time allocation to the detonator  is carried out by uniquely cod d signals 
eliminate any possibility of error. The detonators do not react to any other code t t 
the one f rom the Nitro Nobel blasting machine, and the risk for unintentional initiat:: 
because of spurious signals from other energy sources is thus eliminated. The blast: 
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•! Charging 
For the purpose of this report charging is defined as the stage between the materials having been 
delivered to the blast site until the moment the charge is ready for initiation. Irresponsible charging 
methods may cause unintended ignition. More importantly, the quality of charging determines the 
quality, and thereby safety, of the blast. Also, charging may occur simultaneously as for example drilling 
or loading, and this also requires extra care.  
 
•! Blasting 
Blasting for the purpose of this report is defined as the stage from connection of the initiation system 
to initiation and detonation. During the blast rock will be flying around, the main concern is therefore 
to protect people and equipment and keep them away from the blast, or cover them.  
 
•! Post-blasting 
The post-blasting stage primarily applies to people who are responsible for checking a blasted rock 
mass just after the blast. Safety concerns here are the hazards of misfires, unstable rock masses, 
including an assessment of the need for rock reinforcement, toxic or otherwise damaging blast gases 
and loading hazards insofar related to misfires. Carrying out this professionally is important to ensure 
that subsequent tasks in the mining process, such as loading, hauling, crushing and drilling can be 
carried out safely without, or with the smallest possible, risks of misfires. 
 
!Conclusion 
In this chapter, an introduction to the theory of explosives and blasting techniques was discussed, in order 
to familiarise the reader with some core concepts on explosive materials and rock blasting. The reader has 
also been introduced to the terminology that will be used throughout this report. Furthermore, a brief 
overview has been given of safety risks associated with explosives utilisation. The three main risks that have 
been discussed are unintended detonation, detonation failure and unintended damage following blasting.  
 
Most importantly, following the introduction to explosives utilisation, this chapter has outlined the 
structure that will be followed in the rest of this research. The following topic-classification will be used 
throughout this research in order to compare both relevant legislation and practice: 
 
•! Responsible Persons 
•! Explosives Standards 
•! Storage 
•! Transportation 
•! Charging 
•! Blasting 
•! Post-blasting 
 
For each of these categories some typical risks have been named, for which regulations and practices have 
been put in place to prevent them from becoming reality. It is now possible to zoom in on Boliden’s mining 
operations and their explosives utilisation.   
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3.! Utilisation of Explosives in Boliden Mines 
 
Prior to the more in-depth research, data around the mines studied and the explosives and blasting 
procedures they have, have been assembled. The purpose of this is to see to what extent the different mines 
are similar in size, type of deposit mined and commodities produced. Also, it is important to know the 
mining method, explosives and blasting procedures used in order to see if the techniques used make a more 
uniform policy feasible. This will help a more guided research in the subsequent chapters, and introduces 
the reader to the general characteristics of the mines operated by Boliden. 
!Mines operated by Boliden 
Following a gold rush in 1924, the area around Boliden developed into a thriving mining area. Over the 
years, the company that was founded following this gold rush expanded, and developed to the company it 
is nowadays, with an annual turnover of approximately SEK 40 billion (~EUR 4.2 billion) and 5500 
employees, headquartered in Stockholm. Apart from several smelters, Boliden currently operates 6 different 
mines in Sweden, Finland and Ireland, making it one of the major metal producers in Europe. Exploration 
rights have been acquired for the traditional Outokumpu mining area, Finland, in 2014 and Boliden also 
continues to undertake exploratory activities in Sweden (Boliden, 2017).  
Currently, individual mines operate to a large extent independently, which means they can develop their 
own policies, including explosives safety policies. However, central policies and techniques are developed 
as well. The central mining office, intended to support the individual mining operations with for example 
technological challenges, research and development and HSE-matters is located in the Boliden area (New 
Boliden, 2017). See Figure 6 for the location and names of the mines that are currently operated by Boliden. 
 
3.1.1.!Boliden in Sweden 
Being the home of Boliden, Swedish mining operations still form the backbone of Bolidens operations. 
Note that the Boliden Area "mine" extracts resources from the Skellefteå-field, and currently consists of 
three smaller underground mines, Renström, Kristineberg and Kankberg, and two small open-pit mines 
near Maurliden. General data on the three Swedish mining operations are given in Table 2 (New Boliden, 
2017). Underground mines have a yellow instead of blue background. 
 
FIGURE 6: MINES CURRENTLY OPERATED BY BOLIDEN 
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TABLE 2: BOLIDEN MINES IN SWEDEN 
Mine Aitik Boliden Area Garpenberg 
Mining Technique Open Pit, 20-meter 
bench blasting 
Sublevel stoping using 
backfill 
Sublevel stoping, 
backfilling 
Commodities Mined Copper, Silver, Gold Zinc, Copper, Lead, 
Gold, Silver, Tellurium 
Zinc, Copper, Lead, 
Gold, Silver 
Ore Production (kT/a) 36,361 2,139 2,622 
Number of Employees 647 580 430 
Year Established 1968 1925 357BC/1957 
Mining Depth (m) 450 140-1445 1250 
 
3.1.2.!Boliden in Finland and Ireland 
Recent expansions of Boliden operations were primarily in Finland, and further expansions in Finland may 
be ahead; Tara mine in Ireland is the biggest zinc mine in Europe and the 9th biggest zinc mine in the 
world, and was acquired by Boliden in 2004. General data on the Finnish and Irish mining operations are 
given in Table 3 (New Boliden, 2017). 
 
TABLE 3: BOLIDEN MINES IN FINLAND AND IRELAND 
Mine Kevitsa (Finland) Kylylahti (Finland) Tara (Ireland) 
Mining Technique Open Pit, 12-meter bench 
blasting 
Sublevel stoping using 
backfill 
Stope & Pillar, 
drift & slash 
technique 
Commodities Mined Copper, Nickel, Gold, 
Platinum, Palladium 
Copper, Gold, Zinc Zinc and Lead 
Ore Production (kT/a) 6,700 2932 2197 
Number of Employees 380 114 586 
Year Established 2012 2012 1977 
Mining Depth (m) 500 600 1000 
!Type and Quantity of Materials used 
Considering that all of Boliden's mining operations work in a hard-rock environment, all mines use drill & 
blasting techniques for both development and ore extraction. As seen previously, production rates between 
the mines differ, and this is also translated in different blasting techniques and sizes applied. In this part, a 
quick-scan is made to identify the different materials used in the blasting process.  
 
3.2.1.!Materials Used 
In the Boliden area, Kankberg has been taken as an example of a typical operation. The other mines in this 
area are also relatively small underground mines, under supervision from Bolidens central office. It turns 
out that the materials used are fairly similar, even though there are of course differences in practices between 
the size of operations. There are no major differences in material usage. 
TABLE 4: MATERIALS USED IN SWEDEN 
Mine Aitik Kankberg Garpenberg 
Secondary Explosives  Emulsions Emulsions Emulsions 
Special charges Pre-blasting: Riogur   
Primers 1,7kg booster X-pipe 25g X-pipe 15 mm, SLP-
primer, 1 kg booster 
Ignition Systems NONEL, 1000ms 
delay 
Firex electronic 
detonators, Austin 
Indetshock, riocord 5g 
fuses 
NONEL, electronic 
detonaters, 5g, 
powder fuses 
# primers/blasthole 2 1 1 
# detonators/blasthole 2 1 1 
Emulsion supplied by Forcit Forcit Forcit 
Blastholes ø (mm) 311 45 45-65 
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TABLE 5: MATERIALS USED IN FINLAND AND IRELAND 
Mine Kevitsa (Finland) Kylylahti (Finland) Tara (Ireland) 
Secondary Explosives  Senatel, Presplit with 
Maxam 45mm packaged 
product 
-Kemiitti 810 (~90%) 
-ANFO (~10%) 
Emulsion+gas 
agent, use Non-L 
primed 
Special charges Powder chords, electrical 
detonators 
Pipecharges for smooth 
walls/wet conditions 
Powder chords, 
cartridges 
Primers 500g & 1000g Fortis Extra 
emulsion 
Forprime Rio primers 
Ignition Systems NONEL detonators and 
surface delays 
Millisecond non-
electronic and 
electronic detonators 
Bunch 
connectors-
primer chord, 
Electric 
detonators 
# primers/blasthole 2 1 1 
# detonators/blasthole 2 1 1 
Emulsionsupplied by Orica Forcit Orica,  
Blastholes ø (mm) 165-225 45 45 (dev) 65 (prod) 
Blastholes depth (m) 24  5 (dev), 20 (prod) 
Stemming height (m) 3.5-4.5 - - 
 
!Blasting Procedures 
In this part, the general explosives handling and blasting procedure is laid down. The goal is to see if the 
different types and sizes of mining operations also translate into different working practices. 
 
3.3.1.!Blasting Procedure in Sweden 
All mines have developed their own blasting safety policies according to Swedish safety legislation, usually 
in coordination with Boliden’s central office. 
 
TABLE 6: BLASTING PRACTICE IN SWEDEN 
Mine Aitik Kankberg Garpenberg 
Frequency of blasting 1-2 times per week Daily at 1am Daily at 4.05 am and 
4.05 pm 
Evacuation procedure 
(people) 
-600m (staff involved) 
-1200m (other) 
Entire mine is evacuated 
until 6 am 
Entire mine is 
evacuated 
Evacuation procedure 
(equipment) 
-300m (heavy 
equipment) 
-600m (light 
equipment) 
Protected Area Protected Area 
Storage of explosives All systems are stored 
in a certified storage 
on site 
Certified underground 
storage 
3 certified 
underground storages 
Total number of people 
involved in regular 
charging activities 
12 4 48 
People involved per shift 3 1-2  24 
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3.3.2.!Blasting Procedure in Finland and Ireland 
Kevitsa and Kylylahti have both developed their own safety policies independently, over the course of the 
life of mine. In the case of Kylylahti this is a mixture of Australian, Finnish and Swedish mine safety cultures, 
and within the requirements of Finnish legislation. Tara Mine has a safety policy based on (implementations 
of) European law and specific Irish regulations, together with SOP’s (Standard Operating Procedures) 
developed on site, given their long time of operations. 
 
TABLE 7: BLASTING PROCEDURE IN FINLAND AND IRELAND 
Mine Kevitsa (Finland) Kylylahti (Finland) Tara (Ireland) 
Frequency of blasting 1-3 times per week Daily 2 times daily 
Evacuation procedure 
(people) 
Entire pit is evacuated Entire mine is 
evacuated 
Entire mine is 
evacuated 
Evacuation procedure 
(equipment) 
Minimal 300 meters Protected Area Protected Area 
Storage of explosives -Steel containers modified 
according to Finnish 
legislation for packaged 
products and detonators 
-Insulated and heated 
storage tanks for emulsions 
Dedicated storages are 
mined out, or in after-
use tunnels 
Dedicated storage 
with restricted 
access, reserve 
station 
Total number of people 
involved in blasting 
13 10 66 
People involved per shift 2 2 22 
 
!Comparison of Operations 
Although the commodities produced vary somewhat from mine to mine, all mines are operating in hard 
rock environments mining for base metals and incidentally gold and other high-value byproducts. The 
materials used for regular operations are also similar; emulsions are used as the main explosive in all 
operations, detonated either by NONEL-system (still the majority) or electronic initiation systems. Main 
suppliers are in Sweden always Forcit, outside Sweden Orica has a larger role. There are three main 
distinctions to be made in terms of the mines studied, in terms of the size of operations, but also in terms 
of the types of blasting practices and for example evacuation procedures; 
 
•! Large Surface Mines: Aitik, Kevitsa 
•! Large Underground Mines: Tara, Garpenberg 
•! Small Underground Mines: Kankberg, Kylylahti 
•!  
This distinction may influence the practices studied; for now, all mining operations will be assessed 
according to the same standards however, because in general the materials used make similar safety 
measures seem reasonable. 
 
!Conclusion 
Boliden currently operates three different open pit mines (in Finland and Sweden) and six underground 
mines (in Sweden, Finland and Ireland). It has been found that there are significant differences in terms of 
size, but that materials used are similar. A distinction can be made between large surface mines, large 
underground mines and small underground mines, a distinction that sometimes can be of importance in 
the Part 3 of this research. Now the factual characteristics of the operations studied have been identified, 
the legal landscape in which these mines operate can be studied. 
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4.! Regulatory Framework of Mining Safety 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the sources of law and authorities that have jurisdiction over 
mining operations, in order to define the legal and regulatory framework under which the considered mines 
have to work. Basic legal concepts are also explained, in order to provide clear definitions for the subsequent 
chapters. An overview of the abbreviations and definitions used can also be found on page x. 
!Sources and Types of Relevant Law 
In order to know what applicable legislation is with regards to a certain topic, it is necessary to know what 
the sources are that determine what the law is. Law can have various sources; the various sources that can 
apply to workplace safety are considered below. 
 
4.1.1.!International Treaties 
Generally international law relies significantly on international custom and soft law. The most important 
source of hard binding law are treaties. Treaties exist between two or more countries, and oblige the parties 
to conform to a certain agreement, they can loosely be compared to a contract. In the context of workplace 
safety, international treaties can serve as the basis for worker's protection rights. International treaties are 
generally hard to enforce globally, but also need to be taken into account by national courts and authorities 
when they bind states and offer rights to individuals within their jurisdiction (Janis, 2003, p. 9). 
 
The most important other source of international law is customary international law; this implies that long 
maintained practices between states hold legal power. Most other sources of international law are 
considered to be "soft law". This means that they tend to be more generic and hard or even impossible to 
enforce. Soft law can however be taken into account as a guideline in court cases where the law is unclear 
(Janis, 2003, p. 52). Companies and governments violating soft law may also come under attack from 
NGO's and the press. 
 
4.1.2.!Directives and Standards Issued by International Organisations 
When countries are party to a certain international organization, such as the United Nations, European 
Union or International Labour Organization (ILO), this will generally mean they also give certain (usually 
very limited) law-making powers to these organizations, so they can develop consistent legislation in their 
field for their members. For the context of this research, the most important organisations will presumably 
be the European Union and the ILO. Sweden, Finland and Ireland are all a member of both the EU and 
the ILO.  
 
The EU, and more specifically the European Commission, frequently issues so-called directives. These 
directives need some form of implementation in all EU-member states, either by the introduction of 
independent statutes that require the same as the directive or by accepting direct legal effect of EU-
directives in the national constitution, but since all states have different legal systems the resulting law can 
look slightly different per member state (Obradovic & Lavranos, 2007). In the context of mining safety, 
directives can be issued in the fields of worker's rights/labour law and product standards (Watson, 2014). 
 
4.1.3.!(International) Industry Standards 
Not all law needs to be public by nature; specific industry sectors may voluntarily draft their own standards 
that apply to companies in their field. This can be done in order to ensure fair competition, to take into 
account the needs of the wider public in the form of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agreements, or 
because it may simply be more effective to exchange certain practices.   
 
4.1.4.!National Statutes and Acts 
The central source of national law in countries with a civil law-tradition, such as Sweden and Finland, are 
statutes and acts. These lay out the foundations of regulation in a certain sphere of interest. Enactment of 
statutes requires that the legislative branch of a government, for example parliament, writes the law, and 
that the executive branch signs it into law (Black, 1990). The more common name in Anglo-Saxon countries 
for this source of law is an Act, in Ireland formally called the Act of the Oireachtas after the Irish' name of 
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the parliament. Since both the legislative and executive branch of government are involved in this type of 
law it generally holds the highest value, but will usually also be relatively generic.  
 
This source of law, together with regulations, is probably the most important source of law however, since 
governments usually consider workplace safety such an important topic to oversee that a binding and 
relatively detailed body of law is introduced and maintained (Smith & Thomas, 2003, p. 866). 
 
4.1.5.!National Regulations, Codes and Mine-Specific Standards 
Since statutes and acts tend to offer room for discretion, executive government bodies tend to draft more 
specific legislation. Examples of this are the many sector- and topic-specific regulations that are drafted 
with regards to workplace safety by working environment authorities, that form part of ministries of 
economy and labour. Also, local government bodies may have the opportunity to issue specific regulations 
and codes. The aim of these regulations is always to be sure that the worker is well protected, and therefore 
usually comes accompanied with close oversight (Smith & Thomas, 2003). 
 
Government authorities, specifically Mine Authorities, may make specific arrangements with mines 
depending on their specific conditions and needs. Generally, these standards will form part of the 
permitting procedure.  
 
4.1.6.!Case Law 
The primary source of law in the common-law tradition, which is the tradition of law that is dominant in 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Ireland, is case law. Case law relies on 
legal precedent and, in this way, ensures legal certainty over time. Cases dealt with by lower courts generally 
hold a lower legal value, but cases settled by supreme legal bodies such as national supreme courts need to 
be considered in order to obtain clarification on the law. Case law also serves as a clarification of law in 
countries with a civil law tradition, when statutes, acts and regulations leave legal specifics open for debate. 
Traditionally this field of law is the most important in Ireland. It should be noted however that over the 
years, following the influence of the introduction of a body of workplace safety statutes and regulations 
and the emergence of European law, the importance of case law in the field of health & safety law has 
significantly decreased (Smith & Thomas, 2003, p. 868). 
 
4.1.7.!What is the law? 
The question what the law exactly requires with regard to a specific topic can be a complicated one to 
answer, especially when different sources may give different outcomes. There is however a hierarchy in law; 
if a country has signed up to a treaty, legislation that would go against the requirements of this treaty would 
generally be held to be void. Similarly, statutes rank above regulations, since they have a more solid 
democratic backing and have generally been considered more thoroughly. Sources of soft law, private 
industry initiatives and sometimes even foreign legislation can also help to clear uncertainties on a specific 
legal question, but only when this is not contrary to more "hard" law. Parallel to this, the higher-ranking 
sources of law tend to be much more generic. Regulations, but also case law, will provide answers to more 
specific questions, and will therefore form the bulk of relevant legislation in many specific legal questions. 
See Figure 7 for the general legal structure of types of law considered. 
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To be consistent with this general legal structure, this research will follow this pattern as well; first the more 
generic international and statutory legal requirements will set the general framework for the legal 
assessment, followed by a more detailed analysis based on specific regulations and industry standards. Also, 
considering that the goal of this research is to compare different legislations, foreign legislation will be taken 
into account insofar it could help to form a uniform legal approach. 
 
!Relevant Authorities 
Below an overview is given of the governmental authorities that have been identified that can introduce 
legislation regarding explosives safety in mining and oversee these.  
 
4.2.1.!International 
The main international organisation in the world is the United Nations (UN). In a mining context, its 
primary activities deal with environmental matters, human rights and public health. One subsidiary, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) is the most important organisation. Its aim is to protect workers 
globally, especially those working in hazardous conditions such as miners. Another important, private, 
international institution is the International Standards Organization (ISO), issuing industry standards 
around the world and via its national partners.  
 
Furthermore, the EU is the main authority in Sweden, Finland and Ireland that deals with economic 
matters. It therefore regulates matters related to explosive materials and equipment standards. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) can settle disputes between EU member states when there are conflicts 
regarding EU-law. Individuals and companies can however also report a suspected violation of EU-law to 
the European Commission, which in turn can start a case against the member state responsible for the 
violation. As such, the ECJ and the European Commission can be considered as the enforcers of 
compliance with European safety standards, in case the member states would fail to do so, and can 
undertake inspections if necessary (Obradovic & Lavranos, 2007, p. 27).  
 
4.2.2.!Sweden 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhälsskydd och Beredskap, MSB) is 
responsible for public safety, when it is not covered by other institutions, and as part of this deals with 
issues around hazardous materials, such as explosive materials (MSB, 2017). This includes activities around 
acquisition, storage, transport and preparation of explosives. 
 
The most important authority regulating and overseeing workplace health and safety in Sweden is the 
Swedish Work Environment Authority (Arbetsmiljöverket, AV). The difference with the MSB is that the 
MSB focusses on the dangerous goods themselves and serves the general public interest, whereas the AV 
aims to protect workers and oversees any type of working place.  
FIGURE 7: LEGISLATION PYRAMID 
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Swedish Standards Institute (SIS) is the national standardisation body of Sweden. It is a member of the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and such also implements worldwide ISO-standards 
(ISO, 2017).  
 
SveMin is the main industry organization for the Swedish mining industry. Its goal is to serve the interests 
of Swedish mining, but also sets out internal standards for mining activities in Sweden, also in the field of 
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE). It does not regulate issues related to explosives- and blasting safety 
however (SveMin, 2017). 
 
Municipalities where the mine is located need to give permission for certain activities, such as transportation 
and storage within their borders.  
 
4.2.3.!Finland 
In Finland, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for occupational safety, including the 
developing of applicable legislation. It works together with the Ministry of Employment and Economy and 
other relevant ministries (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2017). The governmental body 
responsible for executing this task is the Finnish Work Environment Protection Agency (Tyosuojelu 
/Arbetarskyddsförvaltningen). 
 
The Regional State Administrative Agency, RSAA(Aluehallintovirasto/Regionalförvaltningsverket) 
administers various issues in Finland that are related to mining, such as occupational health and safety 
topics, environmental permits and rescue services and preparedness (RSAA, 2015). It issues blasting 
licenses, and do this in accordance with the requirements of the Work Environment Protection Law 
44/2006 (§28 3.6.2016/423). 
 
The Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes/Säkerhets- och kemikalieverket) carries out oversight on 
sites handling and storing hazardous chemicals, such as explosives, and issues for example permits for 
explosives transfers (Tukes, 2017).  
 
4.2.4.!Ireland 
In Ireland, the most important authority dealing with workplace safety is the Health and Safety Authority 
(HSA). This body was set up in 1989 under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 1989. The HSA 
has the duty to ensure workplace safety standards for all people working in Ireland, and does this by issuing 
regulations for specific sectors and surveillance. It also regulates the production, transport and use of 
chemicals and explosives. The HSA reports to the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (Health 
and Safety Authority, 2017).  
 
Local authorities have to deal with permit requests for the storage and handling of explosives (§7 Stores 
for Explosives Order 2007). 
 
Importantly, the Mine Inspector carries out close supervisions of mining activities, in particular in regards 
to explosives safety. The Mine Inspector does so under authority of the Mines and Quarries Act 1965. 
 
!Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main types of sources of law have been identified. It has been found that the most 
important sources of law for the topic of workplace safety are national statutes and acts and regulations, 
since national governments have prioritised this in order to ensure worker's safety, but many other types 
of law from many different levels need to be considered as well, in order to lay down the legal framework 
of explosives and blasting safety. The main bodies introducing specific legislation and inspecting and 
overseeing explosive utilisation in mining have been identified as well. It is therefore now possible to 
commence finding out what law exists that applies to explosives safety in mining in the three countries.   
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5.! Law applicable to Explosives Safety 
 
This section lists legal documents that have been judged to be of (possible) relevance to the legal framework 
surrounding explosives safety in mining, including a short description of its source and scope. It also 
outlines the general duties that mining companies have in the discussed jurisdictions, and its legal basis. 
 
!International and European Law 
The main treaty worked out by the ILO in the field of mine workplace safety is the Safety and Health in 
Mines Convention, 1995 (No. 176) which has been ratified by Sweden, Finland and Ireland (ILO, 2016). 
Article 2(1) states that the convention applies to all mines, which, following Article 1(1), includes both 
underground and surface mines. The main purpose of the convention is to put requirements on the 
employer to guarantee safety and worker's right of people working in a mine. As an addition to this 
convention, R183 - Safety and Health in Mines Recommendation, 1995 (No. 183) has been adopted as well. 
The preamble of this Recommendation states that the purpose of this document is to add training advice 
supplementing the Convention. It should be noted that this is a recommendation, and therefore should be 
treated as soft law. 
 
The Environmental, Health & Safety Guidelines for Mining (December 10, 2007, World Bank Group)  
issue a general guideline on explosives handling and blasting safety. The guideline has been issued by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is an international organisation resorting under the World 
Bank, which is part of the UN. The IFC aims to advice and set global standards and code of conducts for 
governments and private institutions such as banks, not necessarily mining companies (IFC, 2017). 
However, since members to the IFC are required to only finance mining projects that comply with these 
standards, IFC and World Bank standards can therefore indirectly apply to mining companies as well. 
Guidelines by international organisations can generally be qualified as soft law. 
 
Directive 2014/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market and 
supervision of explosives for civil uses (Directive 2014/28/EU) is the main European source of law with 
regards to regulation of the explosives market. It is intended specifically for civil uses, not including 
fireworks (Article 1). It is primarily intended for manufacturers and transportation, but impacts actual 
operations as well since it sets health and safety standards for the actual explosives. Also, it is common that 
explosives manufacturers also have a role in the storage- and usage phase at a mine site, and can sometimes 
even carry out most of this work. Considering it is European law it therefore applies to all three studied 
countries. Connected to this main directive are various harmonised standards, which will however not be 
discussed in greater detail, since it is the responsibility of the supplier to ensure conformity. 
 
Commission Directive 2008/43 EC, setting up, pursuant to Council Directive 93/15/EEC, a system for 
the identification and traceability of explosives for civil uses, lays down requirements regarding the 
identification and traceability of explosive materials. Its application to explosives used in mining follows 
Article 1. It does however not apply to explosives transported in pump trucks for their unloading into a 
blast-hole, and explosives manufactured at blasting sites that are loaded immediately (Article 2). 
 
The Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) aims to provide a 
worldwide standard for various chemicals, including explosives, and rules and techniques to decide in what 
category a certain chemical substance falls. Chapter 2.1 in ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.4 outlines the various 
classifications of explosive materials (United Nations, 2011). In this report, this classification is also referred 
to as the "UN Classification System". The system has been applied in the latest version of the United 
Nations Convention Accord européen relatif au transport international de marchandises Dangereuses 
par Route/European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road 
(UNECE, 2015), in this report referred to in this report as “ADR”. This Convention, issued under the 
umbrella of the UNECE, which is the European zone of the UN, which includes Europe, Russia, Turkey 
and countries in Central Asia (UNECE, 2017), regulates transport of hazardous materials, including 
explosives, on the road. 
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!Swedish Law 
The main law that applies to workplace safety in Sweden is the Swedish Working Environment Act 
(Arbetsmiljölagen, SFS 1977:1160). It sets out the general duties on employers and employees with regards 
to the working environment. The act has been adopted in 1977, but revised several times since then. 
Whereas working environment legislation initially only dealt with physical safety, the act now also regulates 
mental well-being. The general purpose of this law is to oblige the employer to take responsibility, and to 
oblige him to undertake a "systematic" approach towards working environment safety. 
 
The main document regarding mining workplace safety can be found in the Swedish Mining Work 
Regulation (Berg- och gruvarbete, AFS 2010:1). This document stipulates general safety rules around 
workplace safety in rock excavation works and mines, including two sections related to blasting activities. 
It aims to avoid accidents in mining work environment, and it applies to any working activity in any mine, 
both surface and underground, following §1 and 2.  
 
The main document outlining the requirements around working with explosives in Sweden can be found 
in the Swedish Work Environment Authority regulations and general advice around blasting activities 
(Sprängarbete, AFS 2007:1). An update has been issued in 2014, AFS 2014:1, this update has been 
implemented in AFS 2007:1. Article 1 states that the regulation applies to all works where explosives, 
gunpowder, detonators or gas-generating compositions are being used, except for military applications. 
This document is specifically developed for blasting activities on site, and covers all types of explosive 
utilisation and blasting activities, including those in rock excavation and mining. Article 2 defines the 
employer, who is the main responsible party to apply this law. A more extensive guidance is added, further 
elaborating on most requirements. This is intended as a recommendation, and will be used to this extent in 
this research as well.  
 
The Swedish law on flammable and explosive Goods (Lag om brandfarliga och explosiva varor 2010:1011) 
is a statute outlining general requirements for flammable and explosives goods. It outlines general 
definitions, oversight and permitting requirements. On top of this, the MSB has issued the Regulations on 
handling of explosive goods (Föreskrifter om hantering av explosiva varor", MSFB 2016:3). In this 
regulation, standards with regards to explosives handling and storage are outlined. It applies to any 
explosives except for explosives used for military purposes or weaponry following §1 to 4. It is an 
implementation of Directive 2014/28/EU.  
 
The Swedish law on transport of dangerous goods (Lag om transport av Farligt Gods, 2006:263) deals with 
the transportation, unloading and handling of explosive materials in industrial areas, underground and on 
public roads, following §3 and §5. Its applicability however stops when the materials have reached the final 
area where they will be utilised, following §3. In this context, its applicability is therefore limited to 
transportation into the mine. 
 
The Swedish Work Environment Authority regulations and general advice around working in explosive 
sensitive environments (Explosionsfarlig miljö, AFS 2003:3), does not apply to mining safety, following 
section 1. Also, the Swedish Mining Act (Minerallagen, 1991:45) does not contain requirements related to 
explosives, blasting or workplace safety, and is therefore not considered relevant to this research. 
 
!Finnish Law 
The main document outlining obligations and rights with regards to mining activities in Finland is outlined 
in the Finnish Mining Act (Kaivoslaki/Gruvlagen, 10.6.2011/621). In it, the rights and duties of investors 
in mining in Finland are laid down, including in Chapter 12 the "Regulations pertaining to mining safety 
permits".  
 
The State Council Order on Mining (Valtioneuvoston asetus kaivostoiminnasta/Statsrådets förordning om 
gruvdrift, 28.6.2012/391) lays down provisions on mineral exploration and the acquisition of a mining 
permit, and can be considered as a further elaboration on the Finnish Mining Act. Apart from a general 
requirement on the procedure of requesting a mine safety permit (§20), as required by the Finnish Mining 
Act, it does not specify mine safety requirements in the field of explosives and blasting safety. 
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The main document with regard to explosives safety in the working environment in Finland is the State 
Council Order on Blasting and Extraction Safety (Valtioneuvoston asetus räjäytys- ja 
louhintatyön/Statsrådets förordning om säkerheten vid sprängnings- och brytningsarbeten, 
16.6.16.6.2011/644). It applies to blasting and rock extraction activities, and should be read together with 
law on the manufacturing and storage of explosives, and is a way to further elaborate on the duties of care 
of the employer in this field (§1).  
 
A more detailed document laying out requirements on people having responsibility in blasting activities is 
laid out in the Charger's Law (Panostajalaki/Lag om laddare, 3.6.3.6.2016/423). §1 states that this document 
regulates the "charger's rights and duties, conditions to issue, renew and withdraw blasting licenses for 
chargers and the duration of the license" (§1, Charger’s Law, 3.6.2016/423). §1 also explicitly excludes 
blasting licenses for police, emergency services and the military.  
 
The Finnish Statute on safety with handling of dangerous chemicals and explosive goods (Laki vaarallisten 
kemikaalien ja räjähteiden käsittelyn turvallisuudesta/Lag om säkerhet vid hantering av farliga kemikalier 
och explosiva varor, 3.6.2005/390) is applicable to explosive standards, manufacture, import, use, transport, 
storage and destruction of these explosive goods (§2(2)).  
 
A further elaboration on this statute can be found in the State Council Order on Safety of manufacturing, 
handling and storage of explosive materials (Valtioneuvoston asetus räjähteiden valmistuksen, käsittelyn ja 
varastoinnin turvallisuusvaatimuksista/Statsrådet förordning om säkerhetskraven vid tillverkning, 
hantering och upplagring av explosiva varor, 20.8.2015/1101). It applies to safety requirements 
manufacturing, handling, storage and destruction of explosive materials, and storage of emulsions in mobile 
aggregates to manufacture explosive materials. 
 
Connected to this law is the State Council Order on the guarding of production and storage of explosive 
goods (Valtioneuvoston asetus räjähteiden valmistuksen ja varastoinnin valvonnasta/Statsrådets förordning 
om övervakning av tillverkningen och upplagringen av explosiva varor, 25.6.2015/819), laying down more 
specifications in the field of explosives storage. It applies to the manufacturing, storage and destruction of 
explosive goods as mentioned in the Finnish Statute on safety with handling of dangerous chemicals and 
explosive goods (§1). It does however not apply to the manufacturing and usage of explosive goods at the 
working place for immediate use for the part that is covered by State Council Order on Blasting and 
Extraction Safety. It does therefore apply to contractors and suppliers that produce and store explosives to 
supply mines, but not to mining operations and short-term storage sites at mine sites. 
 
The State Council Order on Explosive Goods Compliance with Requirements (Valtioneuvoston asetus 
räjähteiden vaatimustenmukaisuudesta/Statsrådets förordning om explosiva varors överensstämmelse med 
kraven, 21.12.2016/1440) is closely connected to EC Directive 2014/28/EU, and applies to explosives 
used for civil purposes (§1). It does not apply to powder fuses and other non-detonating fuses, or to small 
detonators used as propellants (§2). The main aim of the document is to set standards to explosives goods, 
and can be considered as an implementation of EC Directive 2014/28. It is therefore sufficient to notice 
that Finland has effectively implemented this Directive by allowing its direct functioning by means of this 
Regulation, and that its main aim is to regulate manufacturers of explosive materials.  
 
The Finnish Law on the transport of dangerous goods (Laki vaarallisten aineiden kuljetuksesta/Lag om 
transport av farliga ämnen, 2.8.1994/719) is comparable in scope to the Swedish Lag 2006:263. Its goal is 
to prevent and avoid damage and risks in the transport of dangerous goods, and applies to transport on the 
road, railway, airplanes in Finland (§2(1,2,3)), but not transports of less than 45-meter distance, but also to 
packaging, tanks and vehicles for the transport of dangerous goods (§2(3)). It is an implementation of 
several European standards. 
 
The Finnish Worker's Protection Act (Työturvallisuuslaki/Arbetarskyddslag, 23.8.2002/738) is the main 
source of law regarding general workplace safety.  Its aim is to improve the working environment and 
employment relations in order to prevent and avoid accidents at work, diseases or other matters that harms 
workers (§1), and it applies to any type of regular employment relationship (§2). 
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!Irish Law 
General Irish workplace regulation is outlined in the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 2005. Its aim 
is to ensure a safe working environment in any type of Irish working place, and it applies to both employers 
(§8) and employees (§13).  
 
The Mines and Quarries Act 1965 is the main piece of law regarding mining activities in Ireland. It is 
applicable to mining activities, with "Mine" being  
 
"an excavation or system of excavations made for the purpose of, or in connection with, the getting, wholly 
or substantially by means involving the employment of persons below ground, of minerals (whether in their 
natural state or in solution or suspension) or products of minerals." (Section 3) 
 
Since Tara mine is an underground mine the articles insofar relevant to mines are therefore applicable to 
Tara mine.  
 
S.I. No. 123/1972 - Mines (Explosives) Regulations, 1972, does apply to underground mining in the 
Republic of Ireland. It aims to provide detailed regulation regarding the storage, handling and usage of 
explosives in mine sites in Ireland. Article 4 states: "These Regulations shall apply to every mine." The 
regulation is drafted as a more specific detailed addition to the previously mentioned Mines and Quarries 
Act 1965.  
 
The Guidance on the Safe Use of Explosives in Quarries (Doc. No 1396/2/01 EN) gives detailed 
information regarding explosives usage and blasting in a mining environment. However, the Guidelines to 
the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Quarries) Regulations 2008, that also provide regulations on 
explosives utilisation in mining environments, state in Section 3(2)a that "quarry" does not include a "mine 
within the meaning of section 3 of the Mines and Quarries act 1965". This regulation is therefore not 
applicable to Tara Mine, but since it is a much more recent piece of legislation it could provide a general 
impression of more recent approaches in the regulatory environment of explosives and blasting and 
environment. 
 
S.I. No. 423/2016 - European Union (Making Available on the Market and Supervision of Explosives for 
Civil Uses) Regulations 2016, stipulate the requirements on explosives and manufacturers and transporters 
of explosives. It is an implementation of EC Directive 2014/28, required to make the directive directly 
functioning under Irish law, but contains the exact same requirements in terms of content as the EC 
Directive. Differences can be found in for example the rules on legal procedure (Section 2) and different 
legal terminology. It will therefore not be worked out in detail in the next chapter, it should however be 
remembered that in Ireland it is this document, and not the EC Directive, that gives the requirements in 
the directive force of law. 
 
S.I. No. 133/2009 - European Communities (System For the Identification and Traceability of Explosives 
For Civil Uses) Regulations 2009 is the Irish implementation of Directive 2008/43 EC. Its requirements 
are therefore the same as in this directive. 
 
The Explosives Act 1875 is the main document in Irish law elaborating on requirements on manufacturers 
and users of explosives. It contains some provisions applicable to the preparation and storage of explosives 
on a mine site. Since the Act is from 1875, it was issued by the British government who at that time still 
was the government in charge in Ireland, it should therefore be noted that references to British authorities 
nowadays instead refer to Irish authorities.  
 
S.I. No. 804/2007 - Stores for Explosives Order is a regulation that further works out details regarding the 
storage of explosives. The regulation follows the UN-classification of explosives, following §4, and aims to 
elaborate on the more general requirements following from the Explosives Act 1875 (preamble).  
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!Health and Safety Requirements in Mining 
The starting point with regards to workplace safety are statutes and acts drafted by national governments 
that impose general liabilities on employers to ensure that their employees are safe and stay in good health. 
The following paragraphs outline the general requirements with regards to mining working environments 
in Sweden, Finland and Ireland that form the foundation of more specific explosives safety legislation 
outlined in Appendix IX.A. 
 
Since Swedish is an official government language in Finland and all Finnish legislation therefore has to be 
published in Swedish, this work will always use the Swedish version. In practice Finnish is the language 
spoken in Finnish mining environments. 
 
5.5.1.!Safety and Health in Mines Convention and Recommendation 
The two ILO-documents regarding mine work safety, the C176 - Safety and Health in Mines Convention, 
1995 (No. 176) and the R183 - Safety and Health in Mines Recommendation, 1995 (No. 183). C176 Safety and 
Health in Mines Convention 1995, since it is a treaty and therefore meant to bind states and not individuals, 
contain a general duty on states to introduce appropriate laws and regulations, possibly supplemented by technical 
standards, and an authority to oversee compliance with these laws (Article 4, 5(1)). However, these requirements 
on state will into indirect requirements on private parties. The most important requirements are given below: 
 
Article 6 requires the employer to assess the risk and deal with it in this order: 
a)! eliminate 
b)! control at source 
c)! minimize by means that include the design of safe work systems 
d)! if there still is a risk, provide the use of personal protective equipment 
 
Article 7(e) requires the monitoring, assessment and regular inspection of the working environment to identify 
hazards. In respect of zones susceptible to particular hazards, operating plans should be drawn up and 
implemented to ensure safe workings. Article 7(i) requires that operations are stopped when there is a serious 
danger to the health of workers. 
 
Article 10 requires workers to be trained in an understandable manner, at no cost to them. It is also required to 
report all accidents and dangerous occurrences.  
 
In the Safety and Health Recommendation, 1995 it is again stated that employers should undertake hazard 
assessment and risk analysis, and following this, develop and implement, and if necessary systems to manage the 
risk (§12). §17 requires that employers prohibit persons from carrying underground any object that could initiate 
a fire, explosion or dangerous occurrence. Special attention should be paid to, among others, flammable, toxic, 
noxious and other mine gases, fumes and hazardous substances, noise and vibration when estimating hazards 
(§20(b, c, g)). 
 
5.5.2.!Swedish Working Environment Act 
The most relevant general requirements related to this topic are the following. First of all, it is emphasised 
that both the employer and the employee are responsible for a good working environment (Section 1a 
Chapter 3, Arbetsmiljölagen, SFS 1977:1160). Section 2 requires that the employer takes any measures 
necessary to prevent harm. The starting point of any safety approach should take as a starting point that 
the hazard be eliminated or replaced. Special care is required when people have to work alone. Proper 
maintenance of workplaces and equipment is also required. It is the responsibility of the employer to plan, 
lead and oversee the activities of the employee and to take necessary action in case hazardous situations or 
risks are discovered. The employer shall keep a written documentation regarding these activities (Section 2, 
2a Chapter 3, Arbetsmiljölagen, SFS 1977:1160). Section 3 demands that the employer ensures that 
employees are well-qualified to do their job, informed about the risks involved and not allow people to 
work if they are not qualified instructed properly. It is also necessary that an employer reports any lethal or 
severe accident in his workplace, without outside pressures (Section 3a Chapter 3, Arbetsmiljölagen, SFS 
1977:1160). Chapter 4 outlines the opportunities of the government or relevant governmental authorities 
to outline specific guidelines, require medical checks, increase oversight or even stop activities that are 
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expected to cause harm to workers. Chapter 7 specifically assigns oversight tasks to the Swedish Work 
Environment Authority (Arbetsmiljöverket). 
 
5.5.3.!Swedish Mining Work Safety Regulation 
Swedish Working Environment Regulations and General Advice on Rock- and Mining Works 
Arbetsmiljöverkets föreskrifter och allmänna råd om berg- och gruvarbete, AFS 2010:1) contains two 
relevant general safety requirements with regards to mining companies. Section 3 requires companies that 
want to start a mining operation to undertake a written comprehensive risk assessment plan including all 
aspects relevant for the mining operation, before actual operations can begin. Section 6 requires any people 
working in the mining operation to have knowledge of all relevant traffic and work safety rules before they 
can start working in the mining operation. §5 requires that also time-planning is done such that all work 
can be carried out carefully and safely.  
 
5.5.4.!Swedish Statute on Flammable and Explosive Goods 
In Lag 2010:1011, §7 it is demanded that anyone who has obtained a permit to work with explosives is 
required to undertake risk assessments on the possible impacts on workers' safety and health, environment 
and third parties.  
 
5.5.5.!Finnish Mining Act 
The Finnish Mining Act (Gruvlagen, 621/2011) contains general safety requirements for mining 
companies. §112 states that the "mining operator is obliged to ensure mining safety", by the prevention of 
dangerous situations and accidents, alongside with limitation of the consequences thereof. This means that 
elements of danger and threats of accident need to be identified, subsequently eliminated, or if that is not 
possible limited. Measures need to be implemented to prevent accidents. (§113(1)(2)(3), 621/2011).  
 
Importantly, §113(4), 621/2011 states that "generally effective measures" need to be implemented prior to 
individual ones. Also, the development of technology needs to be taken into account when implementing 
safety measures (§113(5), 621/2011). It is necessary to undertake a systematic identification of elements 
endangering mine safety, in order to eliminate them. If it is not possible to eliminate these elements, their 
significance shall be assessed. This assessment is to be written down, kept and kept up to date, and changed 
fundamentally when necessary (§114, 621/2011).  
 
In general, all employees shall be trained and instructed on mine safety (§117, 621/2011). The mining 
operator shall assign a person that is in charge of mining safety. This person shall be employed by the mine 
and be present at the mine site. This person shall be competent with regards to mining regulations and 
measures necessary for mine safety, and ensure compliance with these requirements. This competence shall 
be tested by the mining authority (§118, 621/2011). The issuance and extension, or alteration, of a mining 
safety permit necessary to operate a mine relies on compliance with these safety requirements (§121, 122, 
124 621/2011). According to section 125, the permit will contain measures required to implement mining 
safety, training, guidance and instruction of the person in charge and other key person in mining safety, 
among other things. 
 
5.5.6.!Finnish Worker's Protection Act 
The first issue that is important to notice in the Finnish Worker's Protection Act is that this law applies to 
both regular workers as well as "hired work" (contractors) in the same way (§3). The consequence of this 
is that work safety requirements should be exactly the same for "own" staff as well as contractors. It also 
requires that it is the responsibility of the employer/contracting party to provide clear requirements on 
competency of the hired worker, and to provide clear instructions on the task, and subsequently assure that 
the worker/contractor fulfils these requirements and understands his task and responsibilities. The law also 
applies to for example students and/or interns working at the employer's site (§4). General duties of the 
employer are to take the measures to ensure the safety and health of the worker at his job. These duties 
exclude matters that lie beyond the control of the employer or are unavoidable. The employer shall plan, 
choose, dimension and execute the measures that are necessary to improve working conditions. The 
following principles shall be used in this regard: 
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•! The occurrence of risks and accidents shall be prevented. 
•! Risks and accidents shall be removed, when this is not possible replaced with something less 
dangerous or damaging. 
•! General worker's protection measures shall be prioritised over individual measures. 
•! The development of technology and other methods shall be taken into account. 
 
The employer shall ensure that all these measures are applied everywhere in the organisation (§8). The 
employer shall have operational programs in place to ensure workplace safety and develop them together 
with employees (§9), and identify and judge risks in the work taking into account personal characteristics 
of the people involved (such as the typical types of accidents, age and gender of the employee, the workload 
etc.). If the employer lacks specific knowledge he shall hire external parties (§10). If the work to be carried 
out has a special risk it shall only be carried out by competent people that are suitable for the job (§11). It 
is the responsibility of the employer to provide the employee with sufficient information on the risks of the 
job, and it is the duty of employees to contribute to a safe working environment (§17). Several more 
requirements that are applicable to mining work, such as night shifts, lighting of the workplace, ventilation 
and working space are included in this act as well, but judged outside the scope of this research.  
 
5.5.7.!Irish Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act 
The most important requirements following the Irish Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 are 
discussed here. Article 8 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 states in paragraph 1 that 
"Every employer shall ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety, health and welfare at work of 
his or her employees.". It subsequently elaborates how this is to be done in the subsequent paragraphs; 
work activities have to be managed and conducted to ensure health and safety and prevent improper 
conduct putting safety and health at risk. The employer should also provide and maintain systems to be 
used that are safe and healthy. He is also required to train and oversee employees in order to ensure their 
safety. If hazards cannot be prevented, suitable protective clothing and equipment needs to be provided, 
see §8(2)(i). There is also a duty to provide information on their safety and working methods in an 
understandable manner, including the hazards identified, the measures to be taken and the names of the 
people responsible for safety (§9). This information in any case always needs to be provided prior to the 
start of any employee's commencement of the working contract. The subsequent articles further work out 
the requirements on understandable preparations and trainings. Section 19 requires employers to identify 
the hazards in the place of work and the risks presented by those hazards. Then he has to assess these 
hazards, and in doing this, he has to take into account the duties imposed by the relevant provisions. On 
the basis of this assessment the employer shall take steps to implement any improvement considered to be 
necessary, and ensure that this improvement is implemented at work. This three-stage approach (identify 
risk, assess risk, take protective and preventive measures) is to be followed for any significant hazard.  
 
5.5.8.!Irish Mines and Quarries Act 
Sections 12 and 13 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1965 stipulate that it is the responsibility of the owner 
of a mine and on his behalf the Mine Manager to ensure compliance with relevant safety law. The owner is 
the person that has obtained the right to exploit a certain mining license (section 4). If the person working 
the mine is a contractor this person is assumed to be the owner (section 4(2)). It is therefore essential to 
comply with all relevant mining safety requirements in order to obtain and maintain a mining permit, and 
it is the responsibility of the Mine Manager to practically ensure this.  
 
!Duty of Care 
The most important finding of the previous subchapter is that mining activities and the working with 
explosives in all three jurisdictions have a consistent approach in dealing with workplace hazards, namely 
to actively identify hazards, prevent risks, or if this is not possible, to mitigate them. More broadly speaking, 
employers have a duty of care towards their employees, meaning that negligence in taking effective safety 
measures imply a breach of the law, even though no specific law has been broken.  
 
In common law, this concept was established in Donoghue v Stephenson [1932] UK House of Lords 100 as a 
general concept, being part of the duties towards "one's neighbour". In Ireland, this approach has been 
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followed in Ward v McMaster, Louth Co. Council and Nicholas Hardy & Co. Ltd. [1985] IR 29. The Irish Supreme 
Court held in this case that a duty of care arises from 1) the proximity of the parties, and 2) the foreseeability 
of the damage. This should be balanced against “absence of any compelling exemption based on public 
policy”, but it is unreasonable to assume that any public policy arguments could be used by mining 
companies in this regard. It is good to know that this does not mean that an employer will always be held 
liable, as was the case in Industrial Chemical Industries Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656, where two shotfirers were 
injured during their blasting work in a quarry because they themselves had not taken the necessary 
precautions. Given that employers and employees always work closely together and damage is reasonably 
foreseeable in mining operations, it therefore is reasonable to assume there is always an active duty on the 
employer to identify any sort of workplace risk and deal with this.  
 
The duty of care traditionally is part of private law on liability (Lunney & Oliphant, 2013), and therefore 
not the scope of this research. It is however a concept closely connected to this scope, since it lays down a 
duty on the employer, in that it requires employers to not just not breach existing specific regulations, but 
also act pro-actively in regards to workplace safety. Measures such as systematic risk identification would 
fit in this category. The duty of care is a principle developed in common law, but similar duties exist in civil 
law countries. In civil law countries, this duty is expressed by statutory law and interpretations case law, in 
the case of Sweden and Finland this is called the "omsorgsplikt", and is mentioned in e.g. §8 of the Finnish 
Worker's Protection Act and is expressed in §2 of the Swedish Working Environment Act.  
 
This concept, together with the specific regulations discussed in the previous subchapter, means that the 
legal duties of mining operators in the field of explosives safety always extend well beyond the specific 
regulations, but should also actively identify issues that are reasonably foreseeable to cause damage to 
people or for example contractors, and develop methods to deal with them. 
 
!Concluding Remarks 
There are a few international documents applicable to mining workplace safety and explosives safety in 
particular. These documents have different backgrounds, and scopes of application, since they stem from 
a global public international organization, a European public organization and a global private organization. 
In relation to national legislation, it turns out that all three studied countries have a similar set of legal 
sources applying to explosives safety in mining, the backbone of which are general work environment safety 
statutes, added by specific regulations regarding working in mining. All three countries have specific 
regulations regarding working with explosives in mining environments. In addition, some more specific 
documents related to explosives and transportation standards have been identified. 
It turns out that all the three studied jurisdictions regard mine safety and the responsibility of employers to 
ensure a safe working environment as an essential prerequisite for any form of commercial operation. A 
lack of knowledge of safety requirements, and subsequent failure of employers to ensure safe working 
environments can potentially lead to the withdrawal of mining permits under all three jurisdictions. An 
important aspect of all three jurisdictions is that they maintain that it is the duty of employers to identify 
and deal with workplace hazards. These hazards include those are not discussed in specific regulations, and 
also the mitigation measures suggested in the regulations may not be sufficient.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that all three jurisdictions require employers to implement their 
safety measures in a manner that is understandable to and executable by all employees. This implementation 
includes the duty to provide information and training on these working place hazards and mitigation 
measures.  
 
It is therefore necessary to establish what the exact legal requirements are, and if Boliden does comply with 
these. This will be done in the following chapter. Subsequently, it will need to be assessed what other rules 
should be introduced to ensure a safe working environment.  
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6.! Comparison of Applicable Legislation 
 
This chapter will discuss the contents of the applicable legislation discussed in the previous chapter, 
reviewing both international and national legal sources. The aim is to compare the various legal 
requirements, in order to assess whether it is possible to align these requirements and combine them to 
achieve the highest standards. The detailed comparison and the resulting Combined Legal Requirements 
(CLR) can be found in Appendices and IX.B. 
 
!Approach 
In order to find out what the specific legal requirements are, all relevant laws and regulations have been 
studied, and assembled in Appendix IX.A. Colours have been used to highlight how the different 
regulations can be compared. See Table 8 for a legend of the colours used for the different specific 
requirements. 
TABLE 8: LEGEND OF COMPARISON OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
Contradicting 
Requirement 
Lacking 
Requirement 
Similar Base 
Requirement 
Similar Requirements, 
but Additional/Stricter  
Different 
Requirement 
     
 
Based on this comparison, it will be considered in the next chapter to what extent the requirements of the 
different legislations can be aligned. For this purpose, the first column of the tables will be coloured, based 
on a judgment of the extent to which the different safety requirements can be aligned. See Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9: LEGEND OF INTEGRAL REQUIREMENT ASSESSMENT 
Requirements can be 
copied one on one. 
Requirements are different 
but could be combined. 
Requirements are different and 
may be impractical to combine. 
Different legislations 
need different rules. 
    
 
The next subchapter comments on some of the main issues that should be noted when reading this outline 
of legal requirements. Subchapter 6.3 discusses in further detail the main differences and possible overlap 
of these requirements. The result of this study and comparison is outlined in the Comparative Legal 
Requirements, that can be found in Appendix I.IX.B.  
 
!Content of Legal Requirements 
An outline and detailed comparison of all legal requirements can be found in Appendix Appendix IX.A. 
Below, a brief overview of the key requirements is given.  
 
6.2.1.!Comments on International and European Legal Requirements 
The international documents that were judged to be relevant to this research have very different 
backgrounds, and also have different fields of application. It should be remembered that normally these 
international requirements should have been implemented by the respective states, with the exception of 
the IFC-guidelines, which are applicable to financial institutions instead of states. There is a clear difference 
in implementation procedures between the different states, with Ireland working with “indirect 
implementation”, meaning that a specific act implementing the Directive requirements is necessary, whereas 
the Scandinavian countries appear to (partially) rely directly on European standards. For the actual practice 
this does not matter however, and it is therefore not discussed further. Given that the European standards 
on explosives standards, road transport and track&trace systems are the same, they also do not require 
extensive further comparison. 
 
A central recommendation in the explosives management practices formulated by the IFC is that the 
utilisation, handling, and transporting explosives should always be in accordance with local and national 
explosives safety regulations (Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines Mining, December 10, 2007 
16 World Bank Group). 
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In the Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), explosives are 
ranked according to the hazard they pose, with explosive materials in category 1.1 posing the greatest 
hazard, and those in 1.6 the smallest. See Appendix IX.K for a full overview of the different classes of 
explosive materials, and the associated signs. This categorisation forms the basis for the legal requirements 
related to the storage, transportation and handling of explosives. The signs assigned to the different 
categories (see for example Figure 8) are to be used on packaging and vehicles transporting the materials, 
following the requirements of the ADR. Together with this risk-based classification, there is an associated 
classification based on the type of explosive material. The classification is important because it determines 
what materials can be transported, handled and stored together, and which ones not.  
 
Requirements in EC-Directive 2014/28 are only applicable to government authorities or manufacturers. 
The Directive is implemented in MSFBS 2016:3 (Sweden), Statsrådets förordning om explosiva varors 
överensstämmelse med kraven (21.12.2016/1440) (Finland) and S.I. No. 423/2016 - European Union 
(Making Available on the Market and Supervision of Explosives for Civil Uses) Regulations 2016. Directive 
2008/43/EC is implemented by the S.I. No. 133/2009 - European Communities (System For the 
Identification and Traceability of Explosives For Civil Uses) Regulations 2009. It should be noted that the 
main document regulating explosives standards in the EU is EC Directive 2014/28, which has been 
implemented in various forms in national legislation. Since the requirements should be the same, even 
though the national documents of implementation may be different, these requirements, in so far relevant 
to mining companies, have been listed in the international subchapter of this chapter. The following 
requirements on explosives and storage standards are therefore only those that are not an implementation 
of this Directive. It is important to remember that EC Directive 2014/28 provides detailed requirements 
on the marking and packaging of explosives, and EC Directive 2008/43/EC on track & trace systems.  
 
6.2.2.!Comments on Content of local Legal Requirements 
There are some key issues worth mentioning. The central figure in overseeing blasting activities is called 
the "sprängarbas" in Sweden and Finland, and "shot-firer" in Ireland. Other people responsible for, or 
involved in, the blasting process are the employer (Sweden and Finland) or Mine Manager (Ireland), 
chargers under supervision and explosives storage managers. The exact requirements to be eligible to have 
this position appear to be different per country, but their responsibilities in the blasting process appear to 
be comparable.  
 
Regulations on the transportation of explosives and other dangerous materials are usually intended for 
longer distance transports from the manufacturer or importer to consumer, and not within mine sites. Two 
types of explosives transportation legislation are therefore considered in this part; transportation regulations 
that form part of mine explosive safety regulations in their entirety, and regulations stemming from 
explosive transportation law only insofar it would apply at mine sites. Storage is an issue where legal 
requirements differ significantly between jurisdictions and even in between different permits. Irish 
legislation requires different storages for long- and short-term storage, and separate responsible people for 
managing the storage. The charging and blasting itself is less densely regulated, generally employers are 
required in general terms to ensure safe and healthy working conditions, with sufficient lighting and 
effective evacuation procedures. 
FIGURE 8: EXAMPLE OF SIGN TO BE USED ON 
PRODUCTS WITH A MASS EXPLOSION RISK 
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!Comparison of Regulatory Approach 
It is noteworthy to point at the different approaches the regulators in the three studied countries have taken; 
this subchapter will discuss the different approaches by the three states, the consequences this has for the 
definition of a uniform resulting recommendation.  
 
6.3.1.!Legal Backbone of Mining Safety Legislation 
Already in Chapter 5, the approach of the legislator to general mining safety was discussed. It turned out 
that the approaches are fairly comparable, with the legislator in all cases having introduced a duty of care 
to employers in statutory law, and a duty on the relevant ministries to develop further detailed regulations 
to more specifically define what this duty implies. The type of act serving as the main basis to this extent is 
different however; in the case of Sweden and Ireland this is the general Work Safety Act, in the case of 
Finland the main document was the Mining Act, including safety as part of the mine permit. 
 
6.3.2.!Specific Explosives Safety in Mining Legislation 
All three countries have specific regulations, issued by the working environment authority, to regulate safe 
working with explosives in mining environments (AFS 2007:1 Sprängarbete, 16.6.2011/644 Säkerheten vid 
sprängnings- och brytningsarbeten and the Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 respectively). In Sweden 
and Finland this document is intended for both underground and surface mines, and also for civil 
engineering, in other words for all forms of rock blasting. In Ireland, the regulation has been developed 
specifically for underground mining. However, an important notion here is that some of the regulations 
seem particularly intended to coal mining and associated explosion risks. This is understandable given that 
at the time coal mining was the most common type of underground mining in Ireland, but it is irrelevant 
to this research.  
 
6.3.3.!Explosives Standards 
Since all three countries are EU-members, they have to have the same requirements when it comes to 
product standards, which is an essential component of the internal free market which lies at the heart of 
the EU. For the purpose of this research, this means that explosives standards, albeit the methods of 
implementation differ. Given that the substantive requirements of these national requirements should be 
the same following EU law, EC-Directive 2014/28 is assumed to be the best legal standard to be followed 
directly for all three jurisdictions. This does not mean that for example oversight structures cannot be 
different, but since this law is intended to regulate explosives manufacturers and transporters, this has been 
judged to lay outside the scope of this research.  
 
Although the requirements have been phrased as a duty on explosives manufacturers, this should be 
interpreted for the purpose of this research as a duty on a mining operator to not utilise explosives that 
have not been brought onto the market according to these requirements. The legal reason for this is that if 
a mining company would not ensure that the explosives have been manufactured and marketed in a safe 
manner this may also affect safe workings in the mine, which means the employer would breach its duty to 
ensure a safe working environment.  
 
6.3.4.!Miscellaneous Requirements 
On top of the general safety requirements, mining explosives safety requirements and explosives standards 
there are additional requirements on the storage and transport of explosives, or regulations applicable to 
other mining activities that do however have a relation with explosives safety.  
 
!Comparison on Specific Topics 
In this subchapter, issues that require more elaboration than a general and quick comparison or simple 
addition of different rules is discussed. The more complicated issues per stage in the cycle of explosives 
utilisation have been identified and marked orange or red in the previous chapter, and are discussed in this 
order below. Other issues that may be problematic are discussed as well. The results of this analysis will be 
used in subchapter 6.5 to define the resulting legal requirements. 
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6.4.1.!Main Specific Difference 
The biggest difference between the various legal requirements on explosives handling and blasting appears 
to be on the method of storing explosives; Ireland knows a distinction between a “magazine” and a “reserve 
station”, following §17 of the Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972. The main requirements following this 
approach of storage security is that the magazine is much more restricted and only accessible to an exclusive 
set of people (the “powdermen”), and that the reserve station cannot store more than 2 days of explosive 
materials. The concept of the magazine is that explosive materials for long-term storage in large quantities 
are stored in the magazine, which is an extremely restricted site. From there explosive materials can be 
delivered by the powdermen to the reserve station. This reserve station is also accessible by regular Blasting 
Foremans (at least this is legally allowed), and is the place from which explosive materials are distributed to 
the blast sites. Such a distinction is not made under Swedish and Finnish law.  
 
6.4.2.!Responsible Persons 
The main issue on this topic that is very hard to compare in the field of responsible persons, given that 
each country has their own set of rules regarding blasting qualifications, blasting licenses that are valid in 
one jurisdiction are not valid in another, and the involved agencies are different. It therefore seems 
appropriate not to try to develop a uniform policy and leave this a national matter. It is however possible 
to compare the rights and responsibilities different responsible people have according to the law in the 
various jurisdictions. 
6.4.2.1.!Responsibilities Blasting Foreman 
In Swedish, the Blasting Foreman appears to have a rather large responsibility, including the responsibility 
to “verify storage and dealing of explosives and associated equipment”, in Finnish law this is not mentioned, 
and under Irish law another person is responsible for this task. It therefore seems best to make this Swedish 
requirement conditional on the question if there is not another (in the case of Ireland legally required) 
person responsible to maintain the storage of explosive materials. Apart from that it is clear that in all three 
jurisdictions the Blasting Foreman has a three-fold task regarding blasting, namely by involvement of the 
blast planning, in managing charging works and in verifying if these works have been executed correctly 
prior to the blast.  
6.4.2.2.!Eligibility of the Blasting Foreman 
The exact procedures on obtaining blasting licenses are regulated nationally, and a blasting license for one 
jurisdiction is not valid in another jurisdiction. It therefore seems useless to formulate a uniform rule for 
this purpose. All jurisdictions essentially have a two-fold requirement for people to be eligible as Blasting 
Foreman, namely an experience requirement and the need to have blasting license.  
 
6.4.3.!Explosives Standards 
The bulk on requirements on explosive materials themselves is regulated by European law, since equal 
product standards form part of the European single market for goods (European Commission, 2017). The 
main standards can therefore be retrieved from the two main Directives that are applicable to this topic; 
however, there are some specific aspects, that primarily aim to specify the duty of care with regards to the 
mine operator on checking the materials used. The general approach when drafting the list of requirements 
in this regard therefore is to see in what way the mine operator can see if materials used comply with 
European and national standards in order to act as a responsible employer, and not with the explosive 
materials themselves. 
6.4.3.1.!Quality Requirements on Detonators/Blasting Machines 
It should be noted that there are some problematic issues with these requirements; first of all, does Swedish 
law explicitly refer to other Swedish law. However, in a European context should product standards and 
certifying bodies be held to the same standard across the EU. It is therefore recommended to let the 
question what particular certifying body should be responsible to be a national issue. Secondly, Irish law 
requires the blasting machine to be of the same manufacturer as the cables, whereas Finnish and Swedish 
law require the use of the same manufacture detonators and ignition systems. It is therefore assumed that 
the entire initiation and ignition system, from blasting machine to detonation, should be of the same 
manufacturer, unless it can be ascertained that they are designed as compatible systems. 
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6.4.3.2.!Clarity on explosive materials used 
It is possible to combine these requirements; the Irish regulator has apparently (again) wished to emphasize 
the exclusive duty of the employer to provide the materials used. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
Nordic regulators think this can be reasonably expected. It can also be assumed to be part of the duty of 
care under Irish law that, when the operator of a mine decides to use certain explosive materials, he will 
also make sure he obtains all the necessary material from the manufacturer as well. For the sake of being 
complete, both requirements have been added. 
6.4.3.3.!Requirements on Explosives to be used 
These specific requirements appear to be not necessary to include in the list of applicable regulations given. 
Since Boliden’s mining operations do not take place in urban areas, the Finnish requirement does not apply. 
Also, the Irish requirements reiterate the need of materials to comply with legal requirements, which has 
already been discussed before. 
 
6.4.4.!Storage 
The legal requirements on storage are rather extensive, as can be seen in the previous chapter. The vast 
majority of these requirements are related to the construction of and requirements on new storages, 
together with permitting procedures. Given that these vary between the different countries, and the 
construction of new storages do not form part of the regular activities at a mine site, it is not deemed useful 
to develop a standardised set of requirements for this topic. The rules that have been listed for this topic 
are therefore always related to the way in which explosives materials should be left in a storage, necessary 
signs and on access to the site. One remarkable difference is discussed below. 
 
6.4.5.!Transportation 
Extensive regulations on road transportation have not been included, although its key issues such as 
compliance with ADR-requirements, and the need to request permits have been mentioned. Again, 
permitting procedures differ per country, and apart from that will in general be the responsibility of the 
supplier and not of the mine. As for the transport within the mine several specific requirements exist, and 
these requirements overlap for a large part and in any case, do not contradict. One major difference in 
approach is the concept of the “Scheme of Transit” in Ireland. 
6.4.5.1.!Scheme of Transit 
Apart from the distinction between magazines and reserve stations, Irish law has another characteristic 
distinct from Nordic requirements, namely the requirement of developing a detailed plan, the scheme of 
transit, on the shipping of explosive materials within the mine, following §18 of the Mines (Explosives) 
Regulations 1972. This scheme connects with the concept of the distinction of moving explosive materials 
from the magazine to the reserve station, and subsequently from the reserve station to the blast site. It does 
however also deal with the return of explosive materials to their original place, and also contains 
requirements on the locations of storages, also for low-sensitive emulsions. It connects closely not only 
with storage standards, but also implements other standards, such as the track&trace system. Since this 
therefore forms an integral plan on all aspects of handling of explosive materials in the mine (until the 
charging/blasting phase), it seems to be a good approach to deal with explosive materials in a mine, and 
therefore have been included in the comprehensive legal requirements. 
 
6.4.6.!Charging 
Although charging regulations form a large part of all the identified requirements and all three jurisdictions 
have laid down rather extensive regulations, only two issues have been identified as more problematic. 
These issues are discussed below. Apart from this, no apparent difficulties have been identified, except for 
certifying requirements that may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There are five main issues in regard 
of charging, namely the development of the blasting plan prior to charging, then the preparation of the 
materials needed, the working environment during charging, regulations on the equipment used, drilling 
and finally the charging activities themselves. All these tasks may in practice be the responsibility of different 
people/crews, and will therefore require some more elaboration in the final chapters. 
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6.4.6.1.!Number of Detonators per Blasthole 
The only requirement that was found that appears to contradict another requirement is the different rule 
on the number of detonators to be used per blasthole; Swedish law explicitly recommends two detonators 
per blasthole in order to minimise the risk for non-detonation, whereas Irish law assumes that at a maximum 
one detonator per blasthole should be used; the background of this different approach may be that the 
Irish regulation was specifically developed for underground mines, which generally will have smaller 
blastholes, and the Swedish regulation also applies to surface mines, where it is more common to use two 
detonators in very large blastholes (as was mentioned in subchapter 3.2). It is not the case that these 
requirements cannot be combined; The applicable Swedish regulation literally states that:  
 
"Charging activities shall be executed in such a way that the risk for misfires is minimised. If it would be necessary two or 
more detonators shall be primed in the same drillhole" (§18, AFS 2007:1) 
 
It therefore is appropriate to assume that the regulator has introduced this requirement explicitly in the 
context of minimising risk of misfires. Importantly, it is obligatory to use two or more detonators, if risk 
assessment would indicate that not using two or more detonators would significantly increase the risk of 
misfires, following the wordings "shall be" (skall in Swedish). 
The Irish regulation literally reads as follows: 
 
"A person shall not insert more than one detonator in a shot-hole in a mine, except in accordance with Part IX of these 
regulations or except where the method of shot-firing being used determines otherwise." (§29(1) Mines (Explosives) 
Regulations 1972) 
 
Part IX is the part of this regulation that is dedicated to misfires. In any case the regulator has made it 
obligatory to not use more than one detonator per blasthole, with two possible exceptions. Part IX does in 
fact not contain specific regulations on the number of detonators to be used; Regulations in this part all 
deal with the procedure to follow if a misfire has occurred, not on the measures to be taken to avoid 
misfires. It can therefore be assumed that additional detonators are allowed in a drillhole when attempting 
to blast a misfire. The only exception to rely on to allow more detonators would therefore be the blasting 
method exception. It should therefore be assumed that when it can be proven that the use of multiple 
detonators per blasthole is essential to the success of a given blasting method this will be allowed. It should 
be noted that the Health and Welfare at Work (Quarries) Regulations 2008 do not specify a maximum 
number of detonators per blasthole, not even in the accompanying guidelines. It seems therefore best to 
assume that the limit on the maximum number of detonators to be used is typical for underground mining, 
where smaller drillholes are common. When drawing up the combined safety rules, a distinction is therefore 
made between underground and surface mining in this regard. 
6.4.6.2.!Preparation of Blasting Materials 
Irish law prohibits the preparation of blasting agents underground, only with the literal text being:  
 
“The preparation of a blasting agent shall not be carried out below ground in a mine.”  
(§11(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972) 
 
Given the formulation of “a blasting agent” this is assumed to refer to the manufacture of a single agent, 
and it is therefore assumed not to refer to the mixing of gaseous nitrates and oxidisers as part of emulsions 
just prior to loading. In any case permission is required of the Mine Inspector, following §11(4). The 
Swedish requirement emphasises the need of “sufficient distance” and protected objects. Since Boliden 
mines are located remotely, and does not produce its own explosives, this is judged to be inapplicable. In 
general, the requirements identified are all rather general or seem to deal with materials not regularly used. 
However, a short list of the main requirements in this field has been assembled. 
 
6.4.7.!Blasting 
Arguably the most critical phase in the blasting process is the blast itself, but when all preparational activities 
have been carried out well it should not be a major workplace hazard anymore, given that all people have 
to be evacuated according to all three jurisdictions. The number regulations are therefore limited and 
primarily focus on the evacuation procedures, where no major differences can be distinguished. In practice, 
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the difference between underground and surface operations can be large, but that will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Two issues on blasting materials are discussed below, in general all matters giving some 
complications are related to less used technologies. 
6.4.7.1.!Fuses and Special Blasting 
Fuses are not used for regular blasting in Boliden mines anymore, and therefore only relate to special 
blasting instances. The requirements stipulated have been implemented however. Swedish law discusses 
tools that substitute smaller explosive charges for scaling or the removal of boulders. To be complete it has 
been included in the regulations, but will not be discussed further since it lies outside the scope of this 
research. The Irish regulations are related to shafts and winzes, and therefore will usually not be applicable.  
 
6.4.8.!Post-Blasting 
No major difficulties have been encountered on issues in the post-blasting phase. Inspections on the quality 
of the blast and dealing with misfires form the main topic of regulations in this field. It should be noted 
that issues related to misfires are also relevant for drilling and loading/hauling operations, this will be dealt 
with in subsequent chapters.  
6.4.8.1.!Handling Misfires 
The Irish regulations, following §50 of the Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972, appear to be specifically 
related to techniques not in regular use anymore, namely either fuse-blasting or electric detonation (whereas 
all Boliden mines now use NONEL and incidentally electronic detonators). It is however judged to be 
worth a look when setting up guidelines on the treatment of misfires.    
 
!Resulting Combined Requirements 
When drawing up the aggregated legal requirements, it is important to remember some fundamental legal 
principles. One of the fundamental principles in democratic states under the rule of law that statutes 
approved by parliament, i.e. law that has a definite democratic legitimacy, prevails over regulations and 
decrees issued by not directly democratically elected ministers and government agencies, in case there would 
be a conflicting requirement. A second important principle is that more specific requirements prevail over 
generic ones. Thirdly, if national requirements would be conflicting with international treaties or European 
law, since the European Commission can enforce member state's compliance with European law in case it 
is uncompliant, and international treaties prevail over national law.  
 
By adding up the straightforward specific legal requirements from the different jurisdictions that do not 
appear to give a problem, and by implementing the elaborations made in the previous subchapter, it has 
now been possible to define a comprehensive set of rules that complies with all three jurisdictions and 
provides the highest standard of safety requirements. These combined regulations that have been assembled 
can be found in Appendix IX, and serve as the comprehensive legal requirements for the rest of this 
research.  
 
!Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has found that there are rather detailed regulations regarding explosives safety in mining for 
practically any stage in the explosives handling and blasting process. It should however be noted that each 
country seems to have prioritised different issues, and maintains different levels of detail regarding different 
issues. It is not the case that there are many cases where aggregation of these regulations will be impossible; 
assessing how this combination of various legal requirements can be done to develop a multinational high-
level safety policy will be done in the next chapter. 
 
The structure of the different regulations and other legal requirements in the three countries appear to be 
fairly similar, and it therefore seems reasonable to undertake a closer comparison. In general, as was already 
found that all three jurisdictions explicitly require mine operators to assume a duty of care for their workers, 
and to develop risk assessments and working procedures to ensure working safety. Taking this as a shared 
common approach, exchanging practices would therefore be compliant with the law. 
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A distinct difference in regards of the main document on blasting safety between the Nordic and Irish 
regulations is that the Nordic regulations are relatively new, whereas the Irish regulation was drafted in 
1972. This sometimes appears to make some issues less relevant, given the development of mining and new 
technologies that has occurred in the meantime. This does not mean that this makes the legal requirements 
less valid however. There are various differences on a detailed level, especially since some regulators have 
left certain legal requirements completely open and others not. It is generally fairly easy to work this out, 
by simply adding up the various specific requirements. However, there appear to be three main differences 
between the Nordic and Irish requirements: 
 
•! Relatively detailed legal requirements in Ireland  
•! The distinction between “magazines” and “reserve stations” in Ireland 
•! The explicit legal requirement for a comprehensive “scheme of transit” in Ireland 
 
The approach taken to these three main differences has been to implement the more detailed requirements, 
since they offer a clear and distinct benchmark. The distinction between the different types of storage does 
not seem logical to implement in Nordic requirements, since it would require a thorough overhaul of 
existing mining operations in these countries. Although each jurisdiction has obligations on planning and 
risk assessment requirements for explosives handling, the comprehensive and more specifically regulated 
approach taken in Ireland seems to be worth comparing in detail for its actual practice. 
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7.! Recommended Safety Technologies & Practices 
 
In the previous chapter detailed legal provisions were outlined that follow from the identified applicable 
legal sources. These provisions still contain many open ends, and just following these requirements may 
not be enough to fulfil the duty of care an employer has under Swedish, Finnish and Irish law. Furthermore, 
some requirements may not be applicable to current Boliden mining operations, given that some rules may 
be primarily intended for e.g. coal mining, or civil engineering situations, and other safety requirements may 
therefore apply. This chapter will address some explosives risk management techniques, methods and 
strategies that are suggested by work safety authorities, scientific literature and other authorities in the field 
of blasting and explosives engineering. The goal of this chapter is to identify matters that require further 
consideration, and the suggestion of methods that can be used to identify the importance of various 
different explosives safety hazards, either by chosing different technologies or working methods, that 
ensure safe working practices. 
 
!Approach 
The purpose of workplace safety regulation is to set safety standards, or, to put it differently, to set 
acceptable levels of risk (Fuller & Vassie, 2004). These regulations cannot be seen in isolation however; 
there may also be various non-governmental actors, or the employer itself, that has views on acceptable 
levels of risk. In addition, the sometimes rather general, and more duty-of care type of regulations require 
the consideration of more factors than just workplace legislation. Views by stakeholders in the right side of 
the picture will not be studied, since it can be assumed that they generally simply want something close to 
a guarantee that nothing harmful will happen to employees; governmental, regulator and other 
organisational standards have been discussed before; this chapter will essentially discuss how these 
standards should be interpreted and translated into a working practice. The main sources to undertake this 
task will be scientific literature, but also recommendations on how to meet safety standards and guidelines 
issued by governmental authorities, explosives manufacturers and other professional organisations. Risk 
management approaches are part of this chapter, but more detailed discussion on concrete incidents are 
part of Chapter 9. 
 
!Risk Management 
Central to any systematic safety management, and a legal requirement, is the undertaking of risk 
assessments. Therefore, a risk assessment will be made in order to establish what topics deserve extra 
attention, on top of the fixed requirements. This subchapter will discuss ways to approach risk assessments. 
 
7.2.1.!Types of Risks 
The first step is to decide what the risk scope will be. In the field of blasting, three types of risks can be 
distinguished (Seccatore, et al., 2013): 
 
•! Health & Safety Risks 
•! Economic Risks 
•! Environmental Risks 
 
The latter two are not the topic of this research. Nevertheless, insofar relevant to this topic, they will be 
considered in conjunction with an assessment of health & safety risks. The ultimate goal of this risk 
management approach will be to remove, mitigate or at least minimize these risks. In order to do this, it 
needs to be clear what the hazards intrinsic to blasting activities are, which will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. Techniques to analyse the importance of different elements of entire blasting operations and 
ways to analyse the available data will be discussed subsequently. 
 
 
7.2.2.!Explosives Utilisation Hazard Identification & Mitigation 
Below follows a list of the main concerns that are associated with the utilisation of explosives, together 
with some of the typically associated mitigation measures. This list is based on an analysis by (Maier, 2000). 
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1.! Incorrect timing of the detonation 
Perhaps the main risk is explosives detonating before they are supposed to. Countermeasures focus on 
explosives standards and the storage, handling and transport of explosives. Also, for charging operations, 
the avoidance of time pressure in blasting operations to ensure safe handling is important, together with 
the need to only start charging when drilling has been finished.  
2.! Incomplete detonation 
Explosives partially or completely detonating (misfires) form a hazard since they may explode at a later 
stage, apart from the fact that they harm mine productivity. Countermeasures need to focus both on 
misfires occurring in the first place as well as on how to deal with cases where they have happened anyway. 
Useful countermeasures include the avoidance of re-boring bore hole sockets, the monitoring of the 
blasting process and checking the debris for misfires after the blast. 
3.! Absorbing nitroglycol or nitroglycol through the skin or the respiratory tract 
Proper explosives selection can play an important role in avoiding the most hazardous/unhealthy 
substances. Nevertheless, when dealing with hazardous materials, the use of necessary PPE and maintaining 
hygiene standards are important. 
4.! Explosives shocks and/or sound pressure waves 
In order to deal with this (both health and safety) hazard, it is most important that people keep sufficient 
distance to the point of explosion, and that detonating fuses do not protrude from boreholes since they 
cause extreme waves.  
5.! Flying stone and/or the centrifugal effect 
Getting hit by flyrock is a major risk, both when it hits people, but also when it hits equipment. 
Determination of the danger zone, and keeping people and equipment out of here is key to effectively 
mitigate this hazard. 
6.! Blasting vibrations 
Normally primarily an environmental concern, large vibration may also cause mine damage and thereby 
possibly hazardous situations. The quantity of explosives used and the precision of blast timings are central 
to ensure that vibration levels are limited. Assessment of damage after the blast is also central. 
7.! Noxious components in released blast fumes 
Toxic fumes will be released at any blast, given the nature of chemicals used in explosives. Nevertheless, 
the type of explosives used can influence the severity of this hazard, and good ventilation, sometimes even 
in surface mines, is therefore a key consideration. 
8.! Hazards as a result of incompatibility of the explosives, igniters, the equipment and the auxiliary 
articles envisaged for the blasting operation 
It can be a considerable hazard when incompatible explosive materials are used, both in terms of decreased 
blasting precision, and in terms of early or failing detonation. In this research, it will therefore be considered 
to be a factor contributing to the previously discussed hazards.  
9.! Hazards from the environment  
Hazards from the environment are primarily related to rock falling down, or getting hit by flyrock during 
the blast. The first subtype is considered to be outside the scope of this research, since it is a general mine 
safety hazard. The second subtype is effectively mitigated by keeping people out of the blasting area, and 
will be de discussed under issue 5.  
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10.! Burdens suffered by the working staff 
Hazards relevant from this category are primarily related to noise and dust, or the lifting of heavy loads. 
Since these are more general mining health (and to a lesser extent safety) hazards they will not be discussed 
in further detail, except in the context of the previously discussed hazards. Apart from these hazards, 
another major risk is theft or other ways in which explosive materials may end in the wrong hands. Since 
this is a security risk, and not a health & safety risk they will not be discussed in further detail however. 
 
It can be seen that there are essentially three main type of safety hazards and one smaller health hazard; 
first the hazard of unwanted (or untimely) detonation (hazard 1), secondly the hazard of incomplete or 
failing detonation (misfires), hazard 2, and thirdly hazards related to the impact of blasting (hazards 4-7) 
and fourthly due to the handling of the explosive materials themselves (hazard 3). All safety rule 
recommendations, both these prescribed by governmental authorities, recommendations by other bodies 
and own findings will be seen in the light of how they contribute to the mitigation of these hazards in 
Chapter 10.  
7.2.3.! Fault Tree Analysis 
Before looking at the actual statistics it seems appropriate to first establish on a theoretical level what events 
can lead to a dangerous situation, and perhaps most importantly, how important the failure of one element 
of an entire operation is in terms of its impact on the overall safety of the system. A suitable way to make  
 
such an assessment is by using fault trees. Fault trees were developed in 1962 to analyse system failures for 
the US Air Force and offer a good way to analyse the importance of elements to the overall safety 
performance of a system (Zhou, et al., 2005). See Figure 9 for a legend of the symbols used. For this 
research, it will immediately be assigned whose responsibility a certain activity is, in order to quickly see 
where certain rules should be directed to, or what materials should be used. 
 
One of the useful aspects of fault trees is that it can be established what the importance of specific elements 
of an entire operation to overall safety performance. This can be done by describing all the minimal cuts 
that can lead to failure; a minimal cut is essentially the series of activities that need to fail in order for a 
(possible) accident to occur. Minimal cuts in this tree are {X1 X4}, {X1 X2 X3}. This immediately makes 
clear that by simply eliminating the possibility of failure of X1 would already create a safe system. An 
alternative would be to eliminate X3 and X4, assuming that external event X2 cannot be changed. Assuming 
that all elements are equally improvable the preferred option would thus be to ensure safe function of X1, 
since then only one element needs to be improved. It is therefore a very effective way to see what 
procedures or materials should be prioritised to ensure a safe operation. 
 
In more complicated systems, the importance of respective elements can be established with the so-called 
Birnbaum’s factor of importance (Limnios, 2013). 
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FIGURE 9: LEGEND FAULT TREES 
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With !" #  being the importance of a basic event for the safe functioning of the system, n being the number 
of components in the minimum cut that need to fail and /01#2 the number of minimum cuts that will lead 
to the occurrence of the top event. 
The following elements have been identified as having a (theoretical) impact on blasting operations, and 
included is what person(s) would legally, or otherwise practically, be responsible for this task. All fault trees 
are built from (some of the) components of the blasting system. In Appendix IX.Q, fault trees are worked 
out for types of hazards that have recently led to accidents composed of these events, and resulting 
minimum cuts outlined. Apart from the below mentioned controllable events, events that are assumed to 
be beyond reasonable controlled are detonated by “N”.  
7.2.4.!Risk Assessment per Operational Activity 
Just knowing what the hazards are is not enough; the question is how likely it is that a certain hazard will 
indeed cause actual damage or injury, and what this damage or injury will turn out to be, in other words 
what the risk is. It can be rather hard to make good estimates of what the risks actually are, especially when 
adverse events do not happen frequently but can theoretically have enormous impacts, as is the case with 
explosives handling and blasting. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to quantify the different risks. 
In order to decide on the importance and need of safety measures and standards, this research will 
undertake a comprehensive risk analysis for the different stages discussed. The result of this will be a risk 
matrix (see for an example Figure 10), from which it can be judged what measures deserve the highest 
priority. Risk matrices are fundamentally based on the definition of risk, being: 3 $ 4 . 5 
With R being the risk, P being the probability that a certain type of adverse event will happen and D being 
the damage that can be expected from the occurrence of such an event.  
In this research, two types of probabilities of risk will be distinguished, based on the available data; 
consequence risks (i.e. the risk of certain accidents occurring) and causal risks (i.e. the probability that 
certain components of the system will fail that might possibly lead to an accident). This distinction has been 
made given the availability of data; on one hand data of minor incidents in Boliden sites that did not lead 
to actual harm and on the other hand data from health authorities just stating the type of accident but not 
its cause. The first type shows what types of accidents occur frequently, either because of the major damage 
associated with it or the high likelihood that this type of damage occurs. Types of accidents can be linked 
to a specific type of failure in the blasting process. The second type shows what components in particular 
deserve most attention, either because it is likely that their failure will lead to failure, or that when they fail 
the associated possible damage will be big. This report will continue to make this distinction between issues 
related to the cause and those related to the consequences in the types of hazards, risks and measures discussed.  
In order to assess the level of risk per activity, risk matrices will be used. Risk matrices offer a good way to 
judge different risks, and are thereby a helpful tool for effective risk management. Although criticized for 
the way in which statistical uncertainties are dealt with, they offer an easily understandable method to assess 
risks associated with a given project or operation, which is helpful in the allocation of priorities and 
resources for specific tasks (Cox, 2009, p. 102). 
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FIGURE 10: EXAMPLE RISK MATRIX (FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 2007) 
 
7.2.5.!Assigning Probabilities and Expected Damages 
Assigning probabilities for certain failures in the blasting process may be the most difficult step, since these 
may be dependent on many different factors, and especially for less frequently occurring failures making 
reliable estimates may be difficult. In this report, available data on incidents of certain process steps will be 
used to make an estimate of the probability of failure of certain components of the blasting process, and 
subsequently failure (e.g. accidents leading to material or personal injury) of the blasting process itself, in a 
method that is usually used for the estimation of failure of mechanical, chemical and other physical systems. 
A method to translate the occurrence of incidents into a reasonable probability estimate is to define the so-
called point estimator of failure rate 6 (Gheorge & Mock, 1999, p. 34): 
 6 $ /7899 $ /7(:;< . =>(?-  
 
With n being the number of failures of a specific failure mode, 7899 the accumulated time of service of the 
items or operations involved, 7(:;< the accumulated time in service of the relevant items or operations and 
N the total number of considered items or operation. It is important to realise that this 6 does not equal 
an actual probability; certain incidents may fail more than once for the given time period of a year, but this 
does not mean that the probability of failure during a year is more than one. It is therefore necessary to 
assign a so-called probability density function. To do this it is necessary to assign a certain expected type of 
failure probability density; some types of activities or mechanical parts are more likely to fail at the beginning 
of their life, others once they get older for example. In the case of a continuously ongoing human process, 
with continuous replacements at various sites, it seems most reasonable to assume that the “hazard rate”, 
the probability that some activity fails at a certain point in time is constant, e.g. that how long the activity 
goes on (in this case how many times a certain charging process is repeated) is irrelevant. The appropriate 
formula for this type of function is the exponential density function, given by (Dekking, et al., 2005, p. 62): 
 @ 7A 6 $ 6B,CDEEEEEE7 F G:GEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE7 H GI 
 
To have a proper computation with statistical relevance of 6, it is important to have at least five 
item/operation failures that can be judged to be (moreorless) similar (Gheorge & Mock, 1999). Expected 
damage will be based on the maximum damage or injury that occurred following accidents of a certain type. 
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It is possible to also establish a confidence interval for all of these probabilities, since having more failure 
data will increase the confidence that the given probabilities indeed reflect reality. It will be assumed that 
we always need to be on the safe side, and an upper probability limit will therefore be introduced, with:  
 JK<<LM 7 $ J 7 N G:GO/ N ) 
With n being the number of reported failures. The margin that is added for the, statistical relevant number 
of five operating failures will then be 5 per mil, and the minimum assumed probability of component failure 
per shift is therefore 3 percent. See Appendix IX.C for a further elaboration on this topic. 
 
7.2.6.!Process Improvement 
The previous analysis focused only on hazardous events that have actually occurred; To make a more 
detailed analysis of actual problems that occur for the most severe hazards with the execution of elements 
of the entire system for underground mines, another approach is suggested based on the bow-tie method 
integrated with statistical data. The bow-tie method is frequently used in order to map possible causes and 
prevention and mitigation measures for a given hazard. Causes and associated possible prevention methods 
are outlined on the left side of a certain hazard, and possible mitigation measures and consequences if all 
measures have failed are displayed to the right (Rausand, 2011). See Figure 11. 
 
FIGURE 11: SET-UP BOW-TIE DIAGRAM (RAUSAND, 2011, P. 120) 
Following this bow-tie method, the conception of risk discussed before is indeed rather simplified; first of 
all, it is important to consider both sides of the adverse event, namely the failures (e.g. breaches of certain 
safety protocols) on the side leading up to the adverse event, and on the other hand the failures that aim to 
limit the impact of an adverse event (e.g. not wearing PPE).  
For this analysis, an adaption to the bow-tie method will be made, since it is interesting to implement 
statistical data and to use this quantification to establish the likelihood of certain consequences given the 
occurrence of a certain hazard. What we want to know is how likely it is that a certain hazardous event will 
lead to a certain consequence, and on the left side what the most vulnerable path is leading up to the 
hazardous event. Following breaches of procedures or material failures reported in underground Swedish 
mines, a likelihood is assigned to each element on both sides that they will fail. With this knowledge, an 
assessment can then be made to judge what would be the most effective way to improve safety performance. 
The model developed will essentially implement Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) into the bow-tie method. 
The RBD is a tool similar to fault tree analysis that can be used to judge on the reliability of a system based 
on the reliability of individual components (Gheorge & Mock, 1999, p. 72).In this application, the cause-
side is rather small, since it will be assumed that causes must be beyond reasonable control of staff involved, 
since it would otherwise be a failure of a certain measure. The goal is to establish how likely it would be 
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that these uncontrollable events would lead to the occurrence of a dangerous event, if they were to occur. 
Data on reported possible causes are used; when certain prevention measures appear to fail frequently this 
makes it more likely that the cause that is connected with this prevention measure is by definition riskier, if 
it were to occur; after all, when it would occur, it would be more likely to progress to become an actual 
hazardous event. In order to make these calculations, is important to distinguish between events or parts 
that can lead to failure of the entire system that are in series or parallel (similarly to the AND or OR-gates 
in fault tree analysis); if only the failure of several activities or parts at the same time leads to failure of an 
entire system it is considered to be in series; when the failure of only one part out of many can lead to 
failure of the entire system the system is considered to be parallel (Fuller & Vassie, 2004, p. 262). See Figure 
12 on how to calculate the probability that an entire system would fail based on the probability of failure 
of individual components. It is assumed in the model that each failure in the failure-path has to occur in 
the same shift to turn into a system failure. 
For the consequence side, it will be calculated what the likelihood is that certain consequences will occur, 
following the likelihood of failure of certain safety measures and assuming that the dangerous event has 
occurred. Furthermore, it is interesting to assign a risk for a certain element in a chain. Since the criticality 
of some components is less, as can be concluded from the fault tree analysis, the probabilities will be 
translated into risks per criticality level. Accordingly, the riskiness of each element on this side is given by: 3LPLQL+R $ !" # LPLQL+R . 4LPLQL+R 
finally, in order to also have a risk estimation based on this model, the possible damaging events at the end 
can be calculated by the following formula: 39;+SLTKL+9L $ 49;+SLTKL+9L . 5LU<L9RLV 
In order to distinguish between different types of components of the explosives handling and blasting 
process, the bow-tie model will assume five different types of failure; failure of the rules/procedures 
themselves, failure of the materials used, failure of the practical execution of certain tasks, failure of typical 
inspections to note such failures and finally failures in engineering aspects such as blast design. Each 
component can be marked with a certain probability of failure based on the incident reporting. See Figure 
13 for a legend of the markings used. 
 
 
FIGURE 13: LEGEND ADAPTED BOW-TIE MODEL  
 
Series network:     Probability of failure of the system: 
      4 $ 4- . 4W . 4X  
 
 
 
Parallel network:    Probability of failure of the system:  
      4 $ ) Y 1) Y 4-2 . 1) Y 4W2 . 1) Y 4X2 
P3 
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P2 
P1 
P3 
FIGURE 12: SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY 
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!Causes of Failure 
When all legislative requirements been implemented correctly, the right technologies have been selected 
and best practices have been developed, the phase of implementation may still lead to problems. This can 
be caused by either because implementation issues, or because people deliberately violate rules or simply 
make mistakes. Even when drawing up of working methods, procedures and the selection of technologies 
mistakes can be made. In order to improve overall safety performance, it therefore is important to consider 
the possible reasons why things go wrong. 
 
7.3.1.!Errors and other types of Incidents 
In order to assess what the root cause of possible incidents and accidents can be, it is important to 
distinguish a few types of different failure causes. Although the word “incident” can have several meanings, 
for the purpose of this research, it is defined as the occurrence of (possibly) dangerous situations that are 
unintended (Brown, 1993). It is assumed that these situations will have three possible type of backgrounds: 
 
•! Human error 
•! Material failure 
•! External causes (e.g. unexpected difficult geology, climate, uncontrollable people from outside the 
organisation) 
 
The last category is the most difficult one to deal with, since its causes lie outside the organisation itself; 
possible measures are therefore related to monitoring and general mitigation measures. The topic of human 
error will be discussed in more detail below. Possible material improvements will be discussed in this 
chapter under the subchapter on available technologies. 
 
7.3.2.!Type of Errors 
People make mistakes, and this in many takes the form of a conscious violations to subconscious slips. It 
is important to recognise the differences in types of errors, in order to find a way that minimises risks of 
errors and has opportunities in place to correct them. A first distinction is between active and latent errors. 
Also, a distinction can be made between various types of human safety errors (Simpson, et al., 2009, p. 7): 
a)! Violations 
Arguably the most important type of safety error, since they are intentional, and are therefore always related 
to the deliberate non-compliance with a certain safety standard. This type of violation may seem 
“malicious”, but there can be many different reasons for non-compliance, and it is important to be aware 
of these reasons to effectively mitigate them. The following subtypes can be distinguished (Reason, 1987): 
 
•! Routine violations: Follow habitual behaviour which is considered to be normal within the given 
environment (common excuse: “everyone does it like this”).  
•! Situational violations: Happen when factors in the workplace make it difficult to comply with 
certain rules, and people may deem the rule to be ineffective or even contra-productive in the given 
environment (for example, when wearing safety glasses in a dusty environment view may become 
bad, for this reason many people may choose to take them off).  
•! Exceptional violations: Occur in uncommon situations, when people have to find new solutions 
and feel that violating existing rules in this new situation is unavoidable. This type of violation is 
especially dangerous, since the consequences are unknown. 
•! Optimising violations: People trying to make their work more “interesting” or “efficient” by 
ignoring certain rules. 
 
Assuming that staff generally is not of bad intent, it can be concluded that it is to be recommended to make 
people see the logic of safety rules, and not to “over-regulate”, since this could lead to an inflation of how 
serious important rules are taken. Preparedness, and a culture of regular communication on more unknown 
issues, seems especially important to avoid situational and exceptional violations. 
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b)! Mistakes 
Mistakes are defined as cases where you do the wrong thing, even though you believed it to be the right 
thing to do (Simpson, et al., 2009, p. 8). This type of error is therefore always related to some kind of 
unawareness. The following sub-types of mistakes can be distinguished (Reason, 1987): 
 
•! Rule-based mistakes: Occurs when a certain procedure has been interpreted in the wrong way. 
•! Knowledge-based mistakes: Occur when a situation goes beyond someone’s training and expertise. 
c)! Slips/Lapses 
Slips/lapses are cases where people start of doing the right thing, but end up in doing it the wrong way. 
This type is therefore usually related to distractions causing inadequate execution of a certain task. The 
following sub-types of mistakes can be distinguished (Reason, 1987): 
 
•! Skill-based slips: Occur when people work in ‘auto-pilot’, and start relying too much on routine.  
•! Rule-based slips: Occur when rules have been interpreted correctly but accidentally executed in the 
wrong way. 
 
Mistakes are therefore common with tasks that are too complicated or require a lot of training, whereas 
slips tend to be associated with tasks that are (considered as) easier (and therefore boring).  
 
Concluding, it can be stated in general given the backgrounds of possible errors discussed that it seems 
logical to provide a guideline on the most important lesson that can be learned to avoid Rules and working 
methods that are in place should therefore: 
 
a)! Not give active reasons to ignore/violate them; 
b)! Be straight-forward, easy to understand and leave no room for confusion; 
c)! Ensure that they are not too boring to execute and comply with. 
 
Effective ways to ensure that these procedures are indeed followed are the following (Simpson, et al., 2009): 
 
a)! Oversight and active enforcement of safety standards, together with feedback that can assure that 
it indeed is doable to comply with all rules; 
b)! Involvement of different people to critically assess the way jobs are done; 
c)! Post-execution of work checks. 
 
These concepts of errors, and the recommendations on how to ensure compliance with working 
procedures, will be used to make suggestions on how to avoid the types of breaches discussed before. It 
should be noted that human errors should not be solely blamed on the individual making the concrete 
error; it is likely the result of a set of factors; the way in which an organization is set up, how it motivates 
individuals to work (e.g. is there a perceived notion that for example higher production rates comes first) 
and in what way staff, both at the same and at different levels, communicate (Reason, 1987, p. 13). 
Violations may be the result of the wrong incentives, mistakes may for example be the result of inadequate 
training and slips perhaps with bad working conditions, either because they are too boring or actually with 
too much haste. When assessing incident reporting, these factors should therefore also be taken into 
account, when the aim is to make compliance with workplace safety requirements more effective. 
 
7.3.3.!Personal Failure vs Systemic Failure 
In order to successfully deal with human errors, it is important to look beyond the sharp end of failure, i.e. 
blame all mistakes made by operators (only) on operators. In his paper, (Reason, 1990), dealt with this issue 
and suggested the so-called “Swiss-Cheese model”. This theory relies on the assumption that there are three 
elements to any accident, namely hazards, defences and losses. Hazards can form an intrinsic part of an 
operation, and have been listed before. Defences are the technologies, rules and checks available to mitigate 
these hazards. An accident is assumed to only occur when a hazardous event occurs and is subsequently 
not stopped by any of the defences that could be in place, leading to forms of losses. This theory has been 
elaborated further for different sectors (Reason, 2000), and applied and adapted into different industries, 
e.g. (Eurocontrol, 2006). The main goal of this model is to identify factors that can reduce, or actually 
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FIGURE 14: EXAMPLE SWISS-CHEESE MODEL (STRATOG, 2017) 
 
increase, actual risks, taking into account issues such as for example insufficient funds, time pressure on 
employees, failing maintenance and inadequate checks. See Figure 14 for an example of a Swiss-Cheese 
model, with examples of human errors and how they are influenced by decisions at the management level. 
Since it is the latent failures in the organisation of organising such matters properly, rather than individual 
mistakes, are the focus of this report, these notions are taken into account in the recommendations made 
by this report. This is expressed foremost in the Bow-Tie-Reliability models used to identify what activities 
are most problematic, including factors such as the quality of materials used, effectiveness of procedures in 
place or checks executed by more senior staff. The theoretical background of this has been discussed in 
paragraph 7.2.6, and is worked out in Chapter 10. Furthermore, to go deeper into (possible) root causes of 
failures, the Five Whys Technique will be used for the most problematic issues. 
 
7.3.4.!Five Whys Technique 
In an attempt to ensure a more reliable production of cars in Toyota plants and avoid breakdowns, Taiichi 
Ohno developed a technique called the “Five-Whys Technique” (Ohno, 1988). The technique relies on the 
notion that, in order to really deal with a problem, it is necessary to keep asking five times why a certain 
incident occurred, in order to find the root cause of a problem (e.g., why did the blast cause so much 
flyrock? –because too much emulsion was used. Why? – wrong settings on equipment. Why?… etc.). It is 
therefore an effective way to go deeper into the actual causes of problems, rather than to stay on a shallow 
level. Still, it has also been criticized for delivering different results when used by different people, since 
problems can have many different causes and different people may interpret problems differently, and 
therefore sometimes hard to verify (Serrat, 2009). In the context of this report it is deemed to be a useful 
tool to point into the direction of solutions to deal with bigger problems, based on the available internal 
documents, interviews and incident reporting. When the recommendations following this report would be 
worked out in greater detail it is recommended to use the technique also for less problematic issues, and in 
close collaboration with people involved in these problems. 
 
!Recommendations by Regulators and Industry Best Practices 
Apart from the analysis made in this report it is valuable to also take other recommendations into account. 
In addition to the actual legal requirements, more specific guidelines have been issued as annexes to AFS 
2007:1 and in the Guidelines to the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Quarries) Regulations 2008 
(specifically for surface mining and smaller quarrying, some of these recommendations might therefore be 
less relevant). It is not deemed useful to simply list long standards following these documents, since they 
can simply be looked up, but an example is given for both documents. When working out specific safety 
practices it is recommended to take note of these documents, since they have been issued by the regulator. 
Complying with these soft semi-legal standards will therefore certainly help to meet legal requirements.  
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Industrial organisations also set up best practices to work with explosives. These practices are either issued 
by mining industries, but in many cases also by explosives manufacturers or professional organisations. 
Similar to the previous subchapter, another example will be discussed here. The Australian Explosives 
Industry and Safety Group (AEISG) posts its best practices online. The current practices that have been 
posted online relate to the following topics (AEISG, 2016): 
 
•! Storage and Handling of UN3375 (Edition 4, May 2017) 
•! Mobile Processing Units (Edition 3 June 2014) 
•! Blast Guarding in an Open Cut Mining Environment (Edition 1 March 2011) 
•! Elevated Temperature and Reactive Ground (Edition 4 March 2017) 
•! Prevention and Management of Blast Generated NOx Gases in Surface Blasting (Edition 2 August 
2011) 
•! Segregation Barriers for Transporting Mixed Loads of Detonators and High Explosives (Edition 
2 March 2014) 
•! On-Bench Practices for open cut Mines and Quarries (Edition 1 November 2015) 
 
See Appendix IX.D for an example of such best practices and recommendations.  
  
 
!Technology: Explosives Handling 
Explosives handling is a topic where technology may play a smaller role than in the section on blasting. 
There are still some physical/technological issues that do affect explosives safety and are also referred to 
in the studied legal requirements. These issues and their mitigation measures will be discussed below. 
 
7.5.1.!Vehicles Used 
Vehicles used to transport explosive materials can be a potential safety hazards, due to the shocks they can 
cause to explosives in case of collisions, and due to burning exhausts, or even fire or explosions of fuel in 
the case of more sever incidents. For these reasons, the right exhausts are legally required, and each vehicle 
has to be equipped with a fire extinguisher. Slow and safe driving is essential as well. In the longer term, 
electrical vehicles would be helpful as well, given their lack of exhaust sparks and use of explosive fuels. 
 
7.5.2.!Storage Conditions 
Bad climate conditions can affect the performance of explosive materials when they are stored for a longer 
time. Having unreliable explosives can pose a risk in terms of an increased chance of misfires. Emulsion 
storages are therefore maintained and monitored directly by the emulsion supplier. Other explosive 
materials are however not monitored as closely, and this is not a problem as long as the climate in storages 
is as it should be. To ensure that the climate is indeed as it should be, real-time monitoring of the climate 
in storages is therefore recommended. Whereas the surrounding climate in underground mines tends to be 
relatively stable, this can pose a bigger problem in surface storages in land climates. 
 
7.5.3.!Traceability of Explosive Materials 
Following the legal requirement of the implementation of track&trace systems in mining operations, mines 
have increasingly switched to digital track&trace systems, where both packaged, and single units of, 
explosives are scanned in and out from each different phase in the explosives handling process, until it is 
ascertained they have been used at the blast site. The advantage of a digital online system is that it is much 
easier to be verified from for example an office than paper records recorded in the storage, and that updates 
occur real time. Still, reports from Tara is that these systems, and their interoperability with Maximo-
ordering systems still cause problems, with scanning difficulties and incidentally lagging data processing. 
The development of a reliable explosives management system therefore seems essential to one hand 
ascertain knowledge of the whereabouts of any type of explosive material at any time and at the other 
further simplify the explosives handling and easier to be checked. Also, if one wants to assess the 
performance of certain specific explosive materials, especially in the context of misfires, it is important to 
have a system that can effectively automatically trace back a specific misfire to a batch of delivered explosive 
materials.  
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!Technology: Blasting 
In the field of blasting technologies used determine the success of blasting for the largest extent. Both the 
need to reduce risks for misfires, and the risk for unwanted detonation, as well as limiting damage following 
blasting can be met by selecting the right explosive materials for the task.  
 
The explosive performance or the “brisance”, the ability to fragment solid objects. The brisance value Z[ 
is given by a simple formula from the 1920’s: 
 Z[ $ @ . \] . 5 
 
Here, @ is defined as the specific pressure by the gas, \] is the loading density and 5 is the detonation 
velocity. Although not judged to be a reliable measure of bench blasting performance anymore (Persson, 
et al., 1994, p. 122), it gives a good indication of the factors that effectivity of an explosive, namely the 
pressure generated by the gas, the speed and the density of the exploding component of the explosive 
material. All these factors are intrinsic to the explosive material, but may be affected by the environment in 
which it is charged. It could therefore be a consideration in explosive selection in a safety context, it would 
be unnecessarily hazardous to have an explosive that might be more destructive outside a (for example wet) 
blasthole, such as the difficulties of ANFO in functioning properly in difficult mining environments. On 
the other hand, an explosive is selected exactly because it is as destructive as possible per weight, so it seems 
impossible to completely remove the brisance hazard. To sum up, there are a few considerations when 
selecting explosives purely from the safety standpoint: 
 
•! Low sensitivity required; a disadvantage of lower sensitivity can however be an increased risk for 
misfires (Persson, et al., 1994); initiation systems should therefore be reliable enough to guarantee 
detonation. 
•! Reliability in difficult environments; again, risks for misfires increase when the explosive does not 
detonate when required. 
•! Explosive material becomes sensitive to smaller explosions or other impulses as late as possible. 
 
For this reason, the use of emulsions is also well defendable from a safety perspective (Tamrock, 1999). 
Because of this, emulsions, with their low sensitivity, and complete insensitivity before the blast, and 
suitability in difficult environments, have taken away many of the traditional concerns of explosive 
materials. Chapter 9 also shows that nowadays accidents with high explosives detonating by themselves do 
not occur anymore, and this is therefore deemed to be not a safety hazard anymore. Another important 
topic in this regard is the selection of different detonation systems. A more detailed outline of the 
background and characteristics of different initiation systems can be found in Appendix IX.F. Generally, it 
can be assumed that electronic detonation systems have considerable advantages, given the fact that they 
will not detonate except for when a coded detonation pulse is given, and their very limited scatter in delay 
time will make it possible to use less explosives for high fragmentation, leading to less fumes, flyrock and 
vibrations. Also, it is possible to spot misfires prior to a blast by checking the set-up in advance. 
 
!Conclusion 
This chapter set out to outline some of the basic aspects of explosives safety, and the reason why certain 
measures are necessary or certain explosive materials are to be preferred over the other from a safety 
perspective. Also, additional resources for the formulation of safety procedures have been suggested, 
beyond the requirements of “hard law”. These resources are best practices and guidelines issued either by 
governmental authorities, usually as annexes to applicable regulations, or industrial best practices commonly 
issued by the explosives industry. Examples were given of factors that should be considered in the 
minimisation of hazards. Technological opportunities, in terms of explosive performance and detonation 
systems were discussed, to see what techniques could be helpful in mitigating safety hazards. Electronic 
detonation systems have been identified as being helpful in improving safety.   
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8.! Application of Explosives Safety Requirements  
 
The aim of this chapter is, now that we are aware of the legal requirements that have been put on mining 
companies and the actual safety hazards and technological and methodological safety measures that can be 
applied to meet these safety and legal requirements, to see how this actually is carried out by Boliden Mines. 
Explosives safety rules and guidelines are formed in Boliden by several parts of the organisation. These 
rules and guidelines can have various backgrounds, such as legal requirements or practical experience, and 
have been developed both at Boliden Mines central office in Sweden or at the different mine sites. This 
chapter gives an overview of how and why these rules, guidelines and practices are developed, the most 
essential practices and give notable examples of different approaches. It is assessed what the relation of 
these rules, guidelines and practices with legal requirements is made, based on the integral legal requirement 
that follows the findings of chapter 0. 
 
!Working Method 
This chapter is relying on sources that are neither legal sources nor are scientific works, like the previous 
chapters. Instead, information has been obtained from the internal Boliden management systems, contacts 
with staff and actual mine visits. The following sources have been used to obtain the necessary information: 
 
•! Notes from talks and observations of mine visits 
•! Internal Boliden guidelines and other management documents 
•! SOP’s (Standard Operating Procedures) issued to be used on the job 
•! Input delivered via email or phone from people working with either health & safety, management 
or blasting activities 
•! Pictures and videos from actual operations 
 
Notes and interview results made can be found in Appendix IX.H. Excerpts or drawings from important 
documents have been listed in appendices as well. Mines from all three studied countries have been visited, 
in order to obtain input from a different set of mining cultures.  All the notes made have been shared with 
the mines visited, to ensure that the notes made do not misrepresent the actual situation. The following 
four mines have been visited:  
 
•! Kankberg underground gold mine in the Boliden area, Sweden 
•! Aitik surface copper mine in Sweden 
•! Kevitsa surface copper mine in Finland 
•! Tara underground mine in Ireland 
 
Kristineberg, Renström and Maurliden (Boliden area, Sweden), Garpenberg (Sweden) and Kylylahti 
(Finland) have not been been visited. Basic information on these mines has been obtained as well, in order 
to see if there are interesting outliers or different practices, but in general the focus of this research has 
been on the mines that have been visited. These mines account for around 1760 out of 2780 (or 63%) 
employees working for all Boliden Mines (New Boliden, 2017), or more than 90% of Boliden’s ore 
production in Sweden, 85% of Boliden’s ore production in Finland and 100% of Boliden’s ore production 
in Ireland (New Boliden, 2017). For this reason, they have been judged to be the best mines to visit, giving 
a good representation of the company’s workings with explosives and safety practices, and different legal 
and safety cultures. 
 
Since there is a vast quantity of detailed rules on all stages of the process, it would be a very uninteresting 
and not so useful approach to just list all the actual practices next to the discussed requirements. Instead, 
the topic is approached from two angles. First of all, it is considered what the actual way of translating 
legal requirements or safety concerns into actual working applications. Secondly, from stage to stage, the 
most important aspects are mentioned, by means of examples from different operations. These more 
specific examples will always come from the mines that have been visited. Especially when an approach 
differs significantly, this will be discussed, and if possible explained.  
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!Relation between Legal Requirements and Practical Application 
As was established in chapter 5, it is an obligation on the employer in all three countries to prevent any 
harm to employees, regardless of its source. In order to meet this goal, it is therefore required in all three 
jurisdictions to develop safety policies in working areas where hazards have been identified. It is also 
important to realise that there may not be legislation tailored to specific situations, or that in certain fields 
specific legislation may not even be present.  This does not mean that it then is not legally required to have 
internal standards anymore; the duty of care of the employer obliges him to develop internal rules for these 
fields as well. It is therefore best to regard the findings and specific requirements in the previous chapter 
as minimum standards, in some cases requiring additional rules.  
 
On the other hand, it is sometimes possible that specific mines are exempted from certain requirements, 
when they are very impractical or simply not applicable to the given environment. This is however not to 
be assumed easily, and it will be necessary to verify if such exemptions indeed have been explicitly allowed 
by the relevant authorities. In any case, it is important to remember the main objective of zero LTI’s in any 
of Boliden’s operations in 2018  (New Boliden, 2017, p. 8), and when existing legal requirements are 
insufficient to achieve this aim it will be necessary to take further measures. The following paragraphs will 
all be based on existing practices, not on policies that would follow from the law or general safety and 
blasting theory. It will however be judged whether each policy matches with legal requirements. 
 
A quick overview of compliance with the Comprehensive Legal Requirements is made, by comparing 
legislation requirements with the internal rules and practices at all four visited mine sites per section of set 
of rules. The multinational set of legal requirements that can be found in Appendix IX has been used as 
the basis for this comparison. It will be indicated when there is something special to note on the compliance 
with these requirements. See Table 10 for an explanation of the colours used to compare these findings. If 
there are cases of non-compliance these will be discussed in that particular subchapter. If something is 
labelled as “Strict Compliance” this usually relates to national requirements or cultures that put much higher 
requirements on certain operations. 
 
TABLE 10: LEGEND FOR TABLES COMPARING BOLIDEN POLICY AND LEGISLATION 
In accordance 
with 
legislation 
Strict 
Compliance 
Irrelevant Contradicting 
with legal 
requirements 
Improvement 
might be 
Necessary 
Unknown 
      
 
!Approach to Develop Safety Policies  
The translation of legal requirements and safety and risk assessments into working procedures occurs for 
each aspect of the operations in Boliden Mines. Before switching to the content of these procedures an 
overview will be given of these tools, and the way in which they are developed.  
 
8.3.1.!HSE-Rules & General Statements 
Currently, Boliden already has several centrally issued HSE-rules in the field of explosives safety applying 
to several mines. These rules follow, insofar they were based on legal requirements, the requirements of 
Swedish legislation and therefore currently only apply to Swedish mines. These requirements have been 
translated and put in the same structure as used in the legal analysis. It is noteworthy that a large part of 
these internal requirements closely follows legal requirements that have been listed before quite closely. 
The following internal HSE-rules have been studied for this overview: 
 
•! AOG HMS-regel: Explosiva varor, förvaring, transport och hantering (HSE-rules Explosive 
goods, storage, transport and usage), Reg. nr. C00360. 
•! AOG HMS-regel Laddning av borrhål (HSE-rules Charging of drillholes), Reg. nr. C00371. 
•! HMS-regel Ansvarig Mobil tillverkning/Sprängning (HSE-rules: Responsible mobile 
production/blasting), Reg. nr. C00406. 
•! AOG HMS-regel Bergborrning- åtgärder mot påborrning av sprängämne (HSE-rules drilling- 
measures against drilling of blasting materials), Reg. nr. C00411. 
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•! AOG HMS-regel för hantering av emulsionssprängämnen/BAM HMS rule for handling of 
emulsion explosives, Reg. nr. C21286. 
•! AOG- HMS REGEL. Rutin för repartion och service på laddfordon (HSE-rules. Routines for 
reparation and service of charging vehicles), Reg. nr. C6898. 
 
In Finland, the safety department is responsible for drawing up the main guidelines, in collaboration with 
people in the field. It is important to remember that in this case Orica is responsible for the blasting works; 
since Orica has their own safety standards based on worldwide operations, these are the main working 
documents for charging activities in Kevitsa. Orica does not have its own safety officer on site, but 
Hartikainen, another contractor with much more staff on site actually has its own safety officer.  
Problematically for this report, these documents are usually developed in Finnish. At Tara mine, 
“Statements” serve as more general guidelines. They are drafted by a safety officer, reviewed by the safety 
manager, and then signed by the general manager. The development of such statements is a legal 
requirement under the Mines and Quarries Act 1965. 
 
8.3.2.!Operational Management System & Standard Operating Procedures 
An online Centuri-system is used to manage all documents and data on rules, procedures, risk assessments 
and other safety issues by all mines. In the case of Sweden this is a centralised system, Finland and Ireland 
have separate systems. In a vast majority, these documents are written in the native language of the country 
where the mine is operated, since most documents are directed to people in the field as well. Nevertheless, 
documents are increasingly translated into English as well, but are still kept separate, which makes it 
necessary to always develop new procedures for each mine, especially these located outside of Sweden, 
even when this might not be necessary. The Centuri-system is accessible to all staff. 
 
More detailed operating procedures in Finland, follow from Orica’s practices as well. It is common here as 
well to include people with different viewpoints (e.g. safety officers, operators, engineers) in the drafting of 
these procedures. Blasting plans are however continuously developed, and in case of problems (for example 
misfires) Boliden engineers together with Orica chargers try to improve the operations. In Tara, more 
detailed SOP's and safety guidelines are being used. These always include a scope, purpose and definition 
included in the document. These documents are to be usable in the field by miners. Sometimes particular 
practices and requirements are imported from Sweden.  
 
8.3.3.!Incident Reporting 
An important part of safety management is the reporting of deviations of procedure and investigations into 
incidents, being understood as accidents leading to some form of material damage or personal injury, or 
near-misses of such accidents. Mine safety requirements also explicitly require the reporting of incidents 
leading to LTI’s and lethal injuries, and incident reporting systems should therefore be implemented. The 
way this is done differs significantly between Sweden and the other two countries; in Sweden incident 
reports are gathered centrally to Boliden’s office, whereas in Ireland and Finland these systems are separate. 
Although serious incidents are always reported, company-wide practices in which minor deviations are 
reported are also very different. This makes it hard to compare safety statistics, although an attempt has 
been made in Chapter 9.  
 
8.3.4.!Improvement/Checks on Practices and Operations 
Central Boliden safety policies are sometimes audited by external parties, and the proximity of Kankberg 
to Boliden also makes it relatively easy to stay in close touch. In general, the Swedish mines appear to 
exchange a lot of information and practices. Internally, checks are carried out by shift bosses and 
superintendents. In Kevitsa, Orica has a great level of independence, and there are no structural checks of 
operations by Boliden staff; still, Orica is for example included in the same safety reporting standards, and 
also discusses operational issues regularly with Boliden staff.  Tara does not externally review their policies, 
and all development is done separately from Sweden. This does not mean that knowledge and experience 
from Sweden are not used. Shift bosses visit at least once per shift to see if everything is going well. In 
some cases, the heads of section, who stand above shift bosses in the hierarchy may go down as well for 
inspections. 
 
 62 
!Responsible Persons 
The first issue that is interesting to discuss is how responsibilities, that should be assigned for specific tasks 
according to the various legislative requirements, have been assigned in practice. Given the large differences 
in scale between the various mines, this may be a field that is hard to compare. The objective is to find out 
if it is possible to distinguish some pattern in the assignment of responsibilities, and whether there are 
certain advantages or disadvantages to for example the use of contractors, or whether different 
responsibilities should be distributed among different people or assigned to one person only. Table 26 
shows that no breaches of legal requirements have been found in relation to this topic. 
 
TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE RESPONSIBLE PERSONS 
Part Kankberg Aitik Tara Kevitsa 
1A     
1B     
 
8.4.1.!Training & Licensing 
In Sweden, there appears to be a big difference between Kankberg and Aitik, presumably based on their 
size. For example, chargers in Kankberg also do some other tasks in the mine, and do not have a blasting 
license. In Aitik however, there is a standard crew of three people per shift just carrying out charging works, 
and all of these three have a blasting license. 
 
In Kevitsa, the responsibility for obtaining licenses lies completely with Orica. Boliden does not check 
background requirements and similar issues for the chargers of Orica. During the visit, two summer 
workers were trained; during the summer, the crew will not consist of all-qualified staff, but these summer 
workers will never work independently. The mine superintendent does however have a blasting license as 
well. 
 
In Tara, the chargers do not need to have a license themselves; it is the shift bosses that regularly check the 
works and have the necessary blasting license. Importantly, both contractors (doing part of the 
development works) and the internal shift bosses have their own Blasting Foremans and are responsible 
for their own works. 
 
8.4.2.!Responsibilities for Different Tasks 
The biggest differences between the practices at the different mines are arguably the division of 
responsibilities; as can be seen in Table 12, there is no mine the same when it comes to who does what. 
However, it turns out that there is some noteworthy overlap, primarily based on the distinction between 
surface mines (Aitik and Kevitsa) and underground mines (Kankberg and Tara), and on the size of the 
mines.  Some interesting features: 
 
•! The Blasting Foremans are shiftbosses underground, in Kevitsa this is the Mine Superintendent 
and in Aitik this is one of the chargers. This could be because charging activities in Kevitsa are 
carried out by a contractor, there is therefore no “lower” staff of Boliden working with charging. 
•! Planning is carried out primarily outside the mine site in Kankberg; this presumably has to do with 
the small size of this mine. 
•! In Sweden, the bulk of safety procedures is managed centrally; outside Sweden this is done by the 
mines themselves. 
•! The supply and storage of emulsion is always the responsibility of the contractor; in Sweden this 
is Forcit, outside Sweden this is Orica. However, in the underground mines this responsibility stops 
at the end of storage, whereas in surface mines the supplier also loads the hole. It is suggested that 
this has to do with the practicality of just driving a truck into the surface mine from the storage of 
manufacturing next to the site, whereas with underground mines there has to be a transfer of 
vehicles anyway. 
•! Storage is always carried out by Boliden staff themselves, unless the charging is carried out by a 
contractor (Kevitsa). 
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•! Importantly, training on how to use emulsion trucks is always carried out by the supplier. This is 
in fact a legal requirement. 
8.4.3.!Contractors 
The role of contractors varies significantly; in Kankberg their role is limited to supply and the necessary 
trainings that follow this, whereas in Kevitsa all explosives handling and blasting works are carried out by 
a contractor. It does not seem the case that actual safety practices differ significantly based on whether a 
contractor is responsible or not. The most important notion to take away, is that in all cases where 
contractors carry out more than just emulsion loading they have their own Blasting Foreman.  
 
TABLE 12: RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNMENT VISITED MINES 
Task Aitik Kankberg Kevitsa Tara 
Blasting 
Foreman 
Chargers Shift Boss Mine 
Superintendent 
Shiftboss 
Development 
Drilling plan 
Mine planning 
department on 
site 
Drill & blast 
engineer 
Bolidenområdet 
Mine 
Planning/Blasting 
Engineer 
Mine Planning 
Development 
blasting plan 
Blasting engineer 
on site 
Drill&blast 
Bolidenområdet 
Blasting Engineer Blast Engineer 
Development 
Safety 
Procedures 
Boliden Central 
Office & 
Indenpendently 
Boliden Central 
Office 
Health & Safety, 
Operational 
Health & Safety 
Officers 
Storage 
Emulsion 
Contractor 
(Forcit) 
Contractor 
(Forcit) 
Contractor (Orica) Contractor (Orica) 
Storage, 
explosive 
materials 
Boliden Boliden Contractors (also 
for special blasting) 
Boliden 
Priming-
Development 
Chargers Charger Contractor (Orica) Boliden & Contractor 
Charging-
Development 
Contractor Charger Contractor (Orica) Boliden & Contractor 
Priming-
Production 
Chargers Charger Contractor (Orica) Boliden 
Charging-
Production 
Contractor Charger Contractor (Orica) Boliden 
Training 
emulsion 
charging 
Contractor Contractor - Contractor (Orica) 
Stemming Contractor - Contractor (Orica) - 
 
8.4.4.!Governmental Oversight 
In Finland, the Mine inspector comes from Toukes, the national chemicals safety body. He also inspects 
the storage. The safety department is responsible to prepare these visits. In Tara, oversight from the 
government is done by the Mines Inspector, following the Mines and Quarries Act 1965. He visits twice a 
year and does a thorough check, including visits into the actual mine. On top of this, inspection of the 
explosives handling is carried out by the Department of Justice once a year. This makes the governmental 
requirements stricter than in Sweden and Finland, specifically in regards of security issues. This seems to 
fit the picture of generally much stricter legal requirements related to explosives handling and storage, this 
may have to do with the long history of terrorism on the Irish island. There seems however little sense in 
comparing this closely, since governmental oversight is the responsibility of the government and not of 
Boliden. 
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!Explosive Standards 
Explosive standards are for a large part based on EC Directives 2008/43 and 2014/28, and should therefore 
be relatively easy to compare. Still, it turned out that many practices on tracking & tracing them are different. 
Also, different mining techniques make that the quantities and types of explosives used differ. 
 
Explosives standards may be the stage in the explosives handling part that could least be checked, since it 
is the responsibility of manufacturers, and not of mines, to ensure that explosive materials meet the 
necessary safety requirements. The responsibility of Boliden in this regard is to ensure that there is no 
reason to doubt whether this is actually the case, but no detailed study has been taken in this regard for the 
purpose of this report. As far as could be judged on a quick look there are no problems in this regard, but 
since this has not been assessed closely for all mines compliance is marked as unknown.  
 
In regards of track & trace systems and requirements specifically following mining regulations a closer 
assessment could be made. Tara, Aitik and Kankberg have implemented digital scanning systems, which 
allow for explosives to be traced real-time. Kevitsa still maintains bookkeeping by hand, although this will 
be replaced in the foreseeable future.  
 
TABLE 13: COMPLIANCE RESPONSIBLE PERSONS 
Section Kankberg Aitik Tara Kevitsa 
2 §1-5; §11-13     
2- §6-10      
2- §14-22     
 
The implementation of track & trace systems is a relatively new development; although the law already 
provided for the need to register stockpiles of explosive materials exactly, it is now expected to have a much 
more real-time idea of what explosive material, both as total packages as an individual item is where. This 
means that all items need to be easily scannable. Tara and the Swedish mines have also already implemented 
systems to scan all separate items. 
 
Tara mine seems to be the most advanced mine in this regard, in the sense that the “Scheme of Transit” 
has implemented detailed requirements in this regard, from ordering, to delivery at the face. Still, difficulties 
with the explosives ordering and track & trace system implemented have led to rejection of this system and 
a return to previously used systems. Even this current system does not seem to work perfectly however, 
with errors during scanning, presumably due to bad server connections or other issues internal to the 
program.   
 
As can be seen, Kevitsa has been marked as in need of improvement. It is not the case that violations of 
legal requirements could be noticed, but Kevitsa is planning a new storage, among other reasons for the 
purpose of implementing a digital track & trace system. Kevitsa is therefore an interesting mine to keep an 
eye on in regards of further developments in this regard.  
 
8.5.1.!Materials Features 
Issues related to specific mining issues, such as the delay times that should be visible on detonators, the 
requirement to keep explosive materials in their cases as long as possible, and the materials used to open 
these cases were all followed closely. Even when more people work at the same time on a bench/face, still 
each product is unpacked box by box.  
 
Selection of explosive materials relies on a combination of economic considerations, their reliability and 
safety aspects. No clear ranking in these priorities was given when asked. 
 
Performance of explosive materials is monitored; when in Aitik the number of misfires increased 
significantly during 2016, it was found that this was to blame on the detonators, that apparently did not 
perform optimally in the conditions in Aitik. As a consequence of this, different detonators are in use 
nowadays, and this has indeed led to a significant drop in the number of misfires.  
 
 65 
 
!Storage 
Storage is presumably the stage on which most regulations exist, still, most of these regulations do not 
affect daily workings at the mine, since they deal with the selection of the location of the storage and the 
standards on construction. As can be seen, the fairly straightforward storage rules were deemed to be 
applied consistently with the law; Ireland has been marked as much stricter, this has to do with the fact that 
the entire distinction between magazine and reserve station, and specific tasks of the powdermen, makes 
the practice in Tara relatively complicated, as seen in Table 14. 
 
TABLE 14: COMPLIANCE STORAGE 
Part Kankberg Aitik Tara Kevitsa 
3     
 
When selecting the right location for the storage it is important to minimize possible interference with other 
activities in the mine; storages tend to be located at more remote locations therefore. Figure 15 displays the 
location of storages in Tara. As can be seen, the Explosive & Detonator Magazines are located far from 
the main operations. The Reserve station is in the same area, but closer to the main road. The location of 
emulsion storages in Tara are located much closer to the main roads, this makes sense since the need to 
regularly drive in large trucks for refilling and out for charging makes it more convenient to be located 
closely to the haulage road. This does not pose a hazard, since while stored, the emulsions are still not 
mixed. In Kankberg, the emulsion storage was closer to the explosives storage. In Aitik, emulsions are 
brought in directly into the mine from their manufacturing site in the Aitik business area, explosive materials 
are stored closer to the mine but also far from office buildings. In Kevitsa emulsions are stored near the 
restrooms of Orica, whereas explosive materials are located on a remote fenced off site. 
 
It was found that the security measures at the Tara magazine are very thorough compared to the other 
mines visited; only the powdermen have access to the magazine, and are only allowed in with permission 
from an external security officer located in Dublin, who confirms the identity of the powderman with a 
password. The entire area is also under constant camera supervision. The reserve station, storing a load of 
up to two days of explosive materials, seems more comparable with the Nordic storages. To this place not 
only the powdermen, but also the shotfirers can have access, and no external permission at the time of 
entrance is required. The general reserve station and the separate explosives and detonator stores all have 
their own locks. It is allowed everywhere to keep the main entrance open when people are there.  
Appendix 7 Tara Mines Underground Explosive & Detonator Magazine Locations 
eOOO -^"-':« TOO- S000-:-^«' 9000=:^« 10000^"": 
Title Doc. No. Rev. No. Page No. 
Managers Scheme of Transit T1505 7 28 (30) 
The electionic version of this document is the latest version. It is the responsibility of the individual to ensure that any paper material is 
the cun-ent version. Printed material is uncontrolled documentation 
FIGURE 15: OVERVIEW OF STORAGE LOCATIONS IN TARA 
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Some impressions of storages can be seen below, see Figure 16. The conditions of storage vary between 
the different mines; the underground mines use unused headings (Tara) or newly excavated spaces 
(Kankberg), in regular steel containers in a remote area (Kevitsa) or in a specifically constructed storage 
(Aitik). At the entrance of the storage the appropriate signs should be visible, including the conditions of 
the permit and a copy of the permit itself, which is standard practice and legal requirement in all countries. 
In one case, there was an outdated permit still in place. 
 
Stockpiles are checked each month in Kevitsa, on top of the regular bookkeeping, to see if the bookkeeping 
is still correct. Boliden gets an update on the materials used each two weeks via the invoices issued by Orica, 
this is the main way in which they are aware of the stockpiles. On the storage site, another small contractor 
also has their own containers, with separate locks, for the materials needed for the special blasting tasks 
they are responsible for. At Tara, explosive materials are prepared by the powdermen, and not like in the 
Nordic mines, gathered by the chargers themselves. For each phase, a separate set of explosives is 
assembled, based on the blasting plan issued by the blasting engineer. These are then delivered to the blast 
site. This assembling is carried out in the reserve station. Shotfirers can also sometimes pick up the sets 
from the reserve station. 
 
In any case, when comparing the different explosives handling and blasting practices it is clear there is no 
other area where practices differ so much between countries as with the storage of explosives, where Ireland 
clearly has put much higher requirements on the storage standards. 
  
  
FIGURE 16: IMPRESSIONS FROM, CLOCKWISE FROM TOP LEFT; WATER BUFFERS IN THE 
MAGAZINE BETWEEN STORAGE SECTIONS IN TARA, PERMITS AND INSTRUCTION MANUALS IN 
KANKBERG, EMULSION STORAGE IN KANKBERG AND ORDERLY PRIMER STORAGE PRIOR TO 
CHECKOUT IN KANKBERG 
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!Transportation 
Transportation is a relatively small topic when it comes to explosives handling; legal requirements primarily 
relate to how vehicles should be equipped, and the need to transport explosive materials separately. It has 
not been researched to what extent requirements for transport on public roads have been met. Since there 
is no need for a comprehensive scheme of transit in other operations than these in Ireland, this requirement 
has been labelled as irrelevant for the other mines. The scheme of transit also regulates other activities in 
the explosives handling cycle, but it is discussed only here. Table 15 indicates that Tara is again somewhat 
distinct from the Nordics in its application of the standards following the CLR. 
 
TABLE 15: COMPLIANCE TRANSPORTATION 
Part Kankberg Aitik Tara Kevitsa 
4, §1     
4, §2     
4, §4-6     
 
 
Some of the cars used to transport explosive materials can be seen in Figure 17. Emulsions are brought to 
the site in special trucks, that also have the equipment to mix the blasting agents right before the loading. 
In all cases they are equipped with the necessary signs, lights and fire extinguisher. In the case of Kankberg, 
other explosive materials are also carried on this vehicle; this does not pose a safety risk however, since 
during the transport the agents are still not mixed and therefore not explosive. Cars used to transport more 
sensitive explosive materials have separate compartments, as can be seen on the picture the necessary flag 
in surface mines, and always carry fire extinguishers, signs and lights. No special driver’s licenses are 
necessary, except for the license that all mines issue to people that have proven they can drive safely in the 
mine.  
 
Distinct from the other mines, explosive materials in Tara are almost always exclusively moved by the 
powdermen, before they issue them at the blast site to the chargers. When delivered at surface, transports 
are still guarded by police in Ireland, and they only leave when it is confirmed that the explosive materials 
have been moved into the mine. All transports from surface into the mine, and transports between 
magazine and reserve station are also carried out by the powdermen. The “powderman” is a phenomenon 
not known in the Nordic mines, where all explosives can be obtained and moved from storage by the 
chargers. This entire practice is regulated in the extensive scheme of transit.  
 
This also means more scanning moments in Ireland compared to operations in other countries, where 
explosives are “checked in” when delivered to the storage, and “checked out” when ready for transport to 
the blast site. In Tara, on top of this there is also the move from magazine to reserve station, and the official 
issue of the explosives to the Blasting Foreman at the blast site. 
FIGURE 17: EXPLOSIVES CAR (AITIK) AND CHARGING EQUIPMENT (KEVITSA) 
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!Charging 
Charging is arguably the topic that involves most detailed procedures for miners in the blasting cycle, since 
this is the stage that determines the quality of the blast and involves the most people working at the blast 
site. For this reason, all mines have developed an extensive set of SOP’s, based for a large part on legal 
requirements. Various interesting cases are discussed here. To start with, there are several issues in applying 
the legal requirements where mining operations seem to have different standard compared to some of the 
legal requirements that appear to be more connected to civil engineering practices. Table 16 shows that 
there are some more problematic issues surrounding the multi-country wide implementation of legal 
requirements. 
TABLE 16: COMPLIANCE CHARGING 
Part Kankberg Aitik Tara Kevitsa 
5A     
5B     
5C     
5D     
5E     
5F     
 
Issues related to 5A deal with the development of the blasting plan. This has been singled out since the 
actual practice in surface mines seems to contradict the legal requirement that the Blasting Foreman has to 
at least co-develop the blasting plan; in all mines, the blasting plan is developed by blasting engineers or 
even mine planners, who are not the Blasting Foreman. Then, the Blasting Foreman in the field usually 
simply applies a standardised practice, and in the case of Kankberg, Kevitsa and Tara the Blasting Foreman 
is the supervisor or superintendent, in other words someone who does not make the blast design, nor does 
the charging work himself. This regulation is therefore one that seems more applicable to smaller scale civil 
engineering operations. In mining operations, most of the blasting work is standardised, and is a repetitive 
process. This does not mean that the Blasting Foreman is not involved at all in, if necessary, changing the 
blasting plan; in Aitik it even can happen that the chargers suggest small adaptions when charging in the 
field. By these opportunities to influence standardised plans it seems that the regulatory requirements are 
being met. 
 
Part 5C is marked as “irrelevant”, not because the regulations on the working environment during charging 
do not apply, but because there are two issues to note in this regard that make three of the regulations less 
applicable. The first regulation, to ensure proper lighting, is applicable, and is carried out by lights on 
equipment in underground mines and by lighting towers in the surface mines. The indication of shelters 
(§2) appears to be more related to civil engineering, in mining simply the entire pit or underground mine is 
evacuated for a blast. In regards of §3, electrical detonators are not usually used, only for special blasting. 
§4 demands that a charged area is kept under constant surveillance; in surface mines, it is common that a 
field is kept charged for a few days before it is blast, and there is no constant surveillance of these fields. 
This is not necessary since only authorised people can come into the mining area (the entire mine is fenced 
off). Still, charged areas are marked, warnings signs placed, and if close to haulage roads even a berm can 
be used to stop vehicles from driving through the field. 
 
Another legal requirement, mentioned in Part 5E, that does not seem to be met is that no drilling is to take 
place within close range of charging activities; in these surface mines, it is however common that the drilling 
jumbo operates right next to each other, in different fields. If during charging it turns out that a hole is not 
charged well, the drilling jumbo can come in to charge the hole. This however always happens under 
supervision of the chargers, and can therefore be considered to be safe. Aitik has singled out, since they 
have obtained an exception from the mining authority to drill close to previously drilled holes from the 
bench that has just been blasted 
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8.8.1.!Charging Procedures 
Implementation of requirements on charging have been elaborated on in great detail by all three mine sites, 
in the form of rules and SOP’s for chargers.  shows a (Swedish) flow-chart for the work flow of a charging 
process, from the moment of a drillhole being ready for charging until the moment when the round of 
charged holes is deemed ready for loading and hauling after the blast. In the spreadsheet document where 
this chart is from, per stage in the chart guidelines were connected, outlining more specific safety regulations 
per stage. Examples of these guidelines are the AOG-HMS rules that were discussed previously. Several 
stages are ended with a check, where in case things are not ok contact has to be made with either 
management or the maintenance shop. SOP’s also show drawings of for example how to tie initiation wires, 
or manuals on how to use certain pieces of equipment. Before such SOP’s have been drawn up, risk 
assessments have been undertaken for the procedure (as legally required), and these documents are 
continuously updated if necessary. 
 
8.8.2.!Charging Equipment 
As legally requirement, trainings and documents on the usage of charging equipment is supplied by 
explosives suppliers in all cases.  Some hazards associated with the charging process that are not specified 
in the various safety regulations are also covered in internal guidelines. The fitting of drillholes with cart 
board in Kevitsa is an example of this (Figure 22). Chargers in Aitik use colour to mark if there are issues 
with blastholes, and when they are finished. In underground mines the lowest holes in a face are blocked 
to prevent inflow of dirt. All of these tasks are related to ensuring clean blastholes, which is legally required 
to ensure and minimizes the chance of misfires. 
 
As an example of guidelines that do not follow from direct legal requirements nor from internal experience, 
this example of charging equipment issues is given; although the risks associated do not occur frequently, 
manufacturers tend to have more experience in this field, since they usually work in many mines around 
the world. In relation to charging equipment, many safety hazards exist. It is a noteworthy legal requirement 
that manufacturers provide trainings for these pieces of equipment, examples can be seen in Figure 21 and 
Figure 18. It turns out that the biggest hazard of ammonium nitrate emulsions is not detonation, but rather 
health effects. This sheet from a safety training by Orica has therefore been included, as a typical example 
of such a training. Apart from health issues, there still is a very small risk for explosions, when charging 
pumps and hoses are not clean; if this happens the system can get blocked, and as a consequence of this a 
so-called “hot-spot” can develop, which continues heating up the system, with theoretically very dangerous 
results. Therefore, detailed cleaning and maintenance requirements are being issued, even though they have 
little underlying requirements in mining explosives legislation. 
 
 
FIGURE 19: SAMPLE BLASTING FLOWCHART 
FIGURE 18: EXAMPLE FROM ORICA TRAINING FOR CHARGERS 
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FIGURE 22: CARTBOARD 
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!Blasting 
Blasting procedure is a particularly interesting topic, since it determines the rhythm and shifts at the mine, 
and thereby influences everyone, not only people who directly work with explosives. A big difference in 
blasting practices in this regard is that Kankberg blasts daily and Tara twice daily, whereas the surface mines 
blast around two times per week. This has of course implications for the size of the blast and the time a 
charged face or bench is not blasted. 
 
In relation to blasting procedure Kevitsa has been singled out in Table 17, since their charging work is 
carried out by a contractor, but the responsible Blasting Foreman is from Boliden. This makes that the 
literal requirement that blasting can only be carried out if the holes have been charged by the Blasting 
Foreman himself or someone under his supervision somewhat difficult, since there is no close supervision 
of the charging by Orica. Instead Orica does the check of the charged works themselves, and then hand 
over responsibility to the Blasting Foreman. His responsibilities in this case are thereby limited to ensuring 
that the entire area is evacuated properly, and if necessary, precautions have been taken. No assessment of 
special blasting practices has been done. 
TABLE 17: COMPLIANCE BLASTING 
Part Kankberg Aitik Tara Kevitsa 
6A     
6B     
6C     
 
8.9.1.!Underground Blasting 
An interesting aspect of blasting planning is that it has been standardised for regular development 
operations. Figure 23 shows an example from Kankberg. This plan is included in the SOP, and can thereby 
be used by chargers when charging holes. The numbers in the plan indicate the delay time, and are therefore 
crucial to be followed closely to ensure successful blasting. During blasting, only the Blasting Foreman, in 
Tara accompanied by the shift bosses from both Boliden and contractor, and if necessary someone from 
Orica to program electronic detonation are present in the mine. 
 
FIGURE 23: BLASTING PLAN FOR KANKBERG RAMPS 
8.9.2.!Surface Blasting Issues 
The most important issue during blasting is the evacuation. For underground mines this means evacuation 
of the entire mine, for surface mine a distinction is made between three danger zones; one for heavy 
equipment (300m), one for the other equipment (600m) and one for people (1200m), the distances in 
Kevitsa and Aitik are similar. An example of an evacuation plan for a blast in Aitik can be seen in Appendix 
IX.H. The small circles indicate places that need to be guarded. It should further be noted that surface 
blasts are always planned such that they would not hinder each other, they will therefore usually be located 
on different sites in the mine. An alternative to removing equipment or infrastructure is by providing cover; 
it is currently common in Kevitsa to cover power cables close to the mine with contour blasting, and in a 
rare case an excavator has even been protected by letting two haulage trucks protect it by facing their bucket 
upwards to shield it from incoming flyrock. 
BOLIDEN HMS-REGEL / EHS RULE 
4(10) 
Utfardare 
Joakim Dernstedt 
Titel 
G I N SOP Laddning 
Godkand av 
Urban Karlsson 
Giltigt fran: 
2016-05-01 
Utgava 
6 
Reg.nr 
C23625 
3 Tandplaner 
Tandplan ramp 
Tandplanen ar tillampbar pa grundborrplan för lokala ramper som ar plana eller svagt uppatgaende. 
 72 
! Post-Blasting 
Post-blasting is a relatively straight-forward topic, since the legal requirements in this regard primarily relate 
to several inspections to ensure the area is safe to re-enter. Other requirements relate to subsequent scaling 
and the disposal of explosive waste, all of which seem to be aligned with closely in practice. As can be seen 
in Table 18, there were no practices deemed to need further elaboration. Table 18 shows that no 
unconformities have been discovered for this topic. 
TABLE 18: COMPLIANCE POST-BLASTING 
Part Kankberg Aitik Tara Kevitsa 
7A     
7B     
7C     
Verifying that air quality standards are sufficient form the first part of checks after the blast, only after this 
the other checks are carried out. Misfire checks then follow, and are then completed by an assessment of 
the quality of the rock, to see if additional scaling by means of special blasting or other means are necessary. 
All mines have materials available to do both smaller special blasting or use mechanical tools to fracture 
smaller rocks.  
 
8.10.1.! Misfires 
Since misfires are arguably the largest hazards in relation to explosives handling and blasting, and each mine 
therefore has procedures in place regarding misfire checks. An example of a misfire report template is given 
in Appendix IX.K. Operators of loading and drilling equipment are all trained to spot misfires, at least once 
every two years. In Kevitsa these trainings are provided by Orica. If misfires are found, they are always 
brought back to storage, where they can be kept for a short while, after which they are usually destroyed in 
another blast. Only the Blasting Foreman is allowed to handle misfires; for this reason, if no Blasting 
Foreman is present works around the site cannot continue. In any case it appears that these technical checks 
are fairly similar in all mines. Other material used for explosive handling or blasting has to be destroyed 
when it is not used anymore according to procedure; Figure 24 shows the packaging of explosives being 
burnt at the end of a shift. 
 
FIGURE 24: BURNING OF EXPLOSIVES PACKAGING IN AITIK 
! Conclusion 
It can be concluded that there do not appear to be any breaches of the various legal requirements at the 
researched Boliden mines, except these based on different storage requirements; still, there are some 
deviations in some cases, when the regulations issued appear to be more concerned about for example 
populated areas, or other issues that are not relevant to mining operations. When it comes to most working 
practices they appear to be fairly similar, especially when their background is in the best practices of for 
example explosives suppliers. Working practices, especially these related to charging and blasting, are always 
worked out in great detail, and all people that were interviewed were well aware of them and their 
requirements. The main difference, as could be expected after the previous legal findings, lie in the 
consequences of the strict Irish regulations on storage and transport of explosive materials. The most 
concerning issue is probably that Boliden mines outside Sweden are not included in the operational 
management system, which makes it much harder to exchange relevant experience and standards.   
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9.! Complications and Incidents 
 
In this chapter, a study is made of typical complications and incidents that have occurred in the field of 
explosives and blasting safety. This is done in order to get a picture of typical workplace hazards associated 
with the working with explosives. Also, the practice of reporting incidents is an important aspect of effective 
workplace safety management; following the duty of care that has been imposed on the employer, both in 
general workplace safety legislation and on more specific issues, it is important to be aware of the fields of 
work that give cause to concern. If it is known what the fields of concern and its root causes are, steps can 
be taken to improve the safety performance of the mining performance and thereby the meeting of essential 
safety requirements.  
 
Sources used for this chapter have three different backgrounds; statistical data provided by Boliden, making 
it possible to quantify the different types of incidents occurring; input from interviews undertaken at 
Boliden Mines and it central office on accidents causing concern (notes on these field trips can be found in 
the appendix); and finally, statistical data and analysis from mining operations in Australia and the United 
States. The aim is to at the end of this chapter have a good picture of the fields that deserve extra attention 
and the type of measures that would be necessary to take following suspected causes of failure, with a focus 
on underground mining operations. 
 
!Approach 
Assessing safety risks and trying to draw useful lessons from this is quite a challenge, given that actual 
accidents leading to physical injuries have not occurred in Boliden Mines during the past 10 years. The 
approach in this chapter will therefore be to also look outside Boliden operations, in order to have a larger 
set of available data to see what issues deserve particular attention. After a discussion of general statistical 
trends in explosives handling and blasting safety, serious incidents that actually have occurred will be 
discussed, in order to find out what the central blasting hazards appear to be. Since the ultimate purpose 
of this chapter is to find out what the backgrounds of possible failures are, most attention will be paid to 
understanding the (suspected) causes of these failures. Fault tree analysis will be used to see what 
components of the explosives and blasting process are critical, and incident reports will be studied to 
discussed to see how often certain (possible) incident causes occur in underground mines. Incident causes 
will be categorised in three categories, namely material, procedural and external causes, in order to see what 
measures could best be taken to improve safety and meet both specific and general legal requirements. 
 
Data have been assembled regarding incidents related to explosives and blasting safety in all Boliden mines. 
The total number of incidents per year has been listed below. As can be seen, a distinction is made between 
"red", "yellow" and "green" incidents, with red incidents being incidents that have caused physical injuries 
or material damage, or could have caused such harm and/or damage (thereby including near-misses), yellow 
incidents are incidents that have been judged to be hazardous in general without a direct threat, and green 
incidents are breaches of procedure that do not pose a direct threat. See Figure 25 for an overview of the 
development of reported incidents. 
FIGURE 25: DEVELOPMENT OF REPORTED INCIDENTS PER YEAR 
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9.1.1.!Development of Trends Blasting Incidents  
As could be seen in Figure 25, it almost seems as if the safety situation related to explosives and blasting 
safety at Boliden Mines is severely deteriorating; the sharp increase of “green” incidents and to a lesser 
extent of “yellow” incidents has however been the consequence of a new campaign to make people aware 
of the need to report any type of incident, even these that pose no direct threat whatsoever or are not even 
near-misses. The reporting of “yellow” and “green” incidents is not developed in a similar manner outside 
Sweden. Only the more serious (red incident) data can be compared with cases in Ireland and with external 
data, since these are all related to actual accidents, and not just to small deviations. 
 
Therefore, the only way to get a credible indicator of the actual safety situation is to compare only “red” 
incidents. As can be seen in Figure 26: Trend Development Severe Incidents, there is a clear downward 
trend when it comes to the more severe incidents, with on average more than 3 reported incidents less per 
year over a period of 4 years, which leads to the current number of serious incidents between 4 and 7 cases 
per year since 2013. It therefore appears, given that in the meantime production has increased, that the 
overall explosives handling and blasting safety situation in Swedish Boliden Mines has improved. 
 
Comparing these data with external data overall the period between 1978 and 2016 in metal mines across 
the United States shows that a similar trend can be distinguished there (see Figure 27); when looking at the 
period since 2006, almost no severe incidents have occurred, whereas previously a significant amount of 
injuries was reported. Also, relative to other types of severe mine incidents, the average number of incidents 
decreases (as can be seen in the graph, as a percentage of all underground and surface metal and industrial 
mineral mining incidents). It should be remembered that “red” incidents at Boliden are still much less 
severe; the data for the US only included incidents that had to be reported to the health authorities, given 
that they involved severe injuries and, given the nature of blasting operations, casualties.  
FIGURE 27: REPORTED EXPLOSIVES HANDLING AND BLASTING INJURIES IN THE US 
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FIGURE 26: TREND DEVELOPMENT SEVERE INCIDENTS 
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!Severe Incidents 
In order to find out what types of accidents should deserve special attention on top of the minimum legal 
requirements in terms of material selection and procedural development, it would be interesting to know 
what types of sever incidents have occurred in Boliden Mines and elsewhere.  
  
9.2.1.!Sever Incidents at Boliden 
Incidents leading to fatalities or injuries requiring medical treatment have not occurred in the pas 7 years as 
a consequence of blasting activities in Boliden mines (except for minor injuries due to slips, knife-cutting 
and falls, but these are not part of the scope of this research). However, there have been several more 
serious accidents and near-misses, the most notable of which are discussed below. Figure 28 shows a 
breakdown of the relative amount of serious (or red) incidents at all underground Boliden mines. 
 
A.! Garpenberg Mine 
During a training exercise for blasters in Garpenberg on surface, the reach of flyrock was underestimated. 
As a consequence of this, debris reached as far as the parking lot. Although no one was injured and no 
severe material damage occurred the consequences might have been much more severe indeed. Given that 
this was a non-regular blasting operation it once again highlights the risk of non-regular operations. 
 
B.! Tara Mine 
Although not a typical health and safety issue, issues with the track & trace system have been a source of 
concern for Tara Mine. Failing IT-systems make it impossible to deliver explosives to the right sites. Given 
that improvements failed to deliver, the powdermen even went on strike, leading to a two-day shut-down 
of the mine. In an accident in Lisheen Mine, a mine similar to Tara in Ireland, a miner’s hand was blown 
of as the consequence of static charging, by a copper wire being rolled off during charging works with one 
hand, while the detonator was held in the other. Although the accident occurred at a different mine, this 
has led to the use of different detonators, needing a higher current for detonation in Tara as well.  
 
C.! Kevitsa Mine 
Given that Kevitsa is a relatively new operation, where a lot of contractors operate, including Orica as 
blasting contractor, one could expect more severe incident. The most notable incident that occurred, when 
the mine was still operated by First Quantum Minerals, there was a case of a fuel truck driving out of the 
pit just before the blast, and after the complete evacuation should already have been complete. The 
experience in Kevitsa is also that in general contractors appear to have lower injury rates than Boliden’s 
internal staff, and since explosives handling and blasting in Kevitsa is carried out by Orica, overall safety 
performance related to this topic is relatively good. 
 
 
FIGURE 28: SERIOUS INCIDENTS AT UNDERGROUND BOLIDEN MINES 
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As can be seen in Figure 28, the largest share of severe incidents deal with explosives left outside the storage; 
all of these incidents occurred in Sweden, Tara Mine has not reported any incident of this type. The special 
attention paid to explosives handling, in the form of dedicated powdermen, separate storages inaccessible 
to all chargers and digitised track&trace systems in Tara can arguably lead to this performance. Otherwise 
there do not appear to be large distinctions between different mining operations, which makes sense, since 
apart from their size, there do not seem to be large differences in between the different mines regarding 
working methods and materials used. 
 
9.2.2.!Comparison of Boliden incidents with accidents in the US and Australia 
Although it is good to know that actual harmful accidents have not occurred anywhere at Boliden Mines, 
this does not help in establishing what the main concerns should be; for this reason, broader data from the 
US and Australia will be used to establish this. 
 
The United States Mine Health & Safety Administration (MHSA) publishes reports of serious accidents 
and near-misses of serious incidents of all US metal and industrial mineral mines occurring over the past 
two years; out of 87 incidents reports in between 20 July 2015 and 20 July 2017, only one (1,15%) was 
related to blasting. In this incident in an open pit quarry, passers-by were hit by flyrock, leading to small 
injuries (MSHA, 2017). Following data collected by the MHSA between 2010 and July 2016, 7 miners in 
the United States have died as a consequence of blasting, either by flyrock, toxic fumes or misfires in metal 
and industrial mineral mines (Mine Health & Safety Administration, 2016). 
 
Similar data are available on mining operations in the state of Queensland, Australia. In between 2005 and 
2009 725 serious blasting incidents, both these that led to injuries and these that did not, have been reported 
to the State government of Queensland; the vast majority of these incidents, 658, were related to misfires; 
an uncontrolled shockwave was the cause of only one incident, whereas air overpressure and vibration 
issues were the cause of 2 incidents (Seccatore, et al., 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 29: UNDERGROUND BLASTING INJURIES US 
 
As for underground mines, both Figure 28 and Figure 29 show a similar picture, if one discounts for the 
fact that explosives left around are treated as a serious incident but do not cause injury by themselves and 
therefore cannot be compared with the US statistics. Generally, incident types are fairly evenly spread over 
different parts of the blasting process, although it is clear that blasting procedure in the US (which will 
usually mean flyrock hitting people who should not be there) is by far the most common concern when it 
comes to actual injury.  
Figure 30, based also on less severe incidents but just in Swedish Boliden Mines, confirms again that types 
of incidents are fairly evenly spread for underground mines. 
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FIGURE 30: DEVIATION TYPES PER MINE 
 
When comparing these injury backgrounds in the US and the difference between underground and surface 
injuries with reporting on all types of incidents in Swedish mines, some interesting conclusions can be 
drawn. As for surface mining, it can be seen in 
Figure 30 that the two surface mines considered, Aitik and Maurliden, there are two distinct main concerns; 
in the case of Aitik these are troubles with evacuation of the pit, with Maurliden these are all related to 
misfires (loading incidents in these cases are all related to finding misfires), and no others. This is the case 
because Maurliden only reports red incidents, and there seemed to be a product failure with the detonation 
systems; it can therefore safely be considered to be an outlier. When comparing with Australian incidents 
for surface mines, a completely different picture arises, see Figure 31. In Australia, it appears that misfires 
are the most common concern (Seccatore, et al., 2013). It should be noted that this is probably related to 
the fact that in Queensland misfires need to be reported to the mine safety authority; together with all other 
serious incidents. This therefore mostly seems to be another confirmation that actually severe incidents 
happen very rarely, but if they happen half of them are related to flyrock (and thereby also closely connected 
with the blasting procedure) another large part is connected to toxic fumes and early detonation also still is 
a source of concern. This picture therefore appears to be fairly consistent with Boliden and US data.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 31: BLASTING INCIDENTS IN QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA (SECCATORE, ET AL., 2013) 
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!Results Fault Tree Analysis 
In order to assign a structural importance to the respective parts of the explosives handling and blasting 
process, without having possible biases that would result from the use of just statistical data, fault trees 
without assigned failure probabilities have been assembled for the four most hazardous events, following 
the results in the previous subchapter, i.e. misfires, unwanted detonation, toxic fumes and flyrock. The 
values given are the Birnbaum’s factor of importance, as discussed in Chapter 8. These results have been 
summed up, and the results are given below in Table 19. Since this analysis has been done to understand 
the structure, not the probability, of pathways leading up to an accident, the values do not have a unit, but 
are rather useful to compare the relative criticality of the various subcomponents. A full table is provided 
in Appendix IX.R, below the most important lessons are discussed. 
TABLE 19: RESULTS STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
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B4: The part of the process having been assigned the (by far) highest value is the selection of explosive 
materials; this seems to make sense, given that it affects the safety and reliability of the entire process. As 
discussed before, explosive materials are nowadays extremely reliable. 
A4: Checks of the blasting area are arguably the biggest concern, since they were also deemed to be 
responsible for a large share of reported accidents in the previous subchapters. It also returns as a 
component for several risks, since they mitigate for both flyrock and fumes. Connected to this are also P3, 
the conditions under which return to the blast site is allowed, A5, the systems used to secure the blast site 
and A3, awareness among staff of blasting evacuation rules, are also related to blast area security.  
O1: PPE-usage and protective material on equipment may be an effective help with smaller accidents, and 
are therefore in general an effective measure. Still, the safety planning should not rely on these tools, given 
that the value of such protection is limited in case of more serious blasts and flyrock. 
V1&V2: Ventilation capacity and the ability to quickly push out noxious gases are central in being able to 
avoid intoxication, also given that the occurrence of (at least small amounts of) toxic fumes can never be 
avoided when using chemical explosives. This is also a topic that is regulated precisely, and which can be 
dealt with in mine ventilation planning.  
Using this order to prioritise safety measures, both in terms of working procedures, the necessity to go 
beyond the minimal legal requirements and the technologies used, can contribute to improving the blasting 
practice in the most effective way. The next subchapters will discuss to what extent these separate 
components actually do lead to concerns. 
 
!Causes for Concern based on Interviews 
Questioning has led to the conclusion that there are two issues that appear to give the most issues; the 
implementation of the digital management system for track & trace in Tara has been troublesome, given 
that the systems stopped working for a few days when it was introduced, and still frequently lags or has 
other forms of disruption. There are no immediate safety issues in this regard, but since the track & trace 
system is essential in regards of the safety and security of the explosives handling cycle, it should be noted. 
Furthermore, difficulties with perfect guarding of open pits is another concern. The main concern 
mentioned in all three countries and the main office were misfires. Working with contractors or 
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communication with them is generally not regarded to be a safety hazard; although for example in the 
starting phase of Kevitsa there were many incidents with inexperienced contractors, their safety 
performance now appears to be better than that of Boliden’s internal staff. 
 
9.4.1.!Misfires 
Although mentioned as a main concern, misfires do not appear to occur very frequently. During 2016 for 
example, out of 17,800 charged blastholes in Aitik mine, only 14 (0.08%) turned out to become misfires. 
This will for a large part follow from the fact that in Aitik the standard is to use 2 detonators and primers 
per blasthole, which greatly contributes to detonation reliability. When comparing this with Kevitsa, in the 
past years between 1 and 4 misfires were usually reported per month. In total 45 misfires were reported for 
the past 72,000 charged drillholes, in other words only 0.06% of the charged holes turned into misfires. 
This shows that the use of two detonators and primers per drillhole is a very effective way of avoiding 
misfires; still, a lot of misfires are currently found in Kevitsa now the mine is expanding into quarries 
previously used for mine development and in contouring operations in more difficult situations, leading to 
a recent uptick to above 4 misfires per month. The next subchapter discusses misfires also based on 
statistical indicators.  
 
 
!Elaboration on Specific Issues for Underground Mines 
Based on the extensive Swedish data on various forms of procedural deviations, a look has been taken into 
incidents involving deviations from procedure or situations that were deemed hazardous. Examples of such 
cases are people not being at the right place at the right time, explosives laying at equipment before 
maintenance, traffic violations and doors of the storage left open. The most noteworthy conclusions for 
underground mines are discussed below. The complete classification of (suspected) causes per explosives 
handling and blasting phase category been outlined in Appendix IX.N for underground mines, and in 
Appendix IX.P for surface mines. The most important lessons are discussed below, based on a distinction 
between material failure, forms of human/procedural failure and external causes. Misfires are discussed 
separately.  
 
9.5.1.!Material Failure 
Apart from misfire-related issues discussed below, material failure appears to be a relatively minor cause of 
concern; in a few cases there is insufficient ventilation capacity, and in some cases explosives have slightly 
different characteristics than expected. The main type of material failure appears to be material failure 
around the evacuation, with 21% of blasting procedure cases related to either a tag failure or an alarm not 
being loud enough.  
 
9.5.2.!Procedural and Human Failure 
Human error appears to be the single cause of explosives handling failure; of storage failures, only 10% of 
incidents were related to direct errors; of these 10% 1 case related to belated maintenance leading to 
insufficient door standards, 1 case to a storage not meeting legal standards due to unawareness of the legal 
standards and 1 case to the lack of fire-fighting equipment. The other 90% of cases all related to small 
errors, mostly due to either sleaziness or lack of awareness/training of certain procedures. Similar issues 
appear to be typical for transportation, with cases such as lack of the proper markings or explosives that 
were left in equipment after a shift. For explosives handling, the various forms of human error are therefore 
the primary reason of concern. Also for the blasting process various forms of human error cause the bulk 
of concern, in most cases incidents are related to either a lack of training/experience, or apparent 
carelessness/easy-going mentalities.  
 
For blasting procedures incidents, trespassing of the danger zone is responsible for a quarter of red 
incidents; it appears that it is usually people unintendedly or perhaps intentionally ignoring warning signs. 
Furthermore, failures of warning signals, or missing signs amount to 15% of serious incidents. Insufficient 
checks and last-minute equipment removals also appear to fit in this category. When it comes to the 
evacuation procedure, communication failures appear to be a main concern. Examples of this are people 
not being informed properly on the features of blasting planned, or people not being informed at all. Given 
that for these cases no material failures have been reported, human error must be assumed. Whether the 
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root cause in this lies in negligence or complete unawareness of actual procedures is unclear. Since none of 
these cases has led to real hazardous situations or accidents no investigations have been undertaken in this 
field. Given the involvement with contractors, in one case with people not speaking Swedish or English, 
or people less involved in blasting operations, it appears that in some cases there is insufficient awareness, 
lack of training or a generally careless attitude in this regard that causes these incidents. There is no exam 
testing knowledge of blasting procedures of any type before contractors or people not involved in charging 
and blasting can work in the mine; it may therefore be recommended to undertake more trainings or tests 
in this regard. 
 
For the blasting incidents, most of the non-communication related incidents appear to deal with the lack 
of cover when a lot of flyrock is expected, or damage done by flyrock. This may be the consequence of 
blast planning and sometimes unexpected heavy blasts. The personal injury issue relates to people 
falling/tripping, or having ear damage following a blast (lack of PPE). In no cases have people been hit by 
flyrock directly. The other minor categories appear to be related to negligence of individual operators.  
 
9.5.3.!External Events 
A notable external event was a case of explosive materials being delivered via regular mail, and available for 
pick-up at the local supermarket. Climatological/environmental issues do not appear to be an issue in 
underground mines (in contrast, in Aitik surface mine all cases of unexpected large rockfall were deemed 
to be related to characteristics of the frozen ground that had not been dealt with in a proper way). The 
reason that a switch has been made from ANFO to emulsions had a lot to do with groundwater-related 
issues, but this is therefore no issue anymore. There are no cases of people from outside the mine interfering 
in one way or another. 
 
9.5.4.!Misfires 
Being the most common cause of concern among staff, the topic of misfires deserves extra attention. In 
(Seccatore, et al., 2013) a more detailed study was undertaken on the causes of misfires based on the 
available data from Queensland, Australia. Although the exact reasons were mostly unclear, Figure 32: 
Causes of Misfires in Queensland, Australia shows the causes insofar they were possible to be identified. 
Environmental causes or failure of the emulsion itself seem to be rather minor issues. 
Procedural/methodological failures together account for 28% of failures. Slumping and column dislocation 
account for 37% of failures, and could presumably be traced back to design or execution failures. initiation 
system failure is responsible for almost a third of all incidents, and are thereby the biggest cause of concern.  
 
For Boliden, interestingly enough, misfires seem to be relatively as an important issue for surface- as 
underground mines; in both cases 17% of all reported incidents is related to misfires; given that around 
three quarters of all incidents are reported at surface mines however, the absolute number is smaller at 
surface mines, with in total only 29 cases being reported over the studied five-year term. The causes (insofar 
known) appear to explain why, with surface mines struggling with issues such as vehicles cutting wires and 
environmental conditions being an issue. The causes of 48% of misfires were deemed to be unclear; for the 
cases where the cause could be reasonably well assumed 49,5% was related to connection system set-up 
failures, 34,3% to material (detonator) failure and 16,2% to flyrock damaging the system. For misfires found 
at later stages than after post-blasting the cause were always unclear, they have therefore not been included 
here; it seems however useful to consider if misfire-finding can be improved, since these cases amount for 
almost a quarter of all found misfires, and misfires that pop up later are dangerous when less experienced 
staff gets in touch with them. 
 
Given that it was previously established that using electronic detonators would reduce the risk for misfires, 
this seems a very effective way indeed to reduce the number of misfires, given that almost a third of failures 
directly have to do with this, and also may reduce other major factors that are sometimes related to 
unpredictable blast design such as column dislocation and slumping, and also procedural errors could be 
reduced given the opportunity of pre-blast checks. 
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FIGURE 32: CAUSES OF MISFIRES IN QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA (SECCATORE, ET AL., 2013) 
 
!Resulting Risk Matrix 
In order to classify both the effect risks and cause risks, two different risk matrices will be worked out 
below based on both Boliden and US statistics. These matrices will not look into suspected causes, as was 
discussed qualitatively in the previous subchapter and further analysed quantitatively in the next chapter. 
 
It is deemed less useful to compare on the basis of the number of people working with either charging 
activities or all employees; for the first this seems to be not that important given that many incidents are 
not related to issues facing the chargers themselves; for the second since it cannot be judged what part of 
the total number of people working at a mine site could theoretically be affected by blasting incidents. 
Instead, it seems best to estimate the chance that incidents of a certain type do occur at a mine site per year; 
given that blasting incidents can affect many different people at the same time and various locations it 
seems best to treat accidents as a risk for the entire mine. 
 
9.6.1.!Set-Up 
In order to properly value different types of incidents, the approach of distinguishing the risk of an effect 
occurring during a mining operation and the risk of possible causes for accidents occurring has been 
followed. Different categorisations have been applied for these different types of risks and for US accidents 
vs Boliden incidents. For the effect risks (Re) two sets of data have been used; internal Boliden data on 
actual reported safety hazards (e.g. misfires occurring, breaching of air quality standards, excessive flyrock, 
etc…) and the previously discussed severe incident reporting from the U.S. This is done in order to also be 
able to assess whether the occurrence of a certain hazardous situation will also likely lead to severe accidents 
or not (given that barely any serious accidents or even near-misses occurred at Boliden Mines). For cause-
risks (Rc), the different components of previously discussed risky pathways have been used to categorise 
procedural deviation reporting. Also, when causes for effect-risks were known, these have been included, 
in order to get an idea of the frequency of failure of activities in the explosives handling and blasting process. 
 
TABLE 20: EFFECT LABELS CLASSIFICATION ACCIDENTS 
Value Description Frequency effect 
US (/year) 
Frequency  causes 
Boliden (/year) 
Frequency effect 
Boliden (/year) 
1 Very low <0.1 <1 <0.1 
2 Low 0.1-0.99 1-5.99 0.1-0.99 
3 High 1-2 6-12 1-3 
4 Very high >2 >12 >3 
 
  
Procedure/shotfire errors
17%
Blasting method 
error
7%
Initiation System 
failure
31%Column dislocation
20%
Slumping
17%
Bulk product 
failure
2%
Loading 
method
4% Environmental
2%
Cause of  Misfires
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TABLE 21: EFFECT CLASSIFICATION LABELS BOLIDEN MINES 
Value Description Safety 
(fatalities) 
Health/temporary 
injuries 
Damage 
(potential) 
Criticality 
level 
1 Insignificant 0 0 <"10k <0.5 
2 Small 0 1-2 "10k-"100k 0.5-0.99 
3 Serious 1-2 3-5 "101k-
"999k 
1-3 
4 Severe >2 >5 >"1m >3 
 
9.6.2.!Effects 
Based on the maximum impact that has occurred for a type of accident, the damage labels have been 
assigned. Frequencies of accidents occurring over the past 5 years at all Boliden underground mines, and 
the available data since 1978 for all US metal mines have led to the following frequencies. It should again 
be remembered that the incidents that have been reported for the US are much more severe. See Table 22 
for an overview of all incident types that have led to forms of physical injury. 
 
TABLE 22: RESULTING RISK EFFECT TABLE 
Effect Hazards Damage 
label: 
Frequency  
(/year/mine) 
Label 
(Boliden) 
Frequency (US) 
(/year/mines) 
Label  
(US) 
Misfires (M) 3 2.54 3 1.28 3 
Flyrock (R) 3 0,9 2 0.08 1 
Toxic Fumes (F) 3 0,604 2 2.05 4 
Early Detonation (D) 4 0 1 1.56 3 
Vibrations/blast wave (V) 1 0,25 2 - - 
Blast Area Security (A) 4 1,1 3 1.79 3 
Absorption explosives (E) 1 - - - - 
 
These data lead to the following risk matrix; most effects score rather high on the damage scale; this is 
reflecting of the dangerous nature of blasting. The two that do not score high (health injury due to 
absorption of explosive materials and vibrations and blast waves) do not appear in the U.S. statistics, which 
is logical, since only severe incidents are reported there; although considered to be a major health hazard 
by both people in the field and literature, no such have been reported at Boliden either.  
 
TABLE 23: RESULTING EFFECT-RISK MATRIX 
4 DB 
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AB 
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2     
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 1 2 3 4 
 
What is interesting to see is that misfires and blast area security accidents appear to be of the same 
importance relative to other types of incidents; toxic fumes appear to be a relatively much more serious 
issue in the US than at Boliden, similarly to early detonation. This makes sense, given that both issues are 
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closely related to explosives performance; since Boliden data from the period between 2011-2016, and US 
data for 1978-2016 have been used, it seems thinkable that this difference in performance is related to 
improved explosive materials and blasting techniques. The difference between flyrock may be a result of 
classification, given that there is a close relation with blast area security, alternatively it is simple the case 
that large amounts as flyrock at Boliden have been labelled as a serious incident for this research, whereas 
only flyrock leading to personal injuries have been reported for the US. 
 
9.6.3.!Incidents per Component 
Based on all reported incidents over the period in between 2010 and 2016, including all the “green” type 
of incidents, a frequency of incidents per type of component of the potentially harmful explosives handling 
and blasting cycles has been established. The number of incidents occurring has been translated into a 
probability of an incident of any type occurring during a year at a mine site of the size of Garpenberg or 
Tara. Criticality labels were based on the results of the Fault Tree Analysis, since more critical activities are 
more likely to lead to harmful incidents, or in the few cases where a certain component failure could lead 
to direct harm but not to a failure of the overall blasting process, such as injury due to skin contact with 
hazardous emulsions, a damage label has been assigned. This was done according to Table 20 and Table 21 
respectively. See Appendix IX.S for the specific numbers for each activity. 
 
The riskiest components from Table 24 should be mentioned. E1, uncharged explosive materials left 
outside storage form a big concern according to this classification. As discussed before, it is one of the 
most common serious incidents occurring at underground mines. In all cases these materials were 
apparently forgotten at places like charging sites, equipment or even near the lunchroom. S5, access to 
storage, i.e., doors left open or people walking into places where they should not be, is another big concern 
related to explosives handling. In both these cases, the “Irish approach” with dedicated powdermen and 
very restricted access possibilities to the storage, arguably in combination with a real-time bookkeeping 
system checking making it possible to check were all collected explosive materials have been used, therefore 
indeed seems to be an effective way to solve this issue. The only type of component related to the blasting 
process in de red risk category is U1, or “cause misfire unclear”. The associated risk of misfires, and since, 
as discussed before, the causes of misfires that do occur are mostly not clear, put this type of “incident” in 
a serious risk class. Since the causes are unclear it is also arguably very hard to deal with this; recourse 
should presumably be taken to the other possible causes of misfires. B7, missing or insufficient cover, and 
H4, dangerous driving are other more severe risks. The first one seems closely related to the estimation of 
the danger zone for flyrock, and was therefore treated together with this in the Fault Tree Analysis, but 
turned out to be a common cause of concern. Dangerous driving is a typical example of a “violation” of 
rules, probably because people want to be fast, or are careless when putting explosive materials in the car. 
Some other generally interesting notions are that issues related to the blast design itself do not appear to be 
very risky, except for the danger zone estimation, which was connected to the flyrock cover. Better ability 
TABLE 24: RESULTING CAUSE-RISK MATRIX 
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to predict the reach of flyrock and checks on the presence of flyrock would therefore be the by far most 
pressing concern in this regard. B4, the selection of certain types of emulsions, score high since they 
influence the vulnerability to health issues following skin absorption or fumes. It is also interesting to see 
that most typical blasting process activities (i.e. charging and the blasting/evacuation procedure) fall in the 
average category. Although N4 (uncertain cause of misfire), other external/untreatable events do not appear 
to be especially risky, unexpected blast characteristics appear to be of average concern. The next chapter 
considers how seriously these issues should be taken and what measures could be recommended. 
 
!Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main categories of incidents have been identified, using the same categorisation structure 
as was used previously for the legal assessment. Furthermore, a look has been taken into the (possible) 
causes of these incidents for the more severe cases. Also, people active in this field have been asked to 
discuss what they consider to be causes for concern. The main issues that give reason to concern, according 
to the risk matrices assembled based on both Boliden and international data are blast area security, toxic 
fumes, flyrock and early detonation. Misfires were however consistently judged to pose the biggest hazard 
by the people that have given input on this topic, and a similar picture comes from Australian data. Most 
issues related to blasting incidents and issues related to blasting procedure had to do with lacking or unclear 
communication or failing communication systems. To add to this, Fault Tree Analysis has been undertaken 
for the most pressing concerns, in order to see what components of the explosives handling and blasting 
process are most critical. It follows that blasting procedure components are the most concerning topics. 
 
In general, a clear distinction can be made between surface and underground mines, where underground 
mines have a more equal number of incidents per incident category, whereas issues with blasting safety and 
flyrock appear to be of more concern for surface mines. Other issues surrounding explosives handling are 
explosives that are left somewhere during/after transport, or after charging. In some cases, doors of the 
storage where open when they should not have been open, which also belongs to the riskiest components 
according to risk matrices assembled. This is a field where Tara has a better performance than Swedish 
mines, arguably because of their stricter explosives handling policies. 
 
It can be concluded that, although luckily no significant incidents with harmful consequences have 
occurred, measures related to evacuation procedures, and then in particular the communication thereof, are 
worth to be taken more seriously. A problem in this regard however is that in the vast majority of cases 
individual negligence appears to be the main cause of the incident. This may be hard to solve via regulations 
or other technologies. Avoiding misfires altogether may be very difficult, assuming that charging has always 
been carried out correctly, but the use of different methods of technologies may be worth a closer look.  
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10.!Suggestions for a Standardised Explosives Policy 
 
This chapter will try to combine the findings of the previous legal and practical chapters in order to 
recommend on a consistent and uniform policy for all three jurisdictions. The aim is to develop 
recommendations that lead to the highest standard of explosives- and blasting safety, both in terms of 
maintaining the highest legal standards, the safest and most effective technologies and working practices.  
 
! Guiding Principles 
To start with, specific legal requirements will have to form the bare minimum of any safety policy. These 
requirements are generally quite straightforward, and easy to understand. The difficulty lies more in the way 
of implementation. As required by law, implementation should be straightforward and easy to understand, 
and to be effective, the right laws need to be known by the right people. A first objective of this chapter is 
therefore to outline the existing specific requirements to the right process stages. 
 
Apart from this, it should be remembered that the employer has a duty of care under all three jurisdictions. 
Therefore, risk assessments should be made to assess the need for additional requirements. This also means 
that in case of doubt, the employer will always need to prioritise worker’s safety. It is a general principle of 
safety, but, as this research has found in Chapter 5 also a legal obligation to apply the hierarchy of controls 
when developing a work safety approach. See Figure 33. Rules on the side of elimination, rather than on 
the side of PPE, are therefore preferred. 
 
 
10.1.1.! Explosives Handling & Blasting 
As might have been noticeable throughout the report, there is a clear distinction between explosives 
handling on one hand, and charging and blasting on the other. The explosives handling stage consists of 
the acquisition, transportation and storage of explosive materials, whereas charging and blasting activities 
comprise most of the actual work, but all take place on a single place, namely the blast site. This distinction 
can also be seen in the studied legal sources, explosives handling has many different sources, ranging from 
general chemicals regulations to security-related documents, whereas charging and blasting activities 
themselves are just regulated by the central mine explosives regulations. The distinction is also very clear in 
Irish law, with the explosives handling part is regulated internally by the Scheme of Transit, and the charging 
and blasting activities are regulated internally by other documents. Also, the people responsible for the first 
category are called “powdermen”, whereas these for the second part are called “shotfirers”. In Sweden and 
Finland there is no such (legal) distinction. For this reason, it seems an effective way to distinguish 
essentially different tasks in the mining process, in order to assign clearly delineated responsibilities to 
different people and to draft working practices for. Separate recommendations will be made for both stages. 
This does not mean that it is not possible that tasks from both parts cannot be carried out by the same 
people.  
FIGURE 33: HIERARCHY OF CONTROLS (NIOSH, 2016) 
 86 
! Bow-Tie Reliability Models 
In this subchapter, using both the knowledge of legal requirements and of the reported types of incidents 
in Swedish underground mines will be used to predict the probability of hazardous events and of damage 
and injury occurring. Given that it is assumed that prevention always should be most preferred, the bow-
tie method is used to distinguish between measures preventing hazardous situations (top-events) from 
occurring in the first place, and measures that are there to mitigate these top-events once they have 
occurred. Reliability Block Diagram-analysis will be implemented to calculate these predictions of 
probability. What measures would be most recommended can then be discussed following these estimates. 
 
10.2.1.! Avoid Unintended/Early Detonation 
The most “classical” risk associated with the use of explosives is unintended detonation, or any form of 
explosions or fires in general. It is also the topic were most regulations appear to be focussed on; given that 
in practice there do not appear to have happened such cases in the studied time period it must be concluded 
that modern material use indeed has successfully removed this risk, or that the applicable regulations indeed 
are effective. Assuming the latter, safer, option, strict compliance with the legal requirements is therefore 
highly recommended. 
 
It is assumed that the emulsions, since they are of GHS-class 1.5 or 1.6 and therefore extremely insensitive, 
will not detonate unless there is another explosion occurring as well. This is represented by the lowest line 
in the right-side part of the bow-tie diagram. The most important safety requirement of this entire topic 
may therefore be the need to keep mixed emulsions separate from any explosive substance as long as 
possible. This is also expressed in regulatory requirements on separation distances and the need to store 
emulsions at a different site as the other explosive materials. Other mitigating measures on the right side 
are all related to minimising the presence of other people and equipment near explosives and charged areas, 
and the supply of appropriate protective equipment and PPE. Training and taking these measures into 
consideration with production planning complete the recommended measures on this side. As was 
discussed in Chapter 8, there is also a very small chance of detonation of the emulsion caused by blocking 
of the emulsion loading pump. Rules on proper cleaning of this equipment are therefore also necessary, 
but these guidelines are provided by the emulsion supplier, as is legally required. 
 
The resulting bow-tie reliability model for early detonation, developed for both early detonation during 
transport and during storage can be found in Appendix IX.T.1. As discussed before, this is barely an issue 
anymore, but given its potentially very large consequences is still considered. The extremely small 
probability of this type of accident is also predicted by the bow-tie reliability model, predicting a chance of 
virtually zero that such events occur. Since this topic is regulated on a very detailed level and practice 
showed that internal rules closely follow these legal requirements, there is little room for independent rule-
drafting. This is therefore not included as a component; it should however be noticed that all components 
are covered (some rather extensively) by the Combined Legal Requirements.   
 
10.2.2.! Failure of Detonation 
The main problem associated with a failure of detonation are the subsequent misfires. Factors identified 
that could lead to misfires are problems with the materials used, the way in which emulsion loading activities 
have been carried out, and the way in which initiation systems have been set up. Finally, blasting itself can 
cut off well-installed safety systems. Except for the general risk avoidance requirements, there are no 
specific legal requirements on the avoidance of misfires, most rules appear to be dedicated to avoiding 
unintended detonation; this means that this topic in particular requires independent development of safety 
procedures. The bow-tie reliability model for this issue can be found in Appendix IX.T.2. The part left of 
the top event in the bow-tie reliability model shows the components that affect the occurrence of misfires. 
Material characteristics and the execution of tasks is most important in this regard. In case that a misfire 
has occurred, they should be spotted as soon as possible. See the part right of the top event in the bow-tie 
reliability model for the components influencing the success of this. Materials do not really play a role in 
this regard, except for protection on equipment. Rules would primarily be effective in checks after the blast, 
it is also a specific legal requirement to undertake such checks. Apart from this, training of both Blasting 
Foreman’s and other staff such as loader- and driller operators is important. If such tasks could be carried 
out from a distance or by self-driving vehicles the risk for personal injury would be removed completely. 
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10.2.3.! Avoid Damage following Blast 
There are many different types of damage that can follow an otherwise regular and well-planned blast; 
flyrock, vibrations and fumes are the main categories in this regard. Given the intrinsically destructive nature 
of a blast, these effects can never be fully removed without disbandment of the entire mining technique. 
Effective measures are therefore important to prevent or reduce negative impacts. There are relatively few 
specific regulations in this regard, except for these related to mine evacuation. Given that Boliden Mines 
already evacuate much larger areas than legally required legal constraints might not be the most pressing 
therefore. Maintaining legal requirements in relation to air quality may be the biggest legal compliance 
challenge, but that is not part of the scope of this research. A difficult issue in this regard here is that 
preventing the hazards is almost impossible, given that blasts simply cause these effects; in this case the 
mitigating measures therefore deserve most attention. The bow-tie reliability models for this type of issue 
can be found in Appendix IX.T.3. 
 
In general, flyrock, if the blast is planned well, should not pose a large problem, given that rock masses can 
stand some rocks hitting it. Still, effective planning and danger zone assessment is crucial in removing 
damage. Once again recognising the need to prefer preventive measures over risk-reducing measures, 
methods that make it impossible for flyrock to come even close to equipment or people are therefore 
preferred over options to cover sensitive objects. Given the difficulties that were found in the previous 
chapter with enforcing that people move into or stay in the danger zone this topic deserves extra attention. 
The rules in place themselves appear to be sufficient; more emphasis should therefore be put on awareness 
of these topics, especially among contractors or other people that may have less awareness of typical mining 
hazards. Also, maintaining regular checks on warning systems, signs and communication systems are 
important to support this objective. 
 
It can be seen that flyrock is to a large extent influenced by the materials used and engineering tasks; blasting 
engineers therefore have a large responsibility in this regard. As for toxic fumes, most components in the 
system are related to the proper execution of tasks; the most important topic here seems the successful 
enforcement of the danger zone evacuation, and reliable measurements and returning decisions. Especially 
the Blasting Foremen play a large role in these tasks, and the main ways to avoid failure in this regard is 
ensuring that these jobs are carried out with care. 
 
Vibrations are another concern, when it would lead to rockfall in parts of the mine that are not blasted 
themselves. As a side-effect, vibrations can also be a concern for people living around the mine. The only 
way to reduce vibrations is either by limiting the size of the blast or having more efficient blasts. Maintaining 
appropriate rock support is another additional appropriate measure. A different type of possibly harmful 
effects of blasting are the fumes released by the blast; these are unavoidable with the explosives available 
on the market and can therefore never be completely removed, although different chemical compositions 
could lead to less toxic releases. Still, the amounts can be reduced by blasting efficiency, since smaller 
amounts of emulsions used will lead to less toxic gases. Apart from that straightforward rules on evacuation, 
measurements and in the worst case appropriate PPE should tackle this problem. 
 
Again, predictable and efficient blasting is primarily influenced by the characteristics of the explosive 
materials used, and an effective way in reducing blasting hazards. More than for other topics, proper mine 
planning, blast planning and operational planning can effectively mitigate possibly damaging consequences. 
These notions are also phrased in general terms in legal requirements. In all cases, vibrations, flyrock and 
toxic fumes can all be linked to inefficient blasting or the wrong use of materials.  
 
10.2.4.! Overview of Bow-Tie Reliability Model Results 
Some of the key lessons from the reliability/bow-tie models are displayed in Table 25; first of all, predictions 
for the probability of different types of damage or injury occurring as a consequence of explosives handling 
and blasting in underground mines comparable to Garpenberg and Tara are given; as can be seen the 
probability of flyrock causing damage is by far the most likely; individuals getting hit by flyrock and 
unhealthy exposure to toxic fumes are the two other main categories being significant; all other types of 
damage and injury have an estimated occurrence probability of less than a million. The likelihood of serious 
incidents occurring at the storage site is extremely small.  
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Some comments to be made are; as for fumes only health serious injuries are assumed, not very minor cases 
of feeling not well for a very rare exposure of one minute or less, otherwise the probability should be much 
higher, given the three cases in underground mines reported on this topic. The storage prediction is based 
on the fact that all visited storages meet legal requirements (apart from two incidents in the past years, the 
first relating to not having a fire extinguisher in one case and having an outdated permit hanging in the 
storage), and on the fact that no malicious or extremely incompetent behaviour has been reported or is 
expected; if that would be different this probability would presumably increase a lot. The same goes for 
other forms of early detonation.  
 
TABLE 25: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE/INJURY TYPES 
 
Strictly speaking, only issues affecting health and safety are the scope of research, therefore cases that 
normally lead to just material damages have been marked. Furthermore, the most problematic cause for 
each type of damage or injury has been mentioned. How “problematic” an element is, is based on the 
probability of a particular component failing and its criticality in the bow-tie reliability model. It is 
interesting to note that these causes can mostly be dealt with by improved blast and cover design and proper 
ventilation design. Avoiding misfires can best be done by selecting the right materials; this means using 
electronic detonators, given the opportunity to pre-test them and the relative easiness of charging. 
Awareness of the right driving styles would be most useful for the last part; using driving monitoring 
systems may be an effective technological measure to combat this problem. 
 
Given that missing cover is the only hazardous element that is expected to occur relatively often in the 
blasting process it is the only topic that is looked more closely into with the Five-Whys technique. Also, 
issues considered to be problematic in the sense that explosives would be accessible to unauthorised people, 
have been delved into in this manner. See Appendix IX.U to see what steps have been undertaken in this 
analysis. The main results flowing from this analysis is that it is important to more frequently practice rare 
types of blasts near vulnerable areas (such as the crusher station or important haul roads) in order to stay 
experienced with such operations. The main problem with explosives being at the wrong places, cars used 
to transport explosives within the mine and access to storage (keys) appear to be related to less clear 
delineation of responsibilities in this field. This would best be solved by the assignment of dedicated 
powdermen. 
 
The most important conclusion in relation to legal requirements is that there is the paradox of the vast 
majority of specific legal requirements being related to the hazard of unintended detonation, whereas in 
practice this does not appear to be problematic; it is assumed that it is the strict compliance with these 
regulations, in combination with the materials used, that ensure this. Continued strict compliance with these 
requirements is therefore recommended, whereas for other topics the drafting of rules and procedures 
should be based primarily on the knowledge and experience of experts in the field, such as blasting 
engineers, Blasting Foreman’s, suppliers and chargers. 
Rank Damage Type Probability 
(/year/mine) 
Human 
Injury 
Most problematic 
cause 
1 Material damage due to flyrock 0.451 No Missing Cover 
2 Individual hit by flyrock 0.33E-04 Yes Blast design 
3 Health issues due to toxic fumes 9.13E-05 Yes Ventilation Capacity 
4 Material damage due to misfire 2.95E-07 No Material Usage 
5 Personal injury due to misfire 1.96E-07 Yes Material Usage 
6 Serious intoxication due to blast fumes 2.29E-08 Yes Ventilation Capacity 
7 Minor injury/damage due to exploding detonator 1.31E-09 Yes Traffic Violations 
8 Multiple people hit by flyrock 4.14E-12 Yes Blast design 
9 Serious injury due to explosive transport 8.10E-14 Yes Traffic Violations 
10 Minor damage due to early storage detonation 0  No Storage Conditions 
11 Major damage due to early storage detonation 0 Yes Storage Conditions 
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! Combined Recommendations 
The approach to the functional stages in the explosives handling and blasting process is to delineate clear 
phases. Each phase is to be ended by some kind of check, to ensure the person responsible for a specific 
phase undertakes some assessment of his works, and to make it possible for a possibly different person in 
the next stage to rely on the prior phase. Therefore, the set-up for each phase is the same. Figure 35 shows 
a distinction in stages for the explosives handling cycle; each stage first has a description of the activity, and 
at the end, the topic that should be checked before one can move to the next stage in the explosives 
handling cycle. For each component in this cycle, the riskiness has been assigned based on the previous 
chapter and subchapter; also, based on this, a risk-assignment has been made for the entire stage. See Figure 
34 for this labelling. Then, as minimum legal requirement, the applicable legislation for each stage has been 
connected to each stage, following the Combined Legal Requirements (CLR). Additional recommended 
procedures/rules have been added in white letters on a blue background, based on issues that went wrong. 
Thirdly, if applicable, recommended technology use to improve the performance of a stage have been added 
as well. If a stage is assumed to be low-risk, it is recommended to keep working with existing rules. For the 
more concerning issues, new procedures and SOP’s are to be drawn up in collaboration between blasting 
foremen, health and safety officers, chargers and other people involved, based on the minimum legal 
requirements listed in this report and taking into account the other suggestions. 
 
The assignment of the necessary responsible persons, as outlined in Part 1 of the CLR, is the responsibility 
of the mine management, and should, when executed, not influence the actual operation of both cycles. 
 
FIGURE 34: LEGEND COMBINED RECOMMENDATIONS 
! Explosives Handling  
Although technological solutions may be less helpful to solve safety risks in the explosives handling cycle 
than in the blasting cycle, there are still some measures that should be looked into. Some of these measures 
are already explicitly required by law, such as not having open fire near blasting activities, using vehicles 
without sparking hazards and equipped with fire extinguishers and the need to maintain a stable climate in 
storage. It is suggested that additionally having a real-time track&trace system might also be useful, and not 
only from a security perspective. Also, having systems in place monitoring driving behaviour and being 
aware of the location of cars and equipment would be highly recommended, given the previous analyses. 
 
Maintaining a track & trace system is already required by law. The form in which the track & trace system 
is implemented is not specified by the European directive; there are example of miners just taking pictures 
before each shift in quarries to maintain the registration of explosives, and many Boliden mines still 
maintain paper records. However, there appear to be considerable advantages in having a system that would 
allow for real-time insight in the whereabouts of explosive materials. If explosive materials would be lost 
on the way, as has happened now and then, this would be noticed when checking out all explosive materials 
prior to usage. This could reduce the risk of these explosive materials lying around over a longer period of 
time. It could also, if implemented effectively, save bureaucratic work, since scanning is easier than 
maintaining paper logs, by people responsible for explosives handling, leaving more time for other 
important issues. 
 
The three most pressing concerns in this regard, people gaining access to a storage that should not be there 
or doors left open, explosives lying at places where they should not be and wrongly parked vehicles and/or 
dangerous driving have been singled out as issues that can all very effectively be dealt with by assigning 
dedicated powdermen, whose sole task is to know all about the whereabouts of explosive materials and 
have sole access to storages. They are also expected to check the quality of materials used, such as cars, and 
the (climatic) conditions in the storages and other facilities.  
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FIGURE 35: EXPLOSIVES HANDLING COMBINED RECOMMENDATIONS 
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  FIGURE 36: BLASTING COMBINED RECOMMENDATIONS 
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! Blasting Recommendations 
Compared to the explosives handling cycle, there is only one really concerning issue, namely missing or 
misjudged need of cover. Connected to this is the predictability of the reach of flyrock, which can be 
improved with better blasting materials, and lack of communication between different departments. In 
general, ensuring that a mine is completely evacuated during the blast is essential to ensure zero LTI’s. As 
for some miscommunications that occurred with contractors, it seems necessary to primarily focus on 
awareness of evacuation procedures for both contractors and in-house staff. It would also be safe to use 
systems that check the whereabouts of equipment and people in real-time, so that vehicles and people 
cannot be left at the wrong places prior to a blast. Since it is expected that the number of misfires will 
decrease when using electronic detonators, it is recommended to train more frequently on the dealing with 
misfires, to ensure that these skills remain practiced with blasting foremen. Also, other rarer events, such 
as blasting trainings or blasting near vulnerable places should be practiced more frequently, to avoid 
miscommunications during such events.  
 
10.5.1.! Blasting Systems 
Many of the safety concerns that seem best solvable by technological improvements related to blasting 
seem solvable by using electronic detonators. As discussed previously, the main advantages of electronic 
detonators are that they have very precise timing, which leads to an increase in blasting efficiency and 
thereby reducing vibrations, flyrock and fumes released due to the lower amount of emulsion needed to 
blast a stope of the same size. Because of their better fragmentation characteristics, many mines already use 
electronic detonation systems, but in the case of Boliden this is still not so in the majority of cases. 
According to findings in the field electronic detonators can be around five times as expensive as NONEL-
initiation systems, and for that reason are not economically competitive. At the same time, they bring 
advantages for more complicated blasts, since they leave more room for precise blast designs. It is therefore 
recommended to make an integral assessment of the pros and cons of this system, since it seems that the 
initiation system selection is primarily made on purely blasting performance so far. It could however be the 
case that when safety considerations would be included the outcome of material selection might be 
different. In order to do this, it would however be important to gather more information on the quantity 
of misfires that could be avoided by using electronic detonators, using two detonators and primers per hole 
also proves to be a rather effective way to keep the number of misfires low, as Aitik and Kevitsa show. As 
a positive side effect, the number of required special blasts or mechanical destruction of boulders could 
also be reduced when blasting could be carried out more precisely using electronic detonators. Although it 
does not seem that special blasting operations cause many different situations, having less smaller rock 
destruction operations during shifts would by definition mean that there are less hazardous situations. 
Another concern that followed Chapter 9 were failing communication systems during or prior to blasting; 
decreasing the number of radio failures would therefore also be a good way to ensure a safer working 
environment. 
! Conclusion 
To start with, it should be noted that the recommendations made in this chapter are far from complete. 
People with more specific knowledge and experience should better be able to identify all the potential 
hazards and come up with effective ways to mitigate them. An attempt has been made to provide a structure 
that could be helpful to introduce and further improve more standardized safety practices, and to prioritise 
the measures to be taken. Following the risk analysis undertaken in the previous chapter, it was possible to 
indicate what areas deserve most attention, on top of the minimum legal requirements. This was followed 
by an outline of possible technological improvements that could help to improve legally required safety 
standards, recommending a more wide-spread implementation of electronic detonators and digital track & 
trace systems. Finally, a structure has been suggested that makes it possible to quickly check if all safety 
requirements have been met, and that could be helpful when comparing and improving specific safety 
procedures. The basis is the distinction of an explosives handling cycle and a blasting cycle, split up into 
separate phases. Each phase has been assigned with a clear objective, and an end-check to ensure that all 
works have been carried out properly and that the next stage is safe to commence. The comprehensive legal 
requirements that have been identified previously have all been assigned to one of these specific stages as 
a minimum requirement for regulations, together with recommended technological changes and working 
methods, based on the previously undertaken incident reporting and risk assessments.   
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11.!Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This research set off with the aim of making recommendations to improve the safety of explosives handling 
and blasting in Boliden Mines in Sweden, Finland and Ireland, that meets multinational legal, operational 
and safety requirements. In order to do this, the research had three main objectives, worked out in three 
different parts, with the final part connecting the first two. The aim of the first two chapters after the 
introduction was to find out what the legal requirements entail, the third, fourth and fifth part to discuss 
the actual practices, and the aim of the sixth chapter was to make recommendations based on the first two 
parts. The aim of this final chapter is to connect these different chapters in order to see what the most 
important lessons learned are, how they should be valued, and what an appropriate way to move forward 
on this topic would be. It therefore consists of four parts; the first part draws conclusions from the most 
important findings of the different chapters, the second part discusses how these findings should be 
interpreted, the third part what recommendations for further improvements can therefore be made, and 
the fourth part discusses what future research into this topic would be useful. 
 
! Conclusions  
This chapter will go through the research by discussing the answers to the respective sub-research 
questions. In the end of this paragraph, the overall conclusion reached will be discussed. 
 
Objective 1: Find out what legal requirements apply to explosives safety in Boliden Mines. 
 
Sub-research question 1.1: What law is applicable to mining operations in Sweden, Finland and Ireland regarding 
explosives safety? 
 
The legal sources applying to explosives and blasting safety in mining environments have been identified. 
It turned out that all three countries have similar sources of law, namely an international and European 
layer related to material standards that is the same, a backbone of general mining, workplace and explosives 
legislation and subsequently more specific requirements in government regulations related to explosives 
utilisation in mining, storage and handling and some smaller related issues and permitting procedures. 
Sweden and Finland have one blasting safety regulation applicable to both underground and surface mining 
and civil engineering, whereas Ireland has a blasting safety regulation that specifically applies to 
underground mining. 
 
Sub-research question 1.2: What do international and national regulations in Sweden, Finland and Ireland require 
regarding explosives safety in mines? 
 
Legal requirements in Sweden and Finland are stated in a relatively general and discretionary manner, but 
put significant responsibilities on the employer. Irish regulations tend to be more specific. Importantly, all 
three jurisdictions assign a central role to the Blasting Foreman, and have some kind of regulation on any 
stage in the explosives handling and blasting process. European legislation puts extensive responsibilities 
on suppliers of explosives in regards of their product standards and delivery; storage and handling on site 
is the responsibility of the mine. Key requirements include the separate storage and transportation of 
detonators and explosives, required checks by Blasting Foremen and limitations on drilling near 
charging/charged sites. 
 
Sub-research question 1.3: Is it possible to align the explosives and blasting safety legislation of Sweden, Finland and 
Ireland? 
 
A fundamental different approach between the Irish and Nordic approach of storing explosives is in regards 
to the distinction that is made in Ireland between the magazine and reserve station. Such a distinction is 
not made in Nordic law. Also, Irish legislation is much older, which means regulation on modern explosive 
materials is less detailed in this case. The legal requirement to develop a comprehensive scheme of transit 
in Ireland seems to be worthy of consideration in the Nordic countries as well. In general, no contradictions 
occur, and some more complicated issues, such as regulations on the number of detonators per blasthole, 
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the distinction between detonator types and requirements in Nordic law aimed at blasting in urbanized 
areas could be aligned. 
 
Objective 2: Identify the main issues relevant to explosives safety in mining, the way in which Boliden 
Mines take care of these issues and the complications that occur with this implementation. 
 
Sub-research question 2.1: What are the key safety issues and prevention and mitigation measures and practices when 
storing, transporting and using explosives in mining? 
 
A distinction has to be made between material selection and practices; selection of the right materials can 
already help a lot in securing the goal of ensuring a safe working environment. A successful implementation 
of digital track & trace systems and an increased utilisation of electronic detonators is deemed to be helpful 
in this regard. In terms of practices, governmental authorities and the explosives industry have outlined 
various standards that may be helpful in the process of risk assessments and establishment of new internal 
working practices. 
 
Sub-research question 2.2: What rules, guidelines and practices does Boliden have regarding explosives safety? 
 
All researched Boliden mines have elaborated a large set of SOP’s, guidelines and other internal rules to 
ensure working safety. In the case of Sweden this has been done centrally from Boliden to a certain extent. 
In the case of Kevitsa, Finland, this is for a large part the responsibility of blasting contractor Orica. In all 
cases internal rules go well beyond in terms of level of detail compared to the specific legal requirements. 
Incident reporting is carried out centrally in Boliden and separately in Finland and Ireland.  
 
Sub-research question 2.3: What are practical complications and incidents that pose a threat to the fulfilment of safety 
requirements? 
 
It appears that blasting operations increasingly become safer, both within Boliden and in metal operations 
worldwide. All Boliden Mines have not had any injuries requiring medical treatment in the past six years in 
their blasting- and explosives handling activities, although there have been a few cases of near-misses. 
Misfires are singled out universally by staff as the main cause of concern, although it should be said that 
actual misfire rates are low. The implementation of digital track & trace systems in Ireland also seem to be 
worthy of improvement, given that the ordering system has suffered disruptions making scanning 
impossible. Based on data from the US, flyrock and noxious fumes appear to be the main threats to health 
and safety, and increasingly becoming the main cause of concern given that early detonation seems not to 
be a problematic issue anymore, and the use of electronic detonators may be an effective way to reduce the 
probability of misfires occurring. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has pointed out that the most critical activities 
in the blasting process are the appropriate selection of explosive materials, checks on presence in the 
blasting area and appropriate use of PPE. For underground mines, risk assessment of separate components 
showed that explosive materials lying at the wrong locations and blast area security procedure and the 
execution thereof that form the main concern. Concluding, maintaining stricter explosives handling 
procedures, more reliable blasting and the successful enforcement of existing blasting area security 
measures therefore appear to be critical to live up to the highest safety standards. 
 
Objective 3: Find a way to develop an explosives and blasting safety policy for Boliden mines of the highest 
standards compliant with legal and safety requirements and practical conditions. 
 
Sub-research question 3.1: How can legal requirements, existing and recommended practices be aligned to ensure no LTI’s 
occur in Boliden’s blasting operations? 
 
It is deemed useful to distinguish the practices between large underground, small underground mines and 
surface mines to a certain extent. Large underground mines were dealt with as a case on how to make 
significant improvements, based on typical causes. Three main categories of causes have been discussed, 
namely material, procedural and external causes. Material causes may be dealt with relatively easily, by using 
electronic detonators on a wider scale. The procedural category is most closely aligned to legal matters, and 
may sometimes be hard to implement, following the findings in the second part of this research on incident 
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causes. It is important to note that the most densely regulated safety hazard, early detonation, is also the 
one not leading to any accidents. Continued close compliance with the various legal requirements is 
therefore deemed most important for this hazard, whereas protection from other hazards is much less 
based in specific legal requirements, the only legal basis for the need to do this is the general requirement 
to ensure safe working environments. These different hazards therefore require a bigger reliance on the 
expertise of staff and suppliers, and the selection of the right materials. Therefore, in order to further 
improve explosives handling and blasting standards, a clear structure has been suggested that focusses on 
clear responsibilities per phase in both cycles, and since it would be standardised across different mines 
could be improved and compared by having the same responsibilities at different sites working towards the 
same goal. External causes are assumed to be non-mitigatable at their root, and therefore can only be dealt 
with by putting material and procedural mitigating measures in place. It was however found that external 
causes are responsible for only a tiny fraction of all incidents. 
 
The overall objective of this research was to work out a workable safety practice regarding explosives 
handling and blasting that is compliant with all three jurisdictions. This was translated into the following 
main research question: 
 
Is it possible to develop a multinational policy with regards to explosives- and blasting policy for Boliden Mines of the highest 
standards that is compliant with legal, operational and safety requirements? 
 
Concluding, it can be said that it indeed is possible to develop such a policy. Guidance has been provided 
to achieve this policy; first of all, it is based on three different Compliance with the highest legal standards 
has been achieved by adding up and combining all legal requirements. Then, safety statistics have been used 
to assess safety concerns and incidents that are present, to see where additional measures would be 
necessary. Thirdly, ongoing development of explosives handling and blasting technology will in many cases 
help to mitigate these risks. On this basis, company-wide standards and reporting systems can be developed. 
Operational requirements are suggested to be met by using this structure, from which people that actually 
do have the operational knowledge and experience can work. This could then achieve a universally legally 
compliant explosives handling and blasting policy that would ensure a zero-harm working environment. 
 
! Discussion 
The fact that it does seem possible to develop some form of multinational policy does not mean there are 
no critical points to be made. Perhaps the most important issue in this regard is that all operations and the 
legal landscapes in which they operate are changing continuously; the adoption of a new law could render 
important aspects of these suggestions useless. Also, the implementation of other technologies might raise 
further safety issues that do not play a role in this point, and different mine planning might change a lot as 
well. Regular updates, of both knowledge of multinational legislations and applied mining techniques and 
technologies used is therefore important.  
 
Another difficulty may be the different mining cultures from three different countries; although on paper 
many issues appear to be similar, this does not mean they will be translated into practice in the same way. 
This could also mean that some of the assumptions in this research might be wrong, since a lot of the 
assessments have been made based on “paper” policies, interviews, and reliance on reported incidents. 
Each mine, or even each person, might have different ways of interpreting the same text, or answering the 
same question.     
 
As for the specific Irish regulations on explosives utilisation in mining it should be noted that this legislation 
comes from 1972, and therefore appears to be outdated in regards of some of the conditions and 
technologies mentioned; it might be useful for the regulator to do a thorough overhaul in this regard, but 
this is of course not the responsibility of Boliden. A major overhaul of this old Irish legislation could 
however make many important legal findings in this research obsolete. 
 
On a more general notice, it is to be realised that in practice the issue of explosives handling and blasting 
safety and its compliance with the law does not seem to be a very concerning issue for Boliden Mines. As 
far as could be judged in the course of this research, there are no cases of breaches of legal requirements at 
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any Boliden Mines visited, all mines seem to take their responsibility in developing safety documents 
seriously, and no significant issues following explosives handling and blasting appear to have occurred. It 
could therefore be said that things might be going fine as they go, and that it might not be necessary to 
make any major changes, since these could cause other problems by themselves. 
 
! Recommendations 
Given that explosives handling and blasting already seems a rather safe aspect of the studied mining 
operations, in the sense that no physical injuries have occurred, and that it would theoretically be possible 
to meet the various different legal requirements without major adaptions, it seems reasonably possible to 
move towards a universally legally compliant and zero harm safety policy. The most important steps that 
should be taken to achieve this goal are recommended below. Recommendations are distinguished in three 
types; an alignment of legal requirements, improvements of working practices and the implementation of 
new technologies. 
 
Legal alignment seems helpful to meet legal requirements and meet safety standards, primarily because what 
is law in one country may already be a best practice or soft law in another. Also, given European integration 
overlap between national requirements, law is already getting aligned more and more by the regulators. 
Topics that seem especially suitable to align are the following: 
 
•! Assignment of responsibilities for different explosives handling and blasting tasks, since this could 
also help to improve exchange of best practices for specific tasks by these people. 
•! Requirements following law with a European background, in other words the requirements on 
transportation, explosives standards and marking and track & trace systems. Since the law is the 
same in this case anyway it seems to be inefficient to let all mines interpret these requirements 
separately. 
•! Other issues, that are explicitly national, such as permitting and licensing procedures can better be 
dealt with separately. Also, the implementation of the Irish storage regulation in other countries 
seems too much of an expense for other mines. 
•! The biggest difference between Ireland and the Nordic countries are the legal explosives handling 
requirements; although it may be too much to ask to build separate short-term and long-term 
storages as is required in Ireland, assigning dedicated powdermen for larger mines appears to be a 
successful way to reduce the number of incident related to explosives handling. 
 
As for practices, this may be the most critical aspect in terms of safety performance, since most causes for 
incidents that occur appear to be related to actual practice.  
 
•! Since most incidents appear to be related to people being unaware of blasting of blasting 
procedures, or simple negligence, creating wider awareness of the practices and procedures in 
place, instead of revising the practices and procedures themselves, might be a very effective way as 
well to improve safety performance. 
•! In order to monitor safety performance a multinational incident reporting system should be put in 
place, including the most minor incidents and near-misses, so that mines can learn from each other 
across borders. 
 
In the past, different explosive material usage has already greatly enhanced explosives safety. Therefore, 
technological changes may prove to be most effective. The most significant technological improvement 
could be reached by: 
 
•! Ensuring successful implementation of digital track&trace systems at all mine sites to have a real-
time eye on the whereabouts of all explosive materials at the mine site. 
•! Implementing a more wide-spread use of electronic initiation systems in order to avoid hazards of 
misfires and flyrock, which have been deemed to be the most significant. 
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Methodological improvements would follow the two structural concepts discussed in Chapter 10. This 
means to base any methodological improvement on a structural safety analysis, such as the bow-tie analyses 
made. From there each category should be checked for compliance with the legal requirements, that have 
been discussed before. Then, to turn these requirements in working practices, the model suggested based 
on the explosives handling cycle and the blasting cycle seems a good start. From this distinction of phases, 
with clear beginning and end-markings, experts from different mines could work out a standardised policy. 
Key suggestions in this regard are the implementation of a comprehensive scheme of transit, clear 
communication from one phase to another and working from a single legal basis that would allow for 
ongoing updates of requirements from different jurisdictions to be made. 
 
The implementation of all these measures should also be seen in the light of other aspects, such as economic 
considerations or operational conditions. For this reason, it is judged best to assess these aspects first before 
prioritising any of these measures over the other. 
 
! Further Research 
Following the findings of this research, many new questions have been raised, on matters that may require 
a more detailed or extended approach. First of all, explosives handling and blasting safety issues form just 
one aspect of the works carried out in a mine. Already during this research overlap was found with other 
operations in mining, such as with drilling and loading and hauling operations and ventilation requirements. 
Since these requirements might also affect explosives handling and blasting operations, and some people 
might be involved in all these different operations, a similar research in these other topics could be useful 
to further improve understanding into the legal safety landscape of Boliden Mines and European mines in 
general. 
 
Secondly, the two main recommendations regarding technological matters that were deemed to be helpful 
in regards of improving safety standards were related to the potential of track&trace systems and electronic 
initiation systems. Given that for track & trace the practical application seems to give difficulties of 
implementation, it should be found out how these can be solved, before the advantages of this system can 
become fully beneficial. Secondly, electronic detonators are already applied in most Boliden mines, mainly 
for reasons of improved blasting performance. This research has discussed this topic from the safety and 
legal standpoint, it might be worth it to undertake a more thorough comprehensive assessment of the 
viability of a more wide-spread implementation technology, combining the different operational and 
economic angles to assess this topic. 
 
Thirdly, in order to improve understanding and practices, it could be very useful to benchmark both the 
legal requirements and safety practices with other jurisdictions and other mining companies; this might 
offer insights that are yet unknown. Also, a more thorough analysis of incidents facing other operations 
would be helpful in setting the right strategy to prevent any harmful events from occurring.  
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IX.! Appendices 
 
A.! Specific Legal Requirements 
 
1.! Responsible Persons 
 
TABLE 26: RESPONSIBLE PERSONS 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Who is responsible for a 
blasting round? 
 
 
-Each blasting activity requires the 
assignment of a "sprängarbas"1. 
-It is possible that the employer is 
himself the sprängarbas. 
-Each blasting activity requires the assignment of 
a " räjäytys työnjohtaja ". 
-The identity of the räjäytys työnjohtaja shall be 
clear to all workers and his name be displayed in 
the working place. 
The person responsible for firing a shot is called the 
"shotfirer". This person needs to be a competent person 
appointed by the Mine Manager2. 
Legal basis §4 AFS 2007:1, note to §4 §8 16.6.2011/644 §7(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972; §13 Mines and 
Quarries Act 1965 
Responsibilities of the 
Blasting Foreman 
-Verify safe storage and dealing of 
explosives and associated equipment. 
-Verify that works are executed 
professionally and according to the 
given instructions. 
-Instruct other people involved in the 
blasting process. 
-The räjäytys työnjohtaja directs and oversees 
blasting activities. 
-The räjäytys työnjohtaja shall agree with the 
blasting plan. 
-The räjäytys työnjohtaja has to ensure that 
blasting activities are carried out according to the 
blasting plan. 
-The shot-firer shall retain the removable handle or key 
of the blasting machine in his personal possession until 
he has completed his shot-firing duties.  
Legal basis §4 AFS 2007:1 §8 16.6.2011/644 §21(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Eligibility of the Blasting 
Foreman 
-Documented theoretical knowledge 
around blasting. Preferred option is 
the education by the "Rådet för 
sprängteknisk utbildning, RfSU" 
-Needs to have a license for "ansvarig laddare" 
(responsible charger) when blasting within 200 
meters from areas where people live, otherwise he 
needs to have a license for "äldre laddare" (elder 
charger). 
-Has had at least 12 months of practical experience 
below ground during which he has been trained in the 
use of explosives. 
-A Mine Manager can only appoint a shot-firer to fire 
shots with a delay detonator or more than six shots 
                                                      
1 The “sprängarbas” in Sweden, “räjäytys työnjohtaja” in Finland and “shotfirer” in Ireland have comparable roles, and will be referred to as “Blasting Foreman” when it is not 
necessary to emphasize the national differences. 
2 The required qualifications and tasks of the Mine Manager are described in sections 13-22 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1965. The Mine Manager is appointed by the owner of the 
mine, the owner is the person who is in the end responsible for compliance with the Mines and Quarries Act 1965 and other relevant legislation (section 12). In daily operations, it is 
therefore the Mine Manager that is responsible for the compliance of mine practices with the relevant law, on behalf of the owner (section 13(2)). Following this, for the purpose of 
this research it is assumed that the roles of the employer under Swedish and Finnish law and Mine Manager under Irish law are comparable. “Employer/Manager” is the term that 
will be used for multinational rules to avoid confusion. 
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(Council for blasting engineering 
education).  
 
-The blasting license has to be taken to the job. 
-An "yngre laddare" is allowed to use at most 
25kg of explosives per day and at most 1 kilo of 
explosives per charge. 
unless he has practiced this particular type of shot-firing 
for at least five shifts under the close and exclusive 
personal supervision of a qualified shot-firer. 
 
Legal basis §6 AFS 2007:1 §8 16.6.2011/644; §27 3.6.2016/423 §8(3); §9 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Blasting Licenses The education should include 
terminology, types of explosives, 
detonators, calculations and designs 
around the field of blasting and 
explosives engineering, geological 
impacts of blasting, relevant 
legislation, measurements of 
resistances and practical assignments. 
The course has to be completed with 
a test, and the results have to be 
certified. 
-At least 1 year of experience in 
blasting. 
-In case of uncomplicated activities 
documented theoretical knowledge 
around the specific task and at least 2 
years of general industry experience. 
-Are issued by a RSAA. 
-Will be issued to people; 
-over 20 years old; 
-is healthy (as proven by a doctor);  
-has a good reputation3;  
-has the right education and competence; 
-with sufficient working experience. Each license 
can only be obtained when the lower license has 
been obtained previously as well. 
-Yngre Laddare: >6 months experience 
-Äldre Laddare: >12 months experience  
-Överladdare: >18 months experience 
-Ansvarig Laddare: >24 months experience 
-Procedures on the acquisition, renewal and 
(temporary) withdrawal of blasting licenses are 
listed in §11-17 of 3.6.2016/423. 
-Rules for the RSAA are listed in §22 and 23 of 
3.6.2016/423. 
 
 
Legal basis Note to §6 AFS 2007:1 §5-10, 3.6.2016/423  
Other people involved in 
the blasting process 
 
 
Other people can work with explosives as well, as 
long as they are under direct oversight of a 
qualified charger. 
-No one else than the shot-firer is allowed to blast by 
means of a delay detonator or in a round of more than 
six shots unless he is a shot-firer appointed by the Mine 
Manager, unless he is; 
-A person other than the shot-firer is only allowed to 
fire shots with an electronic detonator when he is in 
training, under close supervision of an experienced 
                                                      
3 The requirements with regards to health and reputation (criminal record) are worked out in detail in §6 and 7, but judged to have limited relevance for this research. Since it is 
impossible to apply similar standards to the blasting license acquisition in all three countries and has no effect on blasting procedure in practice this has not been included.  
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shot-firer and provided with written authority by the 
Mine Manager4. 
-For training purposes the trainee shot-fire can be in 
possession of the blasting machine key or handle as well, 
as long as he remains under the oversight of the trained 
shot-firer. 
Legal basis  §3 3.6.2016/423 7(1)(b); §7(2); §9; §21(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 
1972 
Person Responsible for 
Explosives Storage 
 People responsible for explosives storage and 
other people working with these shall be properly 
instructed and trained. 
The Mine Manager shall appoint such number of people 
and arrangements so that each place where explosives, 
blasting agents and detonators are stored has a 
competent person in charge. 
Legal basis  §37 14 20.8.2015/1101 §12(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Registration responsible 
people 
  -Particulars of the qualifications required for the above 
discussed tasks and functions shall be kept at the office 
of the relevant mine or at a similar place as approved by 
an inspector. 
-The Mine Manager shall keep a record of all shot-firers 
appointed by him, and if a shot-firer is appointed to fire 
shots by means of a delay detonator or in a round of 
more than six shots this shall be included in the record. 
Legal basis   §7(5); §10 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
 
  
                                                      
4 In all requirements mentioned in this report following from the Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 regarding tasks of the shot-firer the same rights and responsibilities will apply 
to the trainee-shot-firer, unless mentioned otherwise. 
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2.! Oversight 
 
TABLE 27: OVERSIGHT 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Responsibilities 
Employer 
-Provide sufficient information about the object to 
be blasted to the sprängarbas. Information must 
include rock mechanical characteristics such as 
faults, brittle rock or other forms of deformations 
or inhomogeneity’s in the rock mass. 
-Notify the sprängarbas about any issues that may 
be relevant for blasting. 
-Verify that the sprängarbas indeed is well-prepared 
and qualified to perform his task. 
-In case the employer has reason to 
believe that the validity of a blasting 
license could be affected due to certain 
issues he has the right to report this to the 
RSAA in written form. 
-The employer has to report any cases of 
accidents with explosives to the work 
environment authority. 
 
Legal Basis §5 and 7 AFS 2007:1, note to §5 §19 2016:423; §30 644/2011  
Inspector, Police  -In case the police has reason to believe 
that the validity of a blasting license could 
be affected due to certain issues it has the 
duty to report this to the RSAA 
immediately5. 
-Any legal person working with explosives 
shall request a permit and be ready to 
provide any information to the applicable 
authority, and be open to inspections. 
-The Minister6 or inspector may exempt a mine to apply 
any of the regulations in the Mines (Explosives) 
Regulations 1972 if he is satisfied that the safety of people 
working in the mine will not be negatively affected. 
-If a scheme of transit (see Transportation Requirements 
 
Table 31) does not meet the legal requirements according 
to the inspector he can require the Mine Manager to amend 
the scheme. 
-If a misfire plan does not meet the legal requirements 
according to the inspector he can require the Mine 
Manager to amend the scheme. 
Legal Basis  §20 2016:423; Chapter 14 3.6.2005/390 §5; §18(5); §51(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Permits -The municipality where explosives will be utilised 
needs to issue a permit allowing this. If explosives 
are used in more than one municipality a permit 
needs only to be obtained in the official residence 
or main place of works of the business. 
-A risk plan is required to undertake, this shall be 
documented. The people drawing up this plan shall 
have good experience with this type of work. 
  
                                                      
5 Similarly, healthcare professionals have the right to report concerns regarding a person with a blasting license to the RSAA, despite patient confidentiality requirements (§21 2016:423). 
6 "The Minister" means the Minister for Labour of the Republic of Ireland (§3(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972). 
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Legal Basis §16 Lag (2010:1011); Kap.2 §2, Kap. 5 §2 MSBFS 
2016:3 
  
Certifying bodies -Certifying bodies shall make a certificate for each 
class of object they have inspected, stating that the 
inspected object meets the legal requirements. The 
certificate is only valid for other objects that have 
been made in exactly the same way. 
-Certification of electrical initiation systems can be 
executed by a body that is accredited according to 
law 2011:791, type A, or a certification body from 
another EEZ-country if this body follows SSEN 
ISO/IEC 17020:2005 or EN 45011that applies the 
requirements of ISO/IEC 17011:2004. If the 
certification for a particular object has been granted 
in another EEZ-country or Turkey and with similar 
safety standards this is acceptable in Sweden as 
well. 
  
Legal Basis 40, 41 AFS 2007:1   
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3.! Quality Requirements with Regards to Explosives 
 
TABLE 28: QUALITY REQUIREMENTS OF BLASTING MATERIALS 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Quality 
requirements 
detonators/ 
blasting machine 
Detonators for both electric and non-electric 
detonation and all types of testing and 
measuring equipment needs to be certified by 
a certification body of type A that is 
accredited according to Lagen 2011:791. The 
check shall prove that unintended ignition is 
made impossible as much as possible 
according to AFS 2014:1, and that intended 
initiation is reliable. 
It is the duty of the employer to select the 
explosive material that causes the least danger.  
-The electric blasting machine is to be provided by the owner 
of a mine with the required cable and shall be suitable in all 
ways for single shots or for firing shots in a round. It is not 
allowed to blast anything with an electrical blasting machine, 
unless it is provided this way. 
-If a blasting machine appears to be defective or when it 
becomes defective while in use shall not use it further and 
return it to the surface immediately and report the 
circumstances to the manager in writing. If the blasting 
machine fails to fire a properly connected round in one go it 
shall be considered defective, although it still may be used to 
fire the misfires in accordance with the other regulations in 
the Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972. 
Legal basis §27 AFS 2007:1 §8 3.6.2005/390 §19(1), 20; §22 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Initiation 
systems of 
different 
manufacturers 
When electronical detonators are used, it is 
not allowed to use different detonation 
systems or manufacturers. 
Initiation systems and detonators of the same 
manufacturer shall be used, unless the different 
systems are compatible. 
 
Legal basis §26 AFS 2007:1 §9 16.6.2011/644  
Clarity on 
explosive 
materials used 
 The operator has a duty to obtain all the 
information from the manufacturer to ensure 
that he can work with the material. 
No blasting material or device shall be taken or used below 
ground in a mine other than material or a device provided by 
the owner of the mine. 
Legal Basis  §7 3.6.2005/390 §66(2) Mines and Quarries Act 1965 
Requirements on 
explosives to be 
used 
 -When working in an open pit mine, or 
underground workings less than 100m from 
the tunnel opening, in an urban area only 
cartridge explosives or explosives of similar 
safety level may be used. 
No explosive or blasting agent is allowed to be taken into or 
used in the mine, except when;  
-in accordance with the Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
and mine-specific regulations. 
-Have correct marking (see §0 of this chapter). 
Legal Basis  §9 16.6.2011/644 §11(1)(2) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Cleaning/ 
maintenance 
 
 
 
 
 
 -The Mine Manager shall ensure that the blasting machine is 
thoroughly cleaned and overhauled at least once every three 
months by the manufacturer or a competent person 
appointed by the Mine Manager. All multi-shot blasting 
machines shall be tested at the surface according to the 
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guidelines of the manufacturers, when failing this test, it shall 
not be taken below ground. Reports and dates on cleaning, 
overhaul and testing are to be registered.  
-Below ground, only in a certified workshop can be tampered 
with blasting machines. 
Legal Basis   §23; §24(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Ignition cables   -No cable with iron or steel wire covering shall be used unless 
during shaft-sinking or when initiation is done by means of 
electric current from a lighting or power circuit. 
-If a cable is used for another purpose than blasting it shall be 
used no more for blasting. 
Legal Basis   §19(3); §24(2) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Defective 
explosives 
  Defective explosives or blasting agents shall be deposed of in 
a safe manner. 
Legal Basis   §12(5) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
General 
Requirements on 
explosives usage 
 -Explosive goods shall be used in such a way 
that they don't cause damage, the prescribed 
safety instructions of the supplier shall be 
followed. 
 
Legal Basis  §78 3.6.2005/390  
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4.! Marking and Packaging of Explosives 
 
TABLE 29: MARKING AND PACKAGING OF EXPLOSIVES 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Marking of 
detonators 
  Period of delay has to be marked on a detonator to be allowed to be used or taken below ground. 
Legal Basis   §15(2); §29(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972   
Packaging of 
explosives. 
  -No explosives shall be taken or used into a mine except in cartridges.  
-The maximum amount of any explosive to be taken below ground is 2.27 kilograms (5 pounds) of cartridges. 
This has to be packaged in a secured case or canister, until they are about to be used for charging, and at no 
point in time more than one case or canister can be open. Deviation from this can only be done when there is 
a conveyance plan.  
Legal Basis   §17 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972  
Packaging of 
Detonators 
  -No detonator shall be taken below ground otherwise than in a securely fastened detonator cases provided by 
the owner of the mine. 
-The Mine Manager shall ensure no detonator case is issued unless it is impossible for any detonator or its leads 
to touch any metal part of the case exposed to the outside. 
-It is the responsibility of the shot-firer to keep the detonator in a securely fastened case, nothing else than a 
check sheet for recording shots is in the case, and that the case is kept separate from any other receptacle, and 
when not on his person or in his immediate vicinity the detonator is in a locked box without explosive on a safe 
place. 
Legal Basis   §15(1)(3); §16(1)(a)(b)(c)(d) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Ignition cables   Ignition cables shall be kept well in a case. 
Legal basis   §24(2) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Opening cases   When opening explosives or blasting agent cases or cartons only implements of copper, wood, fibre or other 
suitable materials shall be used. This does not apply to cutting wire or other binders. 
Legal Basis   §12(6) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
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5.! Storage Requirements 
 
TABLE 30: STORAGE OF EXPLOSIVES 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Risk management -Explosive materials should be stored in 
such a way that the risk of fire or explosions 
are minimised. 
-Areas where explosives are used in such a 
way and quantity that there is a risk for 
explosions shall be divided in risk zones E1, 
E2 and E3 according to Swedish standard 
SS 421 08 24 or a similar standard.  
-The zone division shall be documented in a 
classification plan, which shall be accessible 
at the risk site, at least the set-up of the area 
and their horizontal and vertical dimensions 
and temperature shall be included. 
-The plan shall be continuously updated. 
-Electrical and mechanical equipment shall 
be adapted for each zone. 
-The operator shall identify possible sources of 
initiation of materials that are expected to be 
permanently or temporarily in the storage. The specific 
initiation of the materials stored shall be considered.  
-Surface temperatures shall never exceed the 
temperature where the explosive materials or other 
materials can initiate or catch fire.  
-It is never allowed to have open fire around explosive 
materials.  
-Static charging shall be prevented. 
-Other initiation sources such as electromagnetic 
waves, ionic radiation or ultrasound shall be 
considered as well. 
A licensee shall write an assessment of the site and 
activities related to the storage. This for the purpose 
of identification of fire and explosive hazards, 
assessment of the risks presented by them, 
identification of the persons that might be harmed 
by them and a decision on safety measures needed 
to minimise these risks. This shall be forwarded to 
the competent authority with application or with a 
new assessment. The assessment shall be reviewed 
from time to time by a competent person. 
Appropriate mitigation measures shall be taken. 
General safety precautions and procedures, 
emergency, security and working procedures shall be 
provided as well. Any person on the site shall be 
provided by the licensee with adequate training and 
safety measures.  
Legal basis §32 AFS 2010:1; Kap. 6 §1-4 MSFBS 2016:3 §43-§47 20.8.2015/1101 §15 Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Dedicated storage Explosives shall be stored in a certified 
storage, separate from working rooms.   
 -No storage at a mine site is allowed unless the Mine 
Manager appoints a dedicated surface to this extent. 
This storage needs to have been licensed under the 
Explosives Act 1875. This storage is referred to as 
the "Explosives Store". 
-The storage shall be certified by competent persons. 
Legal basis Kap. 9 §1; §2 MSFBS 2016:3  §12(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972; §10(13) 
Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Permit If a temporary storage stays at the same 
place for more than 5 days a permit has to 
be requested at the local municipality. 
A permit has to be obtained for the temporary storage 
of explosive goods from the Safety and Chemicals 
Service. 
The storage of explosives requires a permit.  
-This permit is issued by a local authority. If the 
storage permit is awarded it can remain valid for at 
most 5 years. It contains provisions on the 
maximum quantity of explosives to be stored and 
the way in which this should be done. The 
conditions of storage can be changed by the local 
authority with prior approval of the Minister, when 
safety concerns arise. 
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 -The permit may even be revoked in case of 
noncompliance with the conditions or this order, or 
the site or store itself is no longer suitable. 
Legal basis Kap. 9 §39 MSFBS 2016:3 §58b 3.6.2005/390 §15 Explosives Act 1875; §7-9 Stores for Explosives Order 
2007 
Storage outside 
dedicated storage 
facilities 
-Explosive materials may be stored in a 
movable storage if the operations require 
this. 
-If an interruption of works occurs for more 
than three days the explosive materials shall 
be returned to the permanent storage or be 
guarded permanently. 
-A maximum of one workday load of explosives can 
be kept outside the explosives storage. The explosives 
should be clearly marked and constantly guarded. If 
the needed amount is less than 25kg a maximum of 
25kg of explosives can be kept. After working hours, 
all explosives have to be returned to the dedicated 
storage. Nevertheless, a charger can keep a maximum 
of 60kg of explosives at the blasting site.  
-Explosive materials that will be used during the day 
and explosive materials that the charger may store on 
the blasting site shall be marked and supervised 
continuously in a proper way and kept in a temporary 
or permanent storage with appropriate protection. The 
explosive materials can also be stored in a separate 
transport unit compliant with safety requirements. In 
the storage room, no other materials than explosive 
materials can be stored. The name and contact details 
of the person responsible for the storage shall be 
known on the blasting site and reported outside the 
storage. The storage shall be indicated in the blast site 
protection plan or another safety document for the 
working place. Detonators shall be placed such that 
they cannot initiate other explosives. The storage shall 
be at least 10 meters from a breakroom or other places 
where other people normally come. A risk assessment 
has to be made prior to the start of storage. 
-Temporary storage for ammonium nitrate solutions 
and other raw materials for emulsions shall be stored 
in dedicated spaces with sufficient spillage collectors. 
The storage shall be on a protected location, and at 
least 5 meters away from break rooms and offices. In 
the vicinity of the storage there may not be matters 
that can cause a fire hazard or burnable materials. The 
storage site has to be indicated in the relevant safety 
-The Mine Manager shall appoint at least one place 
which shall be situated conveniently near the top of 
each shaft or outlet normally used for the deposit of 
explosives, blasting agents and detonators brought 
out of the mine, and may appoint another place for 
the issue of explosives, blasting agents or detonators, 
the reserve station. 
-The person in charge of the reserve station has to 
ensure that; 
(a) any explosive is to brought back to the main 
storage if the mine is not to be worked for a period 
of fourteen days. 
(b) if the mine is worked, the explosive materials are 
to be handed over to the person responsible 
immediately after his own shift, brought back to the 
explosives storage or locked securely in the reserve 
station. 
(c) the key to this reserve station is either delivered 
to a person in charge of the explosive during the 
shift immediately following his shift, or deposited in 
the explosives store. 
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plan. The storage shall have the appropriate signs and 
be locked when not in use. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §1; §2 MSFBS 2016:3 §11 16.6.2011/644; §38; §39 20.8.2015/1101 §12(2); §17(7) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Distance from 
protected objects 
The distance of an explosive storage, for 
explosives of category 1.1, to protected 
objects such as urban areas and busy traffic 
shall be at least A meters, with. ! " #$ %&  
And at least A meters to other traffic roads. ! " ' %&  
with Q=netto weight explosive 
In case there is natural protection such as 
rock walls, the distance can be smaller, but 
never less than half of the distances 
mentioned above. The type of explosives 
stored also need to be considered. 
The distance of explosives and objects outside is the 
following for the respective categories: 
1.1 and 1.5: ( " ) * + * , # 
1.2 and 1.6: ( " ) * + * , - 
1.3: ( " ) * + * , ,$       
with: ( " ./0123456.04.+ ) " .678(910:6.596;;050642.3559</04=.. 29.!4467.,.9;.>$?@?>$,AB,,$, + " .+311.9;.678(910:6.04.)= 
 
For underground storages, the distance shall be at least 
60% of the above-mentioned distances. Minimum 
distances should in any case be at least 100-500 meter 
from public roads, railways etc., special buildings and 
urban areas, depending on the type of material stored. 
Check §13 and 15 for details on this. 
- The explosive of the highest risk class shall determine 
the natural separation distance, and the entire amount 
of explosive materials should be counted as being from 
the highest risk class. Explosives from categories 1.1, 
1.2 and 1.5 shall be at least 100m from high tension 
cables and gas pipelines. 
Separation distances to other buildings shall be in 
accordance with Schedule 4 of the Stores for 
Explosives Order 2007. Any explosive not in its 
ADR-packaging shall be treated as a class 1 
explosive. The explosive of the highest risk class 
shall determine the natural separation distance. 
-In excavated storages, a consultant shall determine 
the appropriate distance. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §16; Annex A, MSBFS 2016:3 §9-13, 15; 14 20.8.2015/1101 §13 Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
General storage 
requirements 
-Explosives shall be stored such that they 
cannot be affected by impact, tearing, 
heating or anything else that can cause them 
to explode. 
-Explosive materials shall be stored in an 
environment where they cannot age 
unnecessarily. 
-Storages shall be built such that: 
1) explosions cause as little dangerous debris as 
possible spread 
2) emergency services have unhindered access 
3) spread of accidents to other spaces is prevented as 
much as possible 
4) a possible explosion cannot get into other buildings 
5) outer walls have pressure reductions if necessary 
-The storage shall not have windows. 
-The storage shall comply with standard SFS 4397 
(permanent) or SFS 4298 (temporary).  
-The storage shall prevent the ingress of moisture 
and protect against climatic effects. 
-Internal walls, ceilings, other surfaces, furniture, 
fittings etc. shall be made such that they can easily 
be cleaned. 
-No iron or steel shall be exposed. 
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-Additional requirements apply to storages for 
oxidising controlled substances7. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §6-7MSFBS 2016:3 §27; §28 20.8.2015/1101 §10(3);(9);(10) Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Way of storing 
explosives 
-Explosives shall be stored decently, and as 
long as possible in unopened original 
transportation packaging. 
-Packages shall be placed such that there is a 
good overview of the storage, and that there 
is sufficient place to load and unload. 
  
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §4-5 MSFBS 2016:3   
Other 
objects/electricity/ 
equipment in the 
storage 
-In a storage only material objects that do 
not increase the risk of fire or explosion can 
be left. 
-Explosives shall be placed at such a 
distance from electrical equipment that they 
cannot cause initiation of the explosives. 
-Electricity in the storage shall be switched 
off when there is no work going on. 
-A space in a storage cannot be used as a 
place to leave motorised equipment for 
more than the time necessary to 
load/unload needed materials. 
 (Electrical) equipment shall be compliant with the 
standard "HSE Guidance Note PM 82" or a similar 
standard. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §8-11 MSFBS 2016:3  §10(7) Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Separation of types 
of explosive 
materials 
-Explosive materials shall be divided in 
groups according to annex 6 of MSFBS 
2016:3; explosive materials in groups C, D, 
E and G should be stored together. 
Explosive materials of group S can be stored 
together with explosive materials from other 
groups except from groups A and L. Other 
groups cannot be stored together. 
-Detonators shall be stored separately from 
other explosive materials.  
  
                                                      
7 §11 Stores for Explosives Order 2007 lists a series of requirements in this regard. Since emulsions are supplied by a contractor that is also responsible for its manufacturing in 
Boliden mines it is kept outside the scope of this research. It is however important to notice that controlled substances shall not be stored on the same site as conventional 
explosives, unless separation distances are maintained according to Table 10 of Schedule 4; different controlled substances shall be stored separately from each other unless 
they are known to be incompatible, and oxidising substances shall be stored separately from fuels and other incompatible substances (§14 Stores for Explosives Order 2007).  
 115 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §14; §15 MSFBS 2016:3   
Storage of mobile 
aggregates 
 Storage of mobile aggregates shall be such that they do 
not cause danger to other works in the area. The 
distance between rooms storing mobile aggregates and 
other objects and rooms shall be at least 5 meters. 
Unauthorised access is not allowed, and it shall be easy 
to notice leakage. Rests of explosive materials that 
occur with cleaning of the aggregate shall be stored 
according to the specific permit requirements. 
 
Legal Basis  §9-13, 15; 14 20.8.2015/1101  
Access to the 
storage 
-Keys, codes etc. shall be stored such that 
unauthorised people cannot get them, or 
they shall be under constant supervision. 
The doors to the storage shall be locked 
except for (un)loading or other necessary 
activities. 
-Each storage shall be protected against 
access by unauthorised people; the 
protection shall be adapted to the level of 
desirability. For mining explosives, this is 
level A according to Annex 7 of MSFBS 
2016:3, which means that the access should 
be able to withstand an attack with handheld 
tools and electrical tools for at least 80 
minutes. 
-Storages shall be burglar-proof. They shall be installed 
with a functioning warning system that transfers the 
signal to a person that is close or in a security shift. The 
possible impact of radio-waves of the system on the 
materials stored shall be considered. 
-Explosive materials shall be stored and handled so 
that unauthorised people cannot get access or danger 
the workings. It shall always be clear how many people 
are in danger in case of accidents. Rooms shall be 
equipped with systems that warn when unauthorised 
people get in. 
-Unauthorised access shall be prevented. Doors, 
openings, security systems etc. shall comply with a 
standard approved by the Commissioner of the 
Garda Síochána. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §12; §17-23 MSFBS 2016:3 §28; §35 20.8.2015/1101 §10(4)(5) Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Anchoring -Storages shall be anchored or weigh at least 
500 kg when they store explosives of 
desirability level A. 
  
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §24 MSFBS 2016:3   
Protection against 
fire 
-A storage shall have fire protection of at 
least fire technical class EI 30. This does not 
apply when there is no risk for fire in the 
area. 
-Trucks with combustion engines accessing 
the storage shall have both fixed and 
handheld fire extinguishers. Such trucks 
The storage shall be able to withstand at least 120 
minutes of fire on the outside. 
-The licensee shall ensure that the fire authority 
concerned confirms that the fire detection, alarm 
safety, resistance, escape routes, fire-fighting 
equipment are in accordance with the "Guidance 
Document on Fire Safety". 
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shall also have a main switch for their 
battery current. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §25-26 MSFBS 2016:3 §28 20.8.2015/1101 §10(8) Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Protection against 
thunderstorms 
Surface storages storing at least 500kg of 
explosives shall have sufficient protection 
against thunderstorms. 
Surface storages storing at least 500kg of explosives 
shall have sufficient protection against thunderstorms. 
-Lightning protection shall be fitted. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §27 MSFBS 2016:3 §46 20.8.2015/1101 §10(11) Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Storage 
underground 
-Storage in rock excavations shall be placed 
and constructed such that there is no hazard 
for explosions by rock loosening, flyrock 
with blasting or collision with vehicles. 
-For a storage in a tunnel roadheading shall 
the storage be surrounded with a thick layer 
that protects against impact. For storage in 
a tunnel or roadheading that follows 
progress the distance to the blasting face 
shall always be sufficient. 
Underground storages shall be located as far as 
possible from regular working places and in such a way 
that blasting that is executed in the area does not 
damage the storage. Spreading of fire to the storage 
shall be prohibited, there shall be no burnable 
materials around the storage. The location of the 
storage shall be motivated, and a risk assessment of the 
storage on the location and protection by a 
comparison of different alternatives shall be 
undertaken. The minimum distance between the 
storage and other rooms shall be at least 30 meters and 
the rock roof at least 15 meters. The storage should 
not be closer than 100 meter from the tunnel mouth. 
The storage shall have its own cave that can be locked 
and prohibits unauthorised people from entering. 
Detonators shall be placed such that they cannot 
initiate other explosives.  
 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §32-33 MSFBS 2016:3 §22 20.8.2015/1101  
Signs -A storage shall have shields that indicate the 
risk of explosion, a prohibition of smoking 
and open fire, and the largest quantity of 
explosives that can be stored there. 
-The shields shall be weather and impact 
resistant. They shall be in accordance with 
Annex 9 of MSFBS 2016:3. They shall be 
placed and adapted to their environment 
and also visible in the dark. 
-Signs shall be removed when they are no 
longer relevant. 
Storages shall have the appropriate signs so that it is 
clear what hazard the storage poses. At least the 
necessary prohibitions and the contact details of the 
responsible person shall be mentioned.  
The licensee shall display in a prominent position 
near the entrance to the storage- fire safety and 
dangerous goods hazard signs, maximum quantity of 
the hazard type or types authorised by the license to 
be kept in the storage, maximum number of both 
employees and all persons permitted by the licensee 
to be present in the store, the general and special 
rules for explosives, procedures, and a copy of the 
current license. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §28-30 MSFBS 2016:3 §28; §30 20.8.2015/1101 §10(12) Stores for Explosives Order 2007 
Supervision   -All detonators shall be in the sole charge of the 
Mine Manager, or when the Mine Manager has 
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appointed this person, a person that is in charge over 
the store. 
-An explosives storage shall at any time be under the 
supervision of a competent person. 
Legal Basis   §14(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972; §12 Stores 
for Explosives Order 2007 
Taking explosives 
from storage 
-When using explosives from a store, those 
that have been longest in shall be taken out 
first. 
 
 -When using explosives from a store, those that have 
been longest in shall be taken out first. 
-No one shall be in possession of a detonator 
outside the store, except for a shot-firer (or one in 
training), or a person with written permission of the 
Mine Manager. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §5 MSFBS 2016:3  §12(4); §14(2) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Reporting 
Requirement 
-He who stores explosive materials, shall 
keep a log containing and continuously 
updating information on the amount of each 
explosive material that is stored. Daily 
updates shall be accessible at another 
appropriate place than the storage. 
 Any accident by explosion in connection with an 
explosives storage shall be reported to the safety 
authority, who may decide on further measures. 
Legal Basis Kap. 9 §13 MSFBS 2016:3  §63-66 Explosives Act 1875 
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6.! Transportation Requirements 
 
TABLE 31: TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Delivery and 
unloading of 
explosives 
-It is not allowed to transport any explosive material 
when it is not following the rules in Lag 2006:263, and 
necessary precautions have been taken to ensure negative 
impacts on life, health, environment and property, and 
verified that all vehicles, packaging and other materials 
used are appropriate.  
-It is necessary to have at least one safety advisor for each 
task, who has the sole risk to avoid damage resulting from 
the transport and delivery. 
-Authorities exercising oversight duties have the right to 
require any information, stop a transport or access sites 
in order to inspect the safety situation8. If necessary 
transports can be forbidden or additional measures 
required by the overseeing authority. 
-For road transport permission shall be 
requested. The driver shall have an 
appropriate license.  
-Safety precautions should be taken for 
the transport of explosives. Rules can 
be established on this, documentation 
on the necessary precautions and these 
rules should be taken along by the 
transporter. 
-It is necessary to have at least one 
safety advisor for each task. 
-The Ministry of Communication is in 
the end responsible for overseeing 
explosives transports. 
 
Legal Basis §2, 6; §11; §13, 14 2006:263 §11(b); §10c; §11(c) 2.8.1994/719  
Internal 
Conveyance 
plan 
  The Mine Manager may decide to convey explosives9 in 
bulk from a storage to a reserve station, if he makes a plan. 
This "scheme of transit" should include provisions on; 
-Location, construction and marking of each reserve 
station, detonator store and custody of the keys thereof; 
-Design and construction of the special carriage; 
-Supervision and precautions to be taken during transit of 
the carriage; 
-Supervision of explosives at a reserve station and 
detonators at a detonator store; 
-Manner of conveying explosive and detonators to any 
working face; 
-Maximum quantity of explosive and the maximum 
number of detonators permitted at their respective stores. 
                                                      
8 Requirements related to oversight can be found in §12-20 2006:263, but they apply to governmental authorities or legal disputes about issued permits and are 
therefore left out since they do not directly affect working practices on a mine site. 
9 In this table, "explosive" includes blasting agents. 
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-Issue of explosive and detonators from their respective 
stores; 
-Return of explosives and detonators to their respective 
store; 
-Ways to ensure that explosives are moved in accordance 
with this plan. 
Legal basis   §18(1)(2);(3)(b) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Size of 
Transport 
  The quantity of explosives moved shall not exceed the 
amount needed in the coming 48 hours. 
Legal basis   §18(3)(a) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Protective 
measures 
-Explosive materials that are moved within the mine have 
to be protected against mechanical impact, heat and 
anything else that can cause fire or explosions. 
-Each powered vehicle shall be equipped with fire 
extinguishers. 
-Vehicles transporting explosives have 
to have been certified by the Transport 
Safety Agency. 
 
Legal basis §8 AFS 2007:1; §34 AFS 2010:1 §7a 2.8.1994/719 §18(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
People involved 
in transport 
Only people that are strictly necessary for the transport 
are allowed to travel along the vehicle or lift transporting 
the explosives. 
 A scheme of transit can impose duties and prohibitions 
on employed persons, it is the duty of the Mine Manager 
to ensure compliance. 
Legal basis §8 AFS 2007:1  §18(4) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Restrictions on 
other goods 
Explosive materials cannot be transported together with 
other hazardous materials. 
  
Legal basis §8 AFS 2007:1   
Documentation  Documentation shall be kept on all 
explosives that are being transported to 
a working place or returned to the 
dedicated storage. The form and 
content shall be described. 
The Mine Manager shall ensure that a copy of the scheme 
of transit is posted and kept posted so that anyone can 
read it clearly, and one is supplied to any shot-firer and 
store manager. 
Legal basis  §12 16.6.2011/644 §17(8) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
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7.! Planning 
 
TABLE 32: PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Planning 
requirements 
Each object to be blasted requires 
planning. Planning and execution 
should be such that physical harm 
as a consequence of the blasting will 
be avoided. 
The employer shall develop the blasting safety plan. It shall include the following 
aspects: 
1. Characteristics of the rock to be blasted. 
2. Electrification, lighting, communication, extraction techniques and other 
technical specifics. 
3. Roads, exits and safe havens. 
4. Equipment selection and maintenance. 
6. Safe working methods. 
7. Explosives that are used. 
8. Emergency plan. 
9. Other factors that may be of importance. 
 
A danger zone has to be defined. 
Legal basis §3 AFS 2007:1 §3 16.6.2011/644 §37 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Risk 
Management 
Risk assessment necessary for each 
object to be blasted. 
-Risk assessment has to be undertaken following the rules in §10:1 of the Finnish 
Workplace Safety Law 738/2002. This means it should be a systematic approach 
identifying the difficulties and risks related to the job, working place, environment 
and time. -If it is not possible to remove these risks the possible negative impact 
has to be assessed. All effects on both health and safety have to be included. 
-Any activity that includes exceptional hazards cannot be executed without explicit 
safety measures having been ordered by the management. 
 
Legal basis §3 AFS 2007:1 §3 16.6.2011/644; §10:1 2002/738; §4 16.6.2011/644  
People to be 
involved 
The sprängarbas has to be involved 
in the development of the blasting 
plan. 
The räjäytys työnjohtaja has to agree on the blasting safety plan.  
Legal basis Note to §3 AFS 2007:1 §8 16.6.2011/644  
Form and 
reporting of the 
risk 
management 
plan 
 The blasting plan has to be formulated in an understandable manner and discussed 
with the people that will have to work with it. Before a new activity is undertaken 
the employer has to ensure that all employees are aware of the suggestions in the 
plan. 
 
Legal basis  §4 16.6.2011/644  
Updates to the 
blasting plan 
 The blasting safety plan has to be continuously checked and updated.  
Legal basis  §4 16.6.2011/644  
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8.! Preparation of Blasting Materials 
 
TABLE 33: PREPARATION OF BLASTING MATERIALS 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
General duties on the 
preparation of explosive 
materials 
 
 
 -The employer has a duty of care regarding the 
manufacturing of explosives. 
-It is necessary to prevent accidents and take 
measures regarding the entire process of 
explosives used in the mining process. 
-The Safety & Chemicals Service has to grant a 
permit for the preparation of explosives, both in 
the case of permanent and temporary facilities. 
 
Legal basis  §9; 10; 58,58a 3.6.2005/390  
Preparation 
fuses/detonators 
  A safety fuse should not be capped with a detonator at any place 
at a mine other than a workshop duly used and located in 
pursuance of and in accordance with §47 of the Explosives Act, 
1875. 
Legal basis   §13 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Preparation of explosives on 
site10 
-There shall be a sufficient 
distance between the place 
of manufacturing and 
protected objects. 
 -Preparation of a blasting agent shall not be carried out below 
ground in a mine. 
-Preparation of blasting agents is only allowed with written 
permission of the Minister or an inspector. 
Legal basis Kap. 10 §4 MSFBS 2016:3  §11(3)(4) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Permit for Explosives 
preparation 
  -It is not necessary for someone who holds a permit for an 
explosives storage to request a full permit for an explosives 
factory for the preparation of explosives on site, as long as the 
explosive of one description is not converted into an explosive of 
another description, and the explosives are solely for use at the 
mine site. The workshop where this task is done shall also be 
separate from the explosives store. 
Legal basis   §47 Explosives Act 1875 
 
  
                                                      
10 There are more detailed requirements on the preparation of emulsions and manufacturing of explosives in general to be found in MSFBS 2016:3 (Sweden), 
20.8.2015/1101 (Finland) and Explosives Act 1875 and associated regulations (Ireland). This preparation is however never carried out by Boliden (as was found in chapter 
3), and is therefore not discussed in this research. Only regulations that direct affect mining operations or Boliden's own activities have been listed here. 
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9.! Working Environment during charging 
 
TABLE 34: WORKING ENVIRONMENT REQUIREMENTS DURING CHARGING 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Lighting The workplace should have sufficient and suitable lighting. The workplace should have sufficient lighting. The 
minimum standard is lighting carried along by miners. 
 
Legal basis §9 AFS 2007:1 §19 16.6.2011/644  
Information on 
hazardous places 
 The räjäytys työnjohtaja shall indicate and mark where 
shelters and the hazardous area around the blasting object 
are located.  
 
Legal basis  §16 2011 644  
Electricity in the 
Environment 
In case electrical detonators are used: 
-If the blasting takes place in the vicinity of for examples of 
power lines or electrified railway the operator has to be 
contacted. 
-Safe distances with electricity cables, transformer stations, 
welding facilities and other electrical facilities has to be ensured 
-In case of possible influence by thunderstorms the affected 
area has to be evacuated immediately 
Electrical detonators cannot be used in the vicinity of power 
lines, electrified railways, transformer stations, 
thunderstorms or anything else causing electromagnetic 
waves.  
 
Legal basis §12 and 13 AFS 2007:1 §10 16.6.2011/644  
Surveillance charged 
area 
 
 
An area that has been charged has to be kept under 
surveillance and unauthorised people should be stopped 
from entering. 
 
Legal basis  §4 16.6.2011/644  
 
  
 123 
10.! Charging Equipment 
 
TABLE 35: CHARGING EQUIPMENT 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Charging tools Any cleaning and charging tools used need to be such that unexpected sparks 
do not occur and unwanted initiation does not occur. 
-If gunpowder or gas generating substances are charged the charging rod has 
to be made of wood. 
  
Legal basis §14 and 16 AFS 2007:1   
Charging Equipment for 
pumpable emulsions 
Charging equipment for ANFO and pumpable emulsions may only be 
operated by operators trained by the producer of the explosive or their 
official representative. 
  
Legal basis §20 AFS 2007:1   
Charging hose -The charging hose has to be made in such a way that electrostatic charging 
is impossible during explosive charging. 
-When the hose is used to charge ANFO or other forms of explosives in 
powder form the charging hose should have a resistance of 1-30 k!/m, and 
be marked clearly with information regarding the type of hose, dimensions 
and the type of explosive for which it is intended.  
  
Legal basis §15 AFS 2007:1   
Equipment in touch with 
explosive materials 
Equipment that is used to prepare explosive materials shall be such that the 
risk for unintended initiation is as small as possible and such that it is easy to 
maintain, clean and repair. 
  
Legal basis Kap. 10 §25 MSFBS 2016:3   
Maintenance -Maintenance of equipment that is of special importance from a safety 
standpoint shall be carried out and checked according to a maintenance plan. 
-Before each modifying, repair or maintenance job a risk assessment shall be 
made. Rooms, tools etc. shall be cleaned so that the work cannot cause 
initiation of explosive materials. 
-There shall be documented routines describing ongoing maintenance, 
returning service and checks of safety functions. 
-Carried out maintenance, services shall be documented. 
-After each moving of mobile preparation equipment the operator shall check 
if there is leakage or other visible damage, and that the inbuilt safety functions 
function properly. 
-The operator shall draw up plans, that ensure by 
preventive maintenance, inspections, testing etc., 
that materials and rooms for explosives are in a 
good state. The hazards of parts of a system or 
entire systems malfunctioning on the safety shall 
be taken into account shall be discussed, together 
with the age of the system and possible 
information on the history of previous 
inspections. Inspections and tests and possible 
failures shall be recorded. There shall also be a 
maintenance record. 
 
Legal basis Kap. 10 §26; §28; §38-40 MSFBS 2016:3 §36 20.8.2015/1101  
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Security -Places where mobile preparation equipment is located shall, when explosives 
preparation goes on, be clearly separated from other activities and people in 
the area. 
-Vehicles carrying mobile preparation shall have, on top of the ordinary lock, 
have a system that can prohibit unauthorised people to start the vehicle. 
- Vehicles carrying mobile preparation shall have a system that can prohibit 
unauthorised people to start the preparation equipment. 
  
Legal basis Kap. 10 §35-37 MSFBS 2016:3   
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11.! Charging 
 
TABLE 36: CHARGING REQUIREMENTS 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
General  -Blasting activities shall be carried out 
professionally, according to plan and cautiously.  
-Instructions of the manufacturer and legal 
requirements are to be followed when handling 
with them. 
-Charging shall not commence before it is ensured that the blasthole 
has been cleaned out thoroughly, air is only to be used for cleaning 
when dust can be minimised. 
-A blasthole shall not be charged by anyone except the shot-firer or 
someone under supervision of the shot-firer. It shall only be charged 
when it is necessary to blast soon after. It shall be ensured that the 
hole is both placed and drilled so to be safe for blasting. Charging 
shall not commence before all holes in the face of a heading, drift, 
raise, ripping, shaft or winze have been drilled. 
Legal basis  §9 16.6.2011/644 §26; §27 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Stoppers and 
Preloading 
-Preloading and separating stoppers 
between charges in a borehole shall be 
made of such material and executed in 
such a that the explosives can still be 
accessed if necessary. 
-If powder explosives are used for 
preloading it is necessary to be aware of 
the demolition sensitivity of the powder 
and to avoid unintended ignition. 
  
Legal basis §17 AFS 2007:1   
Drilling near 
charges 
-Charging near drilling activities shall be 
avoided, appropriate distance required. 
 
-Before drilling commences it has to be checked 
whether this can be carried out according to the 
blasting plan. 
-Drilling activities have to be immediately 
stopped when it is suspected that there are 
explosive materials in there, or when the drilling 
is taking place close to a charged hole. 
-The räjäytys työnjohtaja has to be informed 
immediately if such and other issues affecting 
safety occur during drilling, it is only allowed to 
continue working after he has permitted this 
and if necessary changed the blasting plan. 
-Drilling shall not be carried out within 1.52m (5 feet) of a hole 
containing any explosives or blasting agent. 
-Drilling and charging operations shall not be carried out 
simultaneously on the same face within 7.62 meters (25 feet of each 
other).  
Legal basis §11 AFS 2007:1 §13 16.6.2011/644 §25(3); §25(4) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
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Cleaning 
of/moving 
into blastholes 
Is not allowed to be done with drilling 
rigs. 
 -No tool other than one made entirely of wood shall be inserted into 
a blasthole, unless it is a device for pneumatic stemming approved 
by the Minister, or a device approved by the Minister to remove a 
cartridge from a blasthole in case of a misfire. 
-Any tool to move into a blasthole shall be approved by the owner 
of the mine. 
Legal basis §10 AFS 2007:1  §30(2); §25(6) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Amount of 
explosives 
charged 
 
 
The amount of explosive charged shall not be 
less or more than necessary. 
 
Legal basis  §14 16.6.2011/644  
Stemming   The charger of a shot-hole shall ensure that it is stemmed when 
necessary, with suitable and non-flammable stemming sufficient to 
prevent a blow-out. 
Legal basis   §30(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Cartridges   Cartridges shall be put in a blasthole as a complete cartridge. The 
cartridges shall be of the same diameter and form of explosive, unless 
the blasting technique requires otherwise. The cartridges shall not be 
pushed in violently, and shall not overcharge, in which case a partial 
cartridge may be inserted.  
Legal basis   §28(2)(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Unfinished 
charging; 
removal of 
blasting 
materials 
When the charging of a hole has been 
unfinished without the insertion of a 
detonator the hole has to be marked. 
 -Stemming shall not be removed from a charged blasthole otherwise 
than by means of water and air. 
-A detonator lead shall never be taken out any charged blasthole. 
-An explosive shall not be removed from a blasthole, unless: 
a) explosive forming a part or portion of a cartridge is left protruding 
from the hole as a result of blasting. 
b) in case of misfires (see Subchapter 16). 
Legal basis §10 AFS 2007:1  §31 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Taking the 
detonator from 
the case 
  A detonator shall not be taken from its case unless it is immediately 
required for charging of a blast-hole. 
Legal basis   §16(2) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Risk for non-
detonation; 
number of 
detonators 
The risk for non-detonation has to be 
minimised. If there is a risk of non-
detonation two detonators have to be 
used. 
 Not more than one detonator per blasthole shall be used, except in 
case of misfires (see Subchapter 16) or where the method of blasting 
determines otherwise. 
Legal basis §18 AFS 2007:1  §29(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
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Isolation of 
ignition cables 
It is required to properly isolate all 
ignition cables to avoid short-circuiting, 
breach of cables or touch with conductive 
materials. 
  
Legal basis §23 AFS 2007:1   
Communicatio
n and oversight 
If possible direct regular contact between 
people working should be maintained. If 
direct personal contact is impossible 
remote communication devices have to 
be used.  
-If an employee has to work alone, the employer 
shall have contact with him at least once during 
the working day and at the end of his shift. 
-Blasting activities shall be organised such that 
there are regular visual and audio interactions 
with short time intervals, if necessary with 
telecommunication. 
-The räjäytys työnjohtaja shall visit the blasting 
object at least once a shift, unless the blasting 
safety plan indicates that less or more visits are 
necessary. 
 
Legal basis  §6 16.6.2011/644  
Charging and 
Blasting 
Preparations in 
Shafts and 
Winzes 
  -Only explosives or blasting agents shall be taken into a shaft or 
winze that are immediately required for charging. 
-Only the shot-firer shall take a primer cartridge with a detonator 
into a shaft being sunk, and this only in a thick felt bag or another 
form of appropriate shock protection. 
Legal basis   §40,41 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Opened 
casings 
  No more than one canister of explosive shall be open at any time 
unless provided otherwise in the conveyance plan and reserve station 
rules. 
Legal basis   §28(1) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Unused 
explosive 
materials 
Materials that have not been used shall be 
returned to the explosives storage or 
guarded on site. 
 If there are still detonators unused at the end of the period of duty 
of the shot-firer, the case with the detonator(s) shall be returned to 
the explosives storage. 
Legal basis Kap. 9 §3 MSFBS 2016:3  §16(1)(e) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
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12.! Initiation Techniques 
 
TABLE 37: INITIATION TECHNIQUES 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Initiation methods It is required to use methods that cause 
detonation immediately after initiation.  
-It is allowed to use delayed methods only 
when it is certain that no one can enter the 
blasting area in the period between initiation 
and detonation. 
 The person firing shall ensure that; 
-the detonators are connected in series and no wire is used for connecting 
detonators other than the wire manufactured solely for that purpose when 
using electric initiation methods. 
>The firing cable is not in and cannot make contact with any other cable or 
electric apparatus; 
>No person other than the (trainee) shot-firer shall couple a shot-firing 
cable in a mine to a detonator or blasting apparatus. 
-The firing cable shall not be connected to a blasting apparatus before it has 
been connected to a detonator (circuit). 
Legal basis §22 AFS 2007:1  §34(3);(4);(5);(6) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Electric detonation   Before blasting by means of electric initiation the person blasting has to 
check the circuit for continuity by means of an approved testing device. 
-This test cannot be undertaken before all persons in the vicinity have 
withdrawn to a place of safety and he has taken proper shelter himself, this 
provision does not apply when only approved testing devices are used. 
-An approved testing device that  
a) produces a current automatically limited to one tenth of the minimum 
current required to explode a low-tension detonator and; 
b) is approved by an inspector. 
Legal basis   §34(7);(8) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Detonation systems by 
means of current from 
lighting/power circuits 
  -The Mine Manager shall appoint one or more responsible persons to have 
charge of the blasting device and ensure this person is in charge when shots 
are fired.  
-No blasting is to be undertaken except with written permission of an 
inspection determining the conditions of the blasting machine. This shall 
include the device switch mechanism returning automatically to the open 
position, the live side of the device is installed in a fixed locked box 
accessible only to the shot-firer, the leads to the face of the mine are short-
circuited when the blasting device is in the open position, the devices are 
mounted in a lockbox that can only be opened when both the contacts of 
the device are open and the short-circuiting device is open. The device is 
electro-magnetically operated when the voltage exceeds 550 volts.  
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-It is necessary that the shot-firer ensures himself that all precautions have 
been taken that the drilling and charging done have been performed safely 
in accordance with the Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972. 
-The detonators are to be connected in series and no wire other than wire 
connected solely for this purpose is used. 
Legal basis   §45-48 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Fuses -If detonating fuses are used for initiation the 
initiation system shall be set up with a ring 
line and branches from here. The branches 
shall be coupled perpendicular to the ring line 
and the distance between the branches shall 
be such that the branches cannot initiate each 
other. 
-When blasting around urban areas or in 
tunnels the charge weight cannot be more 
than 20g per meter fuse. 
 -A fuse needs to be at least 0.91m (3ft) long for a single shot, and 1.22m 
(4ft) long for a round. 
-No more than four shots at one time shall be fired by fuse unless that is 
approved by an inspector. 
-The shot-firer shall ensure that, when fuses are used 
a) no naked lights or a person smoking are allowed above nor within 1.22m 
(4ft) in any direction of any blasthole, explosive or detonator. 
b) any surplus explosive is removed from the vicinity of the blasthole before 
a naked light is brought to it for the purpose of lighting the fuse. 
Legal basis §32, 33 AFS 2007:1  §35 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
NONEL If NONEL-systems are used this should be 
done such that unintended ignition cannot 
occur. 
  
Legal basis §31 AFS 2007:1   
 
 
  
 130 
13.! Blasting 
 
TABLE 38: BLASTING 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Blasting of charged 
holes 
  Each shot-firer shall fire each hole that has been charged by him or by 
someone under his supervision, unless this is done by a trainee shot-firer 
or is prevented from doing so for circumstances beyond his control. The 
blasting shall occur in a cautious and safe manner. 
Legal basis   §32 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Removing handle/key   The handle or key of a blasting machine shall not be put in position in 
the blasting machine before he is about to fire and shall remove this 
immediately after. 
Legal basis   §21(2) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Cover When harm can result as a consequence of 
blasting it is required to cover the blasting 
area. It is necessary to assess rock 
characteristics and the expected direction of 
rock debris after blasting in this assessment. 
The need for cover is to be 
judged in the blasting plan, and 
has to be executed accordingly 
if deemed to be necessary.  
 
Legal basis §36 AFS 2007:1 §15 16.6.2011/644  
Restrictions on 
size/number of blasts 
  The inspector can prohibit a mine in writing of firing more than six shots 
in a round. 
Legal basis   §34(1)(b) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Special blasting -Powder-based tools used to blast muck, 
concrete etc. shall have a maximum charge 
weight of 75g. Gas-generating compositions 
can be used in quantities up to 150g per 
blasthole. If charges are bigger all other 
provisions in AFS 2007:1 apply.  
-The supplier of the tool shall provide 
instructions around usage and safety of the 
tool to anyone working with them, and these 
people need to study this carefully. This 
knowledge shall be tested by the 
manufacturer, and he shall keep a proof of 
the test results. Workings need to be planned 
safely, precautions need to be taken especially 
regarding unintended fly-rock and risk for 
personal injury. 
 -It is only allowed to use electric detonators in shafts and winzes. The 
shot-firing cable shall not be connected to the detonator until a bucket 
or kibble is placed so that it is possible to conveniently enter the bucket 
or kibble, and the person operating this is ready to lift. 
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-If these tools are to be used this has to be 
reported to the person responsible to the 
particular working area, who shall make clear 
under what conditions the tools can be used. 
Legal basis §34; §35 AFS 2007:1  §42, 43 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Blasting near power 
cables 
It is required with electrical ignition near 
power cables to make sure that ignition lines 
and splice wires cannot be thrown up to 
power cables during the blast. 
  
Legal basis §24 AFS 2007:1   
Dust Explosions If there is a risk for dust explosions measures 
have to be in place that prevent such 
explosions and limit the consequences if they 
would occur. 
  
Legal basis §38 AFS 2007:1   
Blasting procedure -There has to be a procedure in place around 
evacuation, coverage and initiation of 
blasting rounds.  
-A warning has to be given when blasting is 
about to take place to anyone who can 
potentially be affected by the blast. 
-Initiation can only take place when it is 
confirmed that no one can be harmed by the 
blast. 
-The räjäytys työnjohtaja has to 
ensure that there are no people 
or surplus explosives in the 
blasting hazard area. 
-A clear sound signal has to be 
given until the moment of 
detonation. 
-In case a blast may blow into a place in the mine other than that where 
the shot is fired, the person firing the shot has to give due warning 
before blasting to all people in that place, and after blasting notice has 
to be given to such persons that the danger is over. 
-The danger zone shall either; be either guarded by a person who cannot 
leave that place before he has been given permission by the responsible 
person to leave that place at each entrance, or; an appropriate fence 
marked with the words "DANGER", "SHOTFIRING" or 
"BLASTING" shall be placed at each entrance. It is not allowed to pass 
this fence without explicit permission by the responsible permission. It 
is to be ensured that no people are present in the danger zone, or that 
they have taken proper shelter. 
-The person responsible for the blast shall also have shelter before 
initiation. 
Legal basis §37 AFS 2007:1 §16 16.6.2011/644 §36, 37 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Registration   The shot-firer shall keep a separate record of all shots fired during a shift 
in a book provided by the owner of the mine. 
Legal basis   §33 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
In this subchapter, legal requirements on three aspects that are important after the blast are being discussed; the actions to be taken immediately after a blast, the 
regulations on what to do with explosive materials and sites used and finally mitigation measures related to misfires. 
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14.! Return to Blast Site and Inspections 
 
TABLE 39: RETURN TO BLAST SITE AND INSPECTIONS REQUIREMENTS 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Return not 
allowed 
Entry to the blasting area not allowed as 
long as there still is a risk for personal 
harm due to delayed detonation, gases or 
rockfall. 
-Entry to the blasting area is not allowed 
before it is certain that all charges have 
detonated or after at least five minutes 
after the blast. 
-If the blasted object still is a hazard 
because of loose rocks etc. return to the 
working area is not allowed before it has 
been made harmless. 
-Entry to the blasting area is not allowed within 5 minutes after the 
blast for anyone in case a full round has been fired. 
 
Legal basis §39 AFS 2007:1 §17; §18 16.6.2011/644 §39(3)(a) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Post-blasting 
inspecting 
-The sprängarbas shall assess the area 
after blasting, take necessary steps if 
required and only then allow people to 
return to the area. 
- Reinforcement measures are required 
to be implemented right after blasting 
depending on the need. 
-The räjäytys työnjohtaja has to assess the 
blasted area and report formally that the 
area is safe to enter. 
-If blasting can produce gases that are 
harmful to worker's health their levels in 
the air have to be measured, and it should 
be assured their levels are low enough to 
re-enter the area. 
After blasting, a competent person appointed by the Mine Manager, 
shall: 
-check if the firing cables/wires have been disconnected from the 
blasting apparatus, and the cables/wires have been short-circuited, 
before anyone else can enter. 
-ascertain whether it is safe for ordinary work to be resumed; 
-ensure that necessary action is taken to make each place safe for 
working.  
-Examine if there are misfires, sockets in the face or other explosives 
remaining or if there are reasons to assume there are still unexploded 
charges in the muck. 
-If the person making the examination finds any explosive remaining 
in any socket in the face, he shall (if he is a shot-firer) forthwith 
explode that explosive by a fresh primer, and if he is not a shot-firer 
forthwith report the circumstances to the shot-firer who shall then 
explode it. 
Legal basis §39; §47 AFS 2007:1 §17 16.6.2011/644 §39 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
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15.! Explosive Waste 
TABLE 40: EXPLOSIVE WASTE 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Destruction of 
explosives and 
materials affected 
by explosives 
-Manufacturers of explosive materials shall 
have the ability to destroy explosives 
materials of their making. There shall be 
routines and instructions on how to do this. 
-Sites or equipment dealing with explosive 
materials shall be dealt with so that they are 
free of explosive materials afterwards. Used 
measures shall be documented. 
-Waste and packaging that has been 
polluted by explosive substances shall be 
treated as an explosive material. 
  
Legal basis Kap. 10 §5-7 MSFBS 2016:3   
16.! Misfires 
TABLE 41: MISFIRES 
 Sweden Finland Ireland 
Misfire mitigation 
plan 
  The Mine Manager shall ensure that there shall be a scheme in force 
specifying misfire procedure, ensuring the safety of all people involved. 
The plan shall be posted in the mine visible to everyone and supplied to 
each shot-firer working in the mine.  
Legal basis   §51 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Ascertain misfire   -With fuse detonation: When a fuse has been lighted successfully, but a 
shot has not succeeded, the case is treated as a misfire. 
-With electrical detonation: The shot-firer shall disconnect the blasting 
machine from the ignition cable and remove the handle or key, wait five 
minutes, examine the cable and connection for any defect and remedy, and 
then make a further attempt to blast. If this fails the case is to be treated as 
a misfire. 
   §49 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Handling Misfires -If it is impossible to make a misfire 
harmless immediately, it has to be marked 
and reported, before destruction of the 
misfire. 
-Misfires can be stored in a certified 
explosives storage. 
Misfires shall be removed from 
the working place immediately. If 
this is impossible, necessary 
instructions shall be given about 
the hazard and the precautionary 
measures about this irremovable 
misfire shall be given to all people 
No one shall approach the blasthole, until;  
-with a fuse: at least thirty minutes since firing the fuse have passed; 
-with electric initiation: the removable handle or key and shot-firing cable 
from the shot-firing apparatus and since the last attempt at least five 
minutes have past. 
-It shall not be tried to remove any part of the charge from the blasthole 
unless it is a cartridge or explosive sticking out of the blasthole. 
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who have to be in the area of the 
misfire. 
Legal basis Note on misfires, AFS 2007:1; §???? MSFBS 
2016:3 
§17 16.6.2011/644 §50 Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Cleaning 
rock/drilling 
-Measures have to be implemented that 
avoid drilling in misfires. The rock surface 
has to be cleaned carefully before a new 
drillhole starts.  
-An old blasthole cannot be 
drilled before it is assured there 
are no explosives materials in 
there. 
 
-Before drilling is commenced the exposed face shall be washed with water 
and carefully examined for misfires and cut-off holes and old sockets. 
-Drilling shall not be done within 1.52m (5 feet) of a (remnant of) a blasted 
hole. 
-A person shall not drill in a blasthole or any part of a blasthole with a drill 
with a diameter that is not at least exceeding the diameter of the cartridge 
to be used with 3.2mm (1/8 inch). 
Legal basis §36 AFS 2010:1 §13 16.6.2011/644 §25(1); 25(2); 25(5) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Loading 
equipment 
exposed to 
(possible) misfires 
-Because it is hard to spot misfires in a 
muck, equipment used to load this need to 
have armoured glass. 
 
  
Legal basis Note on misfires, AFS 2007:1   
Rock to be 
crushed 
-When hydraulic hammers and other 
equipment are used to scale rock surfaces or 
decrease rock sizes measures shall be taken 
to protect workers from dust, fly-rock and 
misfires. 
-People working at the crushing plant shall 
be protected against explosions resulting 
from misfires. 
 When a misfired shot is dislodged by the firing of another shot, before any 
person can work near this place or another blast is undertaken, it is 
necessary to search the entire place for missing detonators and charge. If 
these are not found the rock needs to be conveyed out of the mine 
separately from the other rock. 
Legal basis §42; §44 AFS 2010:1  §50(3) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Reporting 
manufacturer 
-If it is suspected that the misfires are a 
result of the materials used, the 
manufacturer should be notified. 
  
Legal basis Note on misfires, AFS 2007:1   
Reporting Mine 
Manager 
  The Mine Manager shall be informed if a misfire has been identified but 
not yet dealt with.  
Legal basis   §50(4) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
Reporting 
requirements 
The sprängarbas has to provide the person 
responsible for moving blasted rock with 
information regarding possibly undetonated 
explosives and necessary measures to secure 
safe operations. 
 -In case of misfire, the person who has fired the shot or the person 
competent for inspections shall, before leaving the mine, report the 
circumstances to a senior official on duty at the mine, and shall record the 
fact of misfire in the record of shots. 
Legal basis §39 AFS 2007:1  §39(4) Mines (Explosives) Regulations 1972 
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B.! Combined Legal Requirements on Explosives Safety 
 
1.! Responsible Persons 
A: Assignment and Tasks of Responsible Persons 
§1: Each blasting activity requires the assignment of a Blasting Foreman. This function is referred to nationally as 
the "sprängarbas", “räjäytys työnjohtaja” or "shotfirer" respectively. 
1a: This person shall be appointed by the person responsible for managing the mine. 
1b: The identity of the Blasting Foreman shall be clear to all workers and his name shall be displayed in the working 
space. 
 
§2: It is the responsibility of the Blasting Foreman to:  
1. Verify the storage and dealing of explosives and associated equipment, unless another person is explicitly made 
responsible for storage and equipment. 
2. Be involved in and agree on the blasting safety plan. 
3. Verify that blasting activities are executed professionally and according to the blasting plan. Instruct other people 
are involved in the blasting process. 
4. Keep the blasting machine under his guard. 
 
§3: The eligibility of the Blasting Foreman, and way of obtaining the required licenses shall be verified according to 
national requirements. In general, at least one year of experience and the possession of a blasting license is required. 
 
§4: Other people can work in blasting activities as well, as long as they are under supervision of the Blasting 
Foreman. Other people can never be in possession of the blasting machine and/or carry out the blast, unless it is a 
Blasting Foreman in training under direct supervision of the Blasting Foreman. 
 
§5: People responsible for the explosives storage(s) shall be appointed separately by the Employer/Manager. 
 
§6: Documentation on the licenses and other qualifications necessary for the various responsible people shall be 
kept at the mining office. 
B: Oversight and Responsibilities Employer/Manager 
§1: Ensure that the Blasting Foreman has sufficient information on the rock mass to be blasted. Information must 
include rock mechanical characteristics such as faults, brittle rock or other forms of deformations or 
inhomogeneity’s in the rock mass. Notify the Blasting Foreman about any other issues that may be relevant for 
blasting. 
 
§2: Verify that the Blasting Foreman indeed is licensed, well-prepared and qualified to perform his task. 
 
§3: Prepare permitting requests and necessary risk assessments required to store and utilise explosives according to 
national law. 
 
§4: Prepare and maintain contacts with certifying bodies and mine inspectors.  
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2.! Explosives Standards 
 
§1: Blasting machines, detonators and other parts of and complete initiation systems shall have been certified by the 
appropriate bodies, to be judged nationally. It is the duty of the employer to select the explosive materials and tools 
that causes the least danger.  
1a: Any blasting machine that appears to be or is defective shall not be used anymore and reported to the 
Employer/Manager. If the blasting machine fails to fire a properly connected round in one go it shall be considered 
defective. 
 
§2: It is required to use blasting machines, initiation systems and detonators of the same manufacturer, unless it can 
explicitly be verified that they are compatible. 
 
§3: Explosives to be used should be in accordance with national regulations, have correct marking. In urban areas in 
open pits only cartridge explosives or explosives of a similar safety level should be used. 
 
§4: Only explosives compliant with Directive 2014/28 EU are allowed to be used in the EU. Manufacturers have 
the obligation to ensure that their explosives are in accordance with Annex II of the Directive.  
4a: Nonconformities of explosives should immediately be reported to the competent authority by manufacturers; 
authorities can always request manufacturers to prove the conformity. 
4b: Importers have a duty to ensure that manufacturers have met these requirements before placing the explosive on 
the market. 
4c: Explosives are assumed to be in conformity with harmonized standards published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union shall be presumed to be in conformity with safety requirements. 
4d: The EU-declaration of conformity shall state the fulfilment of essential safety requirements. 
 
§5: When an explosive is compliant with applicable requirements a CE-marking shall be affixed stating the EU 
declaration of conformity. A CE-marking has to be affixed visibly, legibly and indelibly to the explosive, or when 
this is not possible, to the packaging and accompanying documents. The CE-marking has to be in accordance with 
the principles set out in Article 30 of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008. 
5a: Distributors have to ensure that the appropriate CE-marking is used. 
 
§6: It is necessary that each smallest packaging unit is marked with a unique identification. Each manufacturing site, 
also these outside the European Community, shall have their own three-digit state attributed by the member state of 
manufacture or import. The unique identification shall be marked on or firmly affixed to each single product. For 
cartridges or explosives in sacks this identification shall be placed on each cartridge or sack, and an associated label 
on each case of cartridges. 
 
§7: Two-component explosives, plain detonators and fuses, detonators, primers and boosters, detonator cords and 
safety fuses, cans and drums containing explosives all require (if possible) an adhesive or printed label with the ID 
on its smallest packaging unit, and always a copy of this label on the case or other unit containing one or more of 
these items. 
 
§8: Copies of original labels may be attached for their clients. It must be clear that they are copies and not originals. 
 
§9: Manufacturers shall ensure that explosives they have placed on the market are accompanied by instructions and 
safety information in an understandable manner. Distributors have to ensure that the appropriate CE-marking is 
used. 
 
§10: Each undertaker using explosives shall have a system for data collection in relation to unique identification 
throughout supply chain and life cycle. The system shall enable undertakings to keep track of the explosives and 
their holder at any time. The record shall be kept for 10 years after the delivery or the end of the lifecycle of the 
explosive. 
10a: The location of each explosive is to be known as well. The data system has to be regularly tested on quality and 
effectiveness, the data shall be protected against malicious uses or destruction, and provide competent authorities 
with all sorts of information on the explosive previously mentioned and contact details of people able to provide 
this information. 
 
§11: Economic operators shall be able to identify these parties they have supplied explosives to or have obtained 
explosives from. They shall keep this record for 10 years after the supply. Economic operators shall adhere to a 
uniform system to identify and trace their explosives based on shape, size, design. This does not apply to explosives 
transported and delivered unpackaged or in pump trucks for direct unloading into the blasthole or explosives 
manufactured at blasting sites that directly used. 
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§12: Approval to transfer explosives shall be obtained by the consignee from the competent authority. This 
authority shall ensure that the consignee is authorised to acquire explosives and in the possession of the necessary 
licenses. 
 
§13: No blasting material or device shall be taken or used below ground in a mine other than material or a device 
provided by the operator of the mine. The operator has a duty to obtain all the information from the manufacturer 
to ensure that he can work with the material. 
 
§14: The Employer/Manager shall ensure that the blasting machine is thoroughly cleaned and overhauled at least 
once every three months by the manufacturer or a competent person appointed by the Employer/Manager. All 
multi-shot blasting machines shall be tested at the surface according to the guidelines of the manufacturers, when 
failing this test, it shall not be taken below ground. Reports and dates on cleaning, overhaul and testing are to be 
registered. Only in a certified workshop can be tampered with any blasting machine below ground. 
 
§15: No cable with iron or steel wire covering shall be used unless during shaft-sinking or when initiation is done by 
means of electric current from a lighting or power circuit. If a cable is used for another purpose than blasting it shall 
not be used for blasting anymore. 
 
§16: Defective explosives or blasting agents shall be deposed of in a safe manner. 
 
§17: Explosive goods shall be used in such a way that they don't cause damage, the prescribed safety instructions of 
the supplier shall be followed. 
 
§18: The period of delay has to be marked on a detonator to be allowed to be used or taken below ground. 
 
§19: No explosives shall be taken or used into a mine except in cartridges. The maximum amount of any explosive 
to be taken below ground is 2.27 kilograms (5 pounds) of cartridges. This has to be packaged in a secured case or 
canister, until they are about to be used for charging, and at no point in time more than one case or canister can be 
open. Deviation from this can only be done when this has been discussed in the scheme of transit. 
 
§20: No detonator shall be taken below ground otherwise than in a securely fastened detonator cases provided by 
the owner of the mine. No detonator case shall be issued unless it is impossible for any detonator or its leads to 
touch any metal part of the case exposed to the outside. It is the responsibility of the Blasting Foreman to keep the 
detonator in a securely fastened case, with no other materials in it except for the necessary administrative 
documents, and should be locked when not under direct supervision. 
 
§21: Ignition cables shall be kept well in a case. 
 
§22: When opening explosives or blasting agent cases or cartons only implements of copper, wood, fibre or other 
suitable materials shall be used. This does not apply to cutting wire or other binders. 
 
 
 
 
3.! Storage 
§1: When constructing a new storage, a thorough risk assessment is necessary. All specific legal requirements on 
storage dimensions, construction methods, permitting procedures etcetera are provided in national regulations. 
 
§2: The employer/manager shall appoint one or more people to be in charge of the storage. 
 
§3: Explosives shall be stored decently, and as long as possible in unopened original transportation packaging. 
§4: Packages shall be placed such that there is a good overview of the storage, and that there is sufficient place to 
load and unload. 
 
§5: In a storage only material objects that do not increase the risk of fire or explosion can be left. Explosives shall be 
placed at such a distance from electrical equipment that they cannot cause initiation of the explosives. Electricity in 
the storage shall be switched off when there is no work going on. A space in a storage cannot be used as a place to 
leave motorised equipment for more than the time necessary to load/unload needed materials. 
 
 138 
§6: Explosive materials shall be divided in groups according to the UN Chemicals Classification; explosive materials 
in groups C, D, E and G should be stored together. Explosive materials of group S can be stored together with 
explosive materials from other groups except from groups A and L. Other groups cannot be stored together. 
Detonators shall be stored separately from other explosive materials. 
 
§7: Storages shall have the appropriate signs so that it is clear what hazard the storage poses. At least the necessary 
prohibitions and the contact details of the responsible person shall be mentioned. 
 
§8: Keys, codes etc. shall be stored such that unauthorised people cannot get them, or they shall be under constant 
supervision. The doors to the storage shall be locked except for (un)loading or other necessary activities. Each 
storage shall be protected against access by unauthorised people; the protection shall be adapted to the level of 
desirability, which for mining explosives means that the access should be able to withstand an attack with handheld 
tools and electrical tools for at least 80 minutes. 
 
§9: When using explosives from a store, those that have been longest in shall be taken out first. 
 
§10: He who stores explosive materials, shall keep a log containing and continuously updating information on the 
amount of each explosive material that is stored. Daily updates shall be accessible at another appropriate place than 
the storage. Any accident by explosion in connection with an explosives storage shall be reported to the safety 
authority, who may decide on further measures. 
 
 
4.! Transport 
§1: For transport on public road a permit shall be requested following national procedures. Precautions shall have 
been taken to ensure negative impacts on life, health, environment and property, and verified that all vehicles, 
packaging and other materials used are appropriate. It is necessary to have at least one safety advisor for each task, 
who has the sole risk to avoid damage resulting from the transport and delivery. Necessary signs have to be carried 
following the ADR-standards. 
 
§2: A plan has to be drafted on the way in which explosive materials are moved within the mine. This "scheme of 
transit" should include provisions on; 
1. Location, construction and marking of each reserve station, detonator store and custody of the keys thereof; 
2. Design and construction of the special carriage; 
3. Supervision and precautions to be taken during transit of the carriage; 
4. Supervision of explosives at a reserve station and detonators at a detonator store; 
5. Manner of conveying explosive and detonators to any working face; 
6. Maximum quantity of explosive and the maximum number of detonators permitted at their respective stores. 
7. Issue of explosive and detonators from their respective stores; 
8. Return of explosives and detonators to their respective store; 
9. Ways to ensure that explosives are moved in accordance with this plan. 
 
§3: Explosive materials that are moved within the mine have to be protected against mechanical impact, heat and 
anything else that can cause fire or explosions. They cannot be transported together with other hazardous materials. 
 
§4: Vehicles transporting explosive materials shall be equipped with fire extinguishers. The vehicles have to be 
certified for this purpose by the appropriate national body. 
 
§5: Only people that are strictly necessary for the transport are allowed to travel along the vehicle or lift transporting 
the explosives. 
 
§6: Documentation shall be kept on all explosives that are being transported to a working place or returned to the 
dedicated storage. The form and content shall be described. A copy of the scheme of transit is to be posted and kept 
posted so that anyone can read it clearly, and one is supplied to any Blasting Foreman and storage manager. 
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5.! Charging 
A: Charging Plan 
§1: The employer shall develop the blasting safety plan. Planning and execution should be such that physical harm as 
a consequence of the blasting will be avoided. It shall include the following aspects: 
1. Characteristics of the rock to be blasted. 
2. Electrification, lighting, communication, extraction techniques and other technical specifics. 
3. Roads, exits and safe havens. 
4. Equipment selection  
5. Maintenance. 
6. Safe working methods. 
7. Explosives that are used. 
8. Emergency plan. 
9. Other factors that may be of importance. 
 
§2: Risk assessment has to be undertaken following the requirements in Workplace Safety Law.  
This means at least that it should be a systematic approach identifying the difficulties and risks related to the job, 
working place, environment and time.  
-If it is not possible to remove these risks the possible negative impact has to be assessed. All effects on both health 
and safety have to be included. 
-Any activity that includes exceptional hazards cannot be executed without explicit safety measures having been 
ordered by the management. 
 
§3: The Blasting Foreman has to be involved in the development of the blasting plan and agree on it. 
 
§4: The blasting plan has to be formulated in an understandable manner and discussed with the people that will have 
to work with it. Before a new activity is undertaken the employer has to ensure that all employees are aware of the 
suggestions in the plan. 
 
§5: The blasting safety plan has to be continuously checked and updated. 
B: Preparation of Blasting Materials 
§1: The employer has a duty of care regarding the manufacturing of explosives if they would be prepared on site. 
 
§2: It is necessary to prevent accidents and take measures regarding the entire process of explosives used in the 
mining process. 
 
§3: A safety fuse should not be capped with a detonator at any place at a mine other than a workshop duly used and 
located. 
 
§4: The appropriate national body has to grant a permit for the preparation of explosive materials, both in the case 
of permanent and temporary facilities. 
C: Working Environment during Charging 
§1: The workplace should have sufficient lighting. The minimum standard is lighting carried along by miners. 
 
§2: The Blasting Foreman shall indicate and mark where shelters and the hazardous area around the blasting object are located. 
 
§3: In case electrical detonators are used: 
3a: If the blasting takes place in the vicinity of for examples of power lines or electrified railway the operator has to be contacted. 
3b: Safe distances with electricity cables, transformer stations, welding facilities and other electrical facilities has to be ensured 
3c: In case of possible influence by thunderstorms the affected area has to be evacuated immediately 
 
§4: An area that has been charged has to be kept under surveillance and unauthorised people should be stopped from entering. 
D: Charging Equipment 
§1: Any cleaning and charging tools used need to be such that unexpected sparks do not occur and unwanted 
initiation does not occur. If gunpowder or gas generating substances are charged the charging rod has to be made of 
wood. 
 
§2: Charging equipment for ANFO and pumpable emulsions may only be operated by operators trained by the 
producer of the explosive or their official representative. 
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§3: The charging hose has to be made in such a way that electrostatic charging is impossible during explosive 
charging. When the hose is used to charge ANFO or other forms of explosives in powder form the charging hose 
should have a resistance of 1-30 k!/m, and be marked clearly with information regarding the type of hose, 
dimensions and the type of explosive for which it is intended. 
 
§4: Equipment that is used to prepare explosive materials shall be such that the risk for unintended initiation is as 
small as possible and such that it is easy to maintain, clean and repair. 
 
§5: Vehicles carrying mobile preparation shall have, on top of the ordinary lock, have a system that can prohibit 
unauthorised people to start the vehicle. Vehicles carrying mobile preparation shall have a system that can prohibit 
unauthorised people to start the preparation equipment. 
 
§6: After each moving of mobile preparation equipment the operator shall check if there is leakage or other visible 
damage, and that the inbuilt safety functions function properly. 
 
§7: Maintenance of equipment that is of special importance from a safety standpoint shall be carried out and 
checked according to a maintenance plan.  
7a: Before each modifying, repair or maintenance job a risk assessment shall be made. Rooms, tools etc. shall be 
cleaned so that the work cannot cause initiation of explosive materials. 
7b: There shall be documented routines describing ongoing maintenance, returning service and checks of safety 
functions. 
7c: Carried out maintenance, repair services, cleaning shall be documented. 
E: Drilling 
§1: Underground: Drilling shall not be carried out within 1.52m (5 feet) of a hole containing any explosives or 
blasting agent. Drilling and charging operations shall not be carried out simultaneously on the same face within 7.62 
meters (25 feet of each other).  
 
§2: Both surface and underground: Charging near drilling activities shall be avoided, appropriate distance required. 
 
§3: Before drilling commences it has to be checked whether this can be carried out according to the blasting plan. 
 
§4: Drilling activities have to be immediately stopped when it is suspected that there are explosive materials in there, 
or when the drilling is taking place close to a charged hole. 
 
§5: The Blasting Foreman has to be informed immediately if such and other issues affecting safety occur during 
drilling, it is only allowed to continue working after he has permitted this and if necessary changed the blasting plan. 
F: Charging Works 
§1: Charging shall not commence before it is ensured that the blasthole has been cleaned out thoroughly, air is only 
to be used for cleaning when dust can be minimised. 
 
§2: A blasthole shall not be charged by anyone except the Blasting Foreman or someone under supervision of the 
Blasting Foreman. It shall only be charged when it is necessary to blast soon after. It shall be ensured that the hole is 
both placed and drilled so to be safe for blasting. Charging shall not commence before all holes in the face of a 
heading, drift, raise, ripping, shaft or winze have been drilled. 
§3: Instructions of the manufacturer and legal requirements are to be followed when handling with them. 
§4: Preloading and separating stoppers between charges in a borehole shall be made of such a material and executed 
in such a that the explosives can still be accessed if necessary. 
 
§5: If powder explosives are used for preloading it is necessary to be aware of the demolition sensitivity of the 
powder and to avoid unintended ignition. 
§6: No tool other than one made entirely of wood shall be inserted into a blasthole, unless it is a device for 
pneumatic stemming or a device to remove a cartridge from a blasthole in case of a misfire approved by the 
appropriate national authority. 
 
§7: The amount of explosive charged shall not be less or more than necessary. 
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§8: The charger shall ensure that it is stemmed when necessary, with suitable and non-flammable stemming 
sufficient to prevent a blow-out. 
 
§9: Cartridges shall be put in a blasthole as a complete cartridge. The cartridges shall be of the same diameter and 
form of explosive as the blasthole, unless the blasting technique requires otherwise. The cartridges shall not be 
pushed in violently, and shall not overcharge, in which case a partial cartridge may be inserted. 
 
§10: When the charging of a hole has been unfinished without the insertion of a detonator the hole has to be 
marked. 
 
§11: Stemming shall not be removed from a charged blasthole otherwise than by means of water and air. 
11a: A detonator lead shall never be taken out any charged blasthole. 
11b: An explosive shall not be removed from a blasthole, unless: 
a) explosive forming a part or portion of a cartridge is left protruding from the hole as a result of blasting. 
b) in case of misfires 
 
§12: A detonator shall not be taken from its case unless it is immediately required for charging of a blast-hole. 
 
§13: The risk for non-detonation has to be minimised, if necessary by using two instead of one detonator per 
blasthole. 
13a: Underground: no more than one detonator per hole shall be used, unless this can be proven to be advantageous 
in avoiding misfires. 
 
§14: It is required to properly isolate all ignition cables to avoid short-circuiting, breach of cables or touch with 
conductive materials. 
 
§15: Only explosives or blasting agents shall be taken into a shaft or winze that are immediately required for 
charging. Only the Blasting Foreman shall take a primer cartridge with a detonator into a shaft being sunk, and this 
only in a thick felt bag or another form of appropriate shock protection. 
 
§16: No more than one canister of explosive shall be open at any time unless provided otherwise in the conveyance 
plan and reserve station rules. 
§17: If an employee has to work alone, the employer shall have contact with him at least once during the working 
day and at the end of his shift. Blasting activities shall be organised such that there are regular visual and audio 
interactions with short time intervals, if necessary with telecommunication. 
 
§18: The Blasting Foreman shall visit the blasting object at least once a shift, unless the blasting safety plan indicates 
that less or more visits are necessary. 
 
§19: Materials that have not been used during a shift shall be returned to the reserve station/storage.   
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6.! Blasting 
A: Initiation Techniques 
§1: It is required to use methods that cause detonation immediately after initiation. It is allowed to use delayed methods 
only when it is certain that no one can enter the blasting area in the period between initiation and detonation. 
 
§2: There shall be no open fire or smoking around the area where blasting preparations are undertaken. 
 
§3: The manager/employer shall assign persons to be responsible of the blasting machine. They shall ascertain 
themselves that the blasting machine is in perfect condition before utilising it.  
 
§4: If detonating fuses are used for initiation the initiation system shall be set up with a ring line and branches from 
here. The branches shall be coupled perpendicular to the ring line and the distance between the branches shall be 
such that the branches cannot initiate each other. When blasting around urban areas or in tunnels the charge weight 
cannot be more than 20g per meter fuse. A fuse needs to be at least 1.22m (4ft) long. 
 
§5: If NONEL-systems are used this should be done such that unintended ignition cannot occur. 
 
§6: No other wire than that specifically intended for this purpose is to be used to set up initiation systems. 
B: General Blasting Procedure 
§1: A Blasting Foreman shall only undertake a blast when charging has been done by himself or by someone who 
they supervise, and has ensured that all the works have been executed properly according to all the applicable legal 
requirements and internal rules. 
 
§2: The handle or key of a blasting machine shall not be put in position in the blasting machine before he is about to 
fire and shall remove this immediately after. 
 
§3: When harm can result as a consequence of blasting it is required to cover the blasting area. It is necessary to 
assess rock characteristics and the expected direction of rock debris after blasting in this assessment. 
 
§4: It is required with electrical ignition near power cables to make sure that ignition lines and splice wires cannot be 
thrown up to power cables during the blast. 
 
§5: If there is a risk for dust explosions measures have to be in place that prevent such explosions and limit the 
consequences if they would occur. 
 
§6: There has to be a procedure in place around evacuation, coverage and initiation of blasting rounds.  
 
§7: The danger zone shall either; be either guarded by a person who cannot leave that place before he has been 
given permission by the responsible person to leave that place at each entrance, or; an appropriate fence marked 
with the words "DANGER", "SHOTFIRING" or "BLASTING" shall be placed at each entrance. It is not allowed 
to pass this fence without explicit permission by the responsible permission. 
 
§8: Initiation can only take place when it is confirmed that no one can be harmed by the blast, there are in general 
no people in the area and there are no surplus explosives in the area. 
 
§9: A warning has to be given, when a blast is about to take place, to anyone who can potentially be affected by it. 
 
§10: The Blasting Foreman shall keep a record of all blasts undertaken. 
C: Special Blasting 
§1: Powder-based tools used to blast muck, concrete etc. shall have a maximum charge weight of 75g. Gas-generating 
compositions can be used in quantities up to 150g per hole. If charges are bigger all usual regulations shall apply. 
 
§2: The supplier of the tool shall provide instructions around usage and safety of the tool to anyone working with 
them, and these people need to study this carefully. This knowledge shall be tested by the manufacturer, and he shall 
keep a proof of the test results. Workings need to be planned safely, precautions need to be taken especially 
regarding unintended fly-rock and risk for personal injury. 
 
§3: If these tools are to be used this has to be reported to the person responsible to the particular working area, who 
shall make clear under what conditions the tools can be used.  
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7.! Post-blasting 
A: Return to Blast Site and Inspections 
§1: Entry to the blasting area is not allowed before it is certain that all charges have detonated, at least five minutes 
after the blast. If the blasted object still is a hazard because of loose rocks etc., return to the working area is not 
allowed before it has been made harmless. 
 
§2: The Blasting Foreman shall ensure that the blasting machine has been disconnected from the initiation system. 
 
§3: The Blasting Foreman shall assess the area after blasting, and examine if; 
1. –there are gases that are harmful to worker's health their levels in the air, they have to be measured by the 
Blasting Foreman, and it should be assured their levels are low enough to re-enter the area.  
2. -there are misfires, sockets in the face or other explosives remaining or if there are reasons to assume there are 
still unexploded charges in the muck. Misfires shall be dealt with by a blasting manage according to the rules set out 
in Section B. 
3. -take the measures necessary and only then report formally that it is safe for other people to enter the blasting 
area. 
 
§4: Reinforcement measures are required to be implemented right after blasting depending on the need.  
B: Misfires 
§1: There shall be a SOP in place to deal with misfires. This SOP shall be known to all Blasting Foremans and 
displayed visibly. 
 
§2: Misfires shall be removed from the working place immediately. If this is impossible, it shall be marked. 
Necessary instructions shall be given about the hazard and the precautionary measures taken, and given to all people 
who have to be in the area of the misfire. The misfire can be stored in a certified explosives storage. 
 
§3: An old blasthole cannot be drilled before it is assured there are no explosives materials in there. Before drilling is 
commenced the exposed face shall be washed with water and carefully examined for misfires and cut-off holes and 
old sockets. 
3a: Drilling shall not be done within 1.52m (5 feet) of a (remnant of) a blasted hole. 
3b: A person shall not drill in a blasthole or any part of a blasthole with a drill with a diameter that is not at least 
exceeding the diameter of the cartridge to be used with 3.2mm (1/8 inch). 
 
§4: When a misfired hot is dislodged by the firing of another shot, before any person can work near this place or 
another blast is undertaken, it is necessary to search the entire place for missing detonators and charge. If these are 
not found the rock needs to be conveyed out of the mine separately from the other rock. 
 
§5: Misfires shall be notified to: 
5a: The manager of the mine, or the senior official in function at that time. The misfire shall be recorded in the 
official records of blasting.  
5b: The manufacturer, in case it is suspected the misfire was the result of the products used. 
 
§6: Equipment loading muck shall be equipped with armoured glass. The Blasting Foreman has to provide the 
person responsible for moving blasted rock with information regarding possibly undetonated explosives and 
necessary measures to secure safe operations. 
 
§7: People working at the crushing plant shall be protected against explosions resulting from misfires. 
 
§8: When hydraulic hammers and other equipment are used to scale rock surfaces or decrease rock sizes measures 
shall be taken to protect workers from dust, fly-rock and misfires. 
C: Explosive Waste 
§1: Manufacturers of explosive materials shall have the ability to destroy explosives materials of their making. There 
shall be routines and instructions on how to do this. 
 
§2: Sites or equipment dealing with explosive materials shall be dealt with so that they are free of explosive materials 
afterwards. Used measures shall be documented. 
 
§3: Waste and packaging that has been polluted by explosive substances shall be treated as an explosive material.  
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C.! Exponential Density Function 
 
The exponential density function is given by: 
 ! "# $ % $&'()******" + ,-,***************" . ,/ 
 
What we want to know is the probability that some component will fail over the course of a shift. What we 
do know is the average level of failure, denoted by $, also we know we want to know the likelihood of 
failure over an entire shift, i.e., t will be equal to 1 for the entire studied period. To get to the likelihood of 
failure, a few functions have to be considered. To start with, the hazard function h(t), expresses the hazard 
associated with a certain component and is defined as (Gheorge & Mock, 1999, p. 31): 
 0 " % !1"231"2 
 
f(t) was discussed before, 31"2 is the so-called reliability function, in other words the chance that a certain 
component will not have failed by a given time t, which is given by: 
 3 " % 4 5 61"2 
 
With 6 "  being the so-called failure distribution function (Gheorge & Mock, 1999, p. 31): 
 6 " % ! " 7"89  
 
Therefore, filling this formula in for the exponential density function, 6 "  becomes: 
 6 " % $&'()7"89 % 4 5 &'() 
 
To confirm that the failure rate indeed is constant, working out the initial function it follows that: 
 0 " % $&'(:&'(: % $ 
 
It should therefore be concluded that 0 "  indeed is a constant and equal to $, which we know for all 
components. The exponential density functions can therefore be worked out for all components, always 
considering the entire shift length. 
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D.! Examples of Best Practices Issued by Government and Industry 
 
On the Risk Assessment to be undertaken as part of Blasting Plans   
Guidelines to the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Quarries) Regulations 2008 
The risk assessment should take into account the following factors:  
•! Control measures required to ensure the safety of persons determining the burden from either the 
top or bottom of the quarry face; 
•! Height of the face; 
•! Planned burdens and spacings; 
•! Diameter, angle and azimuth of the shotholes; 
•! Type and quantities of explosive used and the initiation systems; 
•! Geology of the face and the history of the quarry in relation to geological anomalies; and 
•! Proximity of the public, dwellings, roads, railway lines, commercial buildings or other places of 
work to the blast area. 
 
On reducing the risks of Misfires AFS 2007:1 
In order to minimise the risk for misfires it is important to follow the blasting plan with drilling and to 
check the initiation system before blasting. 
•! It is also important to clean the hole before charging activities start. 
•! When a misfire is discovered it is important to apply great care. The area around the misfire is to 
be treated as a dangerous area. Only staff that shall make the misfire harmless are allowed into the 
dangerous zone. That he who shall make the misfire harmless is experienced and used to such 
works, is a prerequisite for the work to be carried out safely. 
•! It is important to first try to decide on the location, size and spread and composition of the misfire. 
Explosive materials can have seeped into nearby fractures. The misfire can be composed of for 
example detonators with a smaller amount of explosive or be part of an entire charge. The misfire 
can even be explosive encompassed in muck, just like parts of detonating fuses.  
•! In the case a misfire cannot be made harmless immediately it is important to mark and report it to 
be made harmless as soon as possible. 
•! When it can be suspected that the misfire follows a production failure the supplier shall be notified. 
After a blast is it important to as much as possible verify that no undetonated detonators are left by 
gathering all visible detonators. 
 
 
The United States Mine Health & Safety Administration lists the following set of best practices as key 
principles to ensure safe explosives handling and blasting practice in industrial mineral and metal mines 
(Mine Health & Safety Administration, 2016): 
1.! Follow manufacturers’ guidelines for the storage, handling, transportation and use of explosive 
materials.  
2.! Keep all explosive storage areas clean, dry and orderly.  
3.! Rotate the inventory of explosive materials, making sure to use the oldest stock first.  
4.! Never use damaged or deteriorated explosive materials, including initiation (detonating) devices, 
boosters, dynamite and blasting agents. Contact the explosives manufacturer if damaged, 
deteriorated or outdated explosives are discovered.  
5.! Ensure that all locations where explosives are stored or used are properly ventilated before miners 
enter.  
6.! Utilize technology such as face profilers and borehole probes to obtain specific details about areas  
of weak burden and potential borehole deviation.  
7.! Communicate with the driller and understand the geology of the blast site.  
8.! Review and follow the site-specific blast plan prior to loading any explosives. Develop a drill 
pattern appropriate for the location, and adjust stemming depth and/or decking to maintain 
adequate burden for the blast.  
9.! Establish the blast area and remove all persons from the area before the blast is fired.  
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10.!Guard or barricade all access routes to the blast area to prevent people and vehicles from entering.  
11.! Before firing a blast, give ample warning to allow all persons to be evacuated from the blast area.  
12.!Conduct a post-blast inspection to be certain the blast area is safe before anyone re-enters.  
 
On reducing the risks of Misfires (AFS 2007:1) 
In order to minimise the risk for misfires it is important to follow the blasting plan with drilling and to 
check the initiation system before blasting. 
•! It is also important to clean the hole before charging activities start. 
•! When a misfire is discovered it is important to apply great care. The area around the misfire is to 
be treated as a dangerous area. Only staff that shall make the misfire harmless are allowed into the 
dangerous zone. That he who shall make the misfire harmless is experienced and used to such 
works, is a prerequisite for the work to be carried out safely. 
•! It is important to first try to decide on the location, size and spread and composition of the misfire. 
Explosive materials can have seeped into nearby fractures. The misfire can be composed of for 
example detonators with a smaller amount of explosive or be part of an entire charge. The misfire 
can even be explosive encompassed in muck, just like parts of detonating fuses.  
•! In the case a misfire cannot be made harmless immediately it is important to mark and report it to 
be made harmless as soon as possible. 
•! When it can be suspected that the misfire follows a production failure the supplier shall be notified. 
•! After a blast is it important to as much as possible verify that no undetonated detonators are left 
by gathering all visible detonators. 
 
On the Risk Assessment to be undertaken as part of Blasting Plans   
Guidelines to the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (Quarries) Regulations 2008 
The risk assessment should take into account the following factors:  
•! Control measures required to ensure the safety of persons determining the burden from either the 
top or bottom of the quarry face; 
•! Height of the face; 
•! Planned burdens and spacings; 
•! Diameter, angle and azimuth of the shotholes; 
•! Type and quantities of explosive used and the initiation systems; 
•! Geology of the face and the history of the quarry in relation to geological anomalies; and 
•! Proximity of the public, dwellings, roads, railway lines, commercial buildings or other places of 
work to the blast area. 
 
Determine acceptability of ANE location  
Storage and Handling of UN3375, Code of Practice AEISG 
Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) is a commonly used secondary explosive. Deciding on the location 
of a storage is an important consideration, giving the enormous amounts of emulsions that are commonly 
stored on mine sites.  
First of all; It is important to not consider the risk of explosion from ANE in isolation from other explosive 
materials stored. Other siting and layout issues that need to be considered: 
 
•! The risk of fire generating toxic decomposition products; 
•! And the potential impact on the environment from spills or firefighting 
 
See Figure 37 for a flowchart on the decision-making process. PES=Potential Explosive Site 
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FIGURE 37: FLOWCHART TO DETERMINE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ANE LOCATION 
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E.! Elements of the Explosives Handling and Blasting Process 
 
A1: Blast area security measures (general safety management/Blasting Foreman) 
A2: General mine area security measures (general safety management) 
A3: Awareness of blasting evacuation rules (general safety management) 
A4: Checks on presence in blasting area (Blasting Foreman) 
A5: Security systems for mine evacuation (general safety management) 
B1: Blast design (blasting engineer) 
B2: Detonator & initiation system reliability (blasting engineer) 
B3: Detonator & initiation system performance (blasting engineer) 
B4: Explosives & emulsion selection (blasting engineer) 
B5: Danger zone estimation (blasting engineer) 
B6: Pre-blast checks (Blasting Foreman) 
B7: Cover (in the fault tree diagrams treated together with B5) 
C1: Charging procedures (Blasting Foreman/blasting engineer/chargers) 
C2: Charging execution (chargers) 
C3: Charging execution oversight (Blasting Foreman) 
C4: Charging equipment cleaning execution (maintenance staff, not discussed in fault trees) 
C5: Charging equipment cleaning reporting (maintenance staff, not discussed in fault trees) 
E1: Explosives outside dedicated area (chargers/powdermen, not discussed in fault trees) 
H1: Detonators transported together with explosives (chargers/powdermen) 
H2: Vehicles and collisions cannot cause explosions (chargers/general safety management) 
H3: Scanning/bookkeeping (chargers/powdermen) 
H4: Traffic violations/general irresponsible transporting (chargers/powdermen) 
H5: Emulsion handling (chargers/suppliers) 
H6: Packaging/handling safety barriers (suppliers) 
M1: Misfire handling rules for Blasting Foremans (Blasting Foreman/general safety management) 
M2: Misfire handling for Blasting Foremans execution (Blasting Foreman) 
M3: Misfire handling rules & training for loaders/drillers/chargers (general safety management) 
M4: Misfire handling execution for operators (operators) 
N1: Unexpected Geology 
N2: Unexpected blast characteristics, either due to geological anomalies or extremely unlikely flyrock paths 
N3: External people moving into mine site 
N4: Misfire unnoticed since hidden 
O1: PPE usage (operators/Blasting Foreman) 
O2: Protective wear on equipment (in fault trees dealt with together with PPE) 
P1: Post-blast inspection rules (general safety management/Blasting Foreman) 
P2: Post-blast measurements/inspections execution (Blasting Foreman) 
P3: Post-blast return timing decision (Blasting Foreman) 
S1: Detonators and explosives stored separately (general safety management) 
S2: Detonator storage stops external effects of exploding detonators (general safety management) 
S3: Storage conditions don’t affect explosive materials (general safety management) 
S4: Storage inspections (general safety management/powdermen/mine inspector) 
U1: Cause misfire unclear (not discussed in fault tree) 
V1: Ventilation capacity (ventilation engineer/general safety management) 
V2: Ventilation execution (ventilation engineer) 
Y1: Blockage blasting rules (general safety management/crushers, not discussed in fault tree) 
Y2: Blockage blasting execution (crushers, not discussed in fault tree)  
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F.! Background to Blasting Technology 
 
1.! General Theory on Rock Fragmentation 
The purpose of using explosives is to fragment rock in effective way. Having an explosive that performs 
very effectively, by expanding very rapidly and generating a fierce wave is the first factor that is important. 
Figure 38 displays a simplified view on how a crater forms from a drillhole, and turns into fractured rock 
over a wider area. There are two main effects of a detonating charge; a gas bubble/wave from the expanding 
gases and a stress wave that move through the rock, which leads to tension fractures and release fractures. 
It is now commonly assumed that it is the combination of these two effects that lead to rock fragmentation 
(Hartman, 2002). An important aspect is that it is the free face that is essential in securing the success of 
the blast; if an initial compression wave first hits the free face, it reflects, increasing tension in the rock, 
which in turn leads to fracturing of the rock. It is therefore crucial to have free faces throughout the blast, 
for surface mining this means that there needs to be an open side on the bench, blast direction therefore 
always moves from the side-bench to the new wall, and not the other way around, because then a free face 
would only be there at the end of the blast. In underground blasting this objective is reached by having 
large holes in the middle of the face, from where the blast expands outwards. For this reason, timing of the 
detonators is essential; if detonators detonate to early or too late a free face might not develop on time, 
leading to large rocks remaining (Persson, et al., 1994).  
 
FIGURE 38: CRATER-FORMING (HARTMAN, 2002, P. 389) 
 
For a blasting engineer, an issue that may be a very relevant issue, apart from fragmentation size and 
vibration considerations, is how the rock that has not been blasted adjacent to the blasted area looks after 
the blast; after all, this, together with the geological characteristics of the rock, determines the need for rock 
reinforcement to create safe drifts (Maier, 2000). For this reason, it is essential that vibrations around the 
area to be blasted are kept to a minimum, and also that flyrock is reduced. The only way to achieve this aim 
is by making sure that as much explosive energy as possible is used to only fracture the rock to be blasted, 
and very little energy is released by other means, in other words as flyrock and vibrations. This can be 
achieved by perfecting blast designs, which is only possible if the scatter of detonators is minimal and blast 
design and execution is done carefully (Persson, et al., 1994). Concluding, there are two main parameters 
that influence the effectivity of a blast to fragment rock, except for the quantity of explosive used per rock 
mass. The first is the “explosive performance”, the second the way in which different blast waves interfere. 
 
2.! Initiation Systems 
Different initiation systems are currently in use at Boliden mines, as discussed previously. In order to reach 
the goal of minimising the risk of unintended detonation and at the same time minimising the risk of failing 
detonation (misfires), the characteristics of the different initiation system need to be considered before rules 
on the avoidance of accidents can be drawn up. Initiation systems also determine operational working 
methods, because of the way in which they need to be prepared, and therefore need to be considered in 
this regard as well. To recap the introduction in Chapter 2, more specifically paragraph 2.2.3, there are three 
different initiation systems commonly in use in mining, electrical systems, NONEL-systems and electronic 
systems. This topic is considered from three different angles; the aim of maximising blasting performance, 
the aim of minimising the discussed risks, and what system is most “workable”. 
A.! Blasting Performance 
As was discussed before, the performance of a blast is greatly influenced by the timing of detonation. 
Reliability in timing of detonators is therefore essential. Using large quantities of detonators, there will 
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always be some deviations from intended delay times. Figure 39 displays case A, where the deviation of 
detonation times stays within the accepted margins, and detonators supposed to detonate at time 1 detonate 
then, without overlap with those detonating at time 2. In case B however, detonators that detonate at time 
1 overlap with detonators that are supposed to detonate at time 2; either because of large deviations from 
the average production value (B1), or because of a structural bias (B2). In this case B the success of the 
blast would therefore be harmed by the unpredictability of the detonator delays. Given that electrical and 
NONEL-detonators both use pyrothechnic delays, they tend to have relatively large deviations from their 
intended delay. Electronic delays solve this problem, since their delay is programmed digitially, and 
therefore very precise (Singh, et al., 2017). Typically, average scatter percentage variation of NONEL-
detonators is inbetween 3.5% and 5.5%, i.e. 17.5 milisecond per 500 milisecond delay. For electronic 
detonators this scatter is only around 0.01% (i.e. 0.5 milisecond deviation on average) (Grobler, 2001). 
 
 
FIGURE 39: DEVIATION OF INTENDED DELAY TIMES 
B.! Avoid unintended Detonation 
Different initiation systems have different associated hazards of unintended detonation; the fact that mines 
have mostly shifted from electrical detonation systems to NONEL-systems lies primarily in the fact that 
electrical systems are sensitive to all sorts of static and electromagnetic impulses, and therefore pose a 
hazard (Persson, et al., 1994), when they have to function in environments with for example power supplies. 
NONEL-systems are much safer in this regard, since they are practically impossible to detonate 
unintendedly. Electronic detonators do not have the same issues has electrical detonators, since, although 
it is possible that an unintended current would occur in the wiring, this current will never reach the explosive 
charge in the charge. This is the case because the chip, that processes the digital signal that is sent to the 
detonator when the blast is commenced, only transmits the ignition signal to the charge when it matches 
the ID of the particular chip. A regular pulse will therefore be filtered out.  
C.! Workability 
Workability of different initiation systems, in the sense of how easy, straightforward and verifiable the set-
up of the initiation system is. Electronic detonation is in this sense relatively complicated, since the entire 
system has to be programmed after it has been set up, using the unique ID’s each detonator has, whereas 
electrical and NONEL-systems can be connected immediately to the blasting apparatus when they are 
ready. Still, for anyone who is trained to program a blast it is not difficult, and as an extra advantage it is 
also possible to make last-minute changes in the blasting set-up, which would not be possible with other 
initiation systems. 
D.! Misfires 
Another advantage of electronic detonators is that it can even be possible to pinpoint misfires after the 
blast (Kiernan, 2011); this makes it much more likely that, when misfires have occurred, they will be found 
immediately, thereby reducing the risk of misfires coming up during loading, crushing or drilling. In Figure 
40 the different types of set-up can be seen. Binding of wires of electrical and electronic systems is similar, 
since a circuit has to be set up. NONEL-systems can be easier in that sense, on the other hand they usually 
rely on groupings of sets of detonators, this set-up has therefore to be thought through well.  
An advantage of electrical systems and electronic detonation systems is that the set-up can be checked after 
installation; this ensures that no connections are missing, which significantly reduces the chance of misfires. 
For this reason, simpler special blasting electrical systems are still commonly used. 
 
 151 
It is important also to remember how the delays are positioned; in the case of electrical and NONEL 
initiation systems, the right detonator has to be put in the right hole. For electronic systems, universal 
detonators can be used, since their delay time can be programmed afterwards. This makes the chance for 
mistakes with delays much smaller. 
 
 
3.! Electronic Detonators 
Given that electronic detonation systems are somewhat more complicated than traditional detonation 
systems, a quick impression of its functioning is given here. Electronic detonation systems get an electric 
firing pulse, similarly to electrical detonators. However, the electric signal is a digital signal sent from the 
blasting machine to a microcontroller in the detonator. Each detonator is unique, and only processes the 
signal if it matches the microcontrollers ID, thereby unlocking the switch. This gives two main advantages; 
first of all, random signals caused by for example electromagnetic waves will not reach the explosive part 
of the detonator, significantly reducing the risk for unwanted initiation. Secondly, the same type of 
detonators can be used for the entire set-up, and their delay times can be implemented after the charging 
is complete. The delay is digital, enabling it to be very precise compared to pyrotechnic delays that are used 
in NONEL and electrical detonators. See  
Figure 41 for the internal circuit of electronic detonators.  
 
 
FIGURE 41: INTERNAL CIRCUIT ELECTRONIC DETONATOR (CHAMBERS, ET AL., 2017) 
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Figure 2. Simplified electronic detonator circuit diagram 
 
The most complex device within the detonator is the microcontroller. This can be a generic microcontroller or 
an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), see Figure 1. The microcontroller processes commands 
received from the communications line and fires the detonator element by closing a switch. This allows energy 
stored within the firing capacitor to be rapidly delivered across the initiation element. The firmware running on 
the microcontroller enforces a protocol designed by the manufacturer to avoid unintended initiations and to 
prevent misfires. The protocol used is manufacturer specific and typically involves a number of unique 
commands that execute the firing sequence, with various ‘health checks’ being reported back from the detonator 
at each stage.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Detonators connected to integrated programming/testing unit via a communications line 
 
EIS typically include a firing unit, programming and/or testing unit and electronic detonators, often 
programming and testing functions are integrated into the same device. The programming/testing device is 
connected to either a single detonator or a group of detonators via the communications line as shown in Figure 
3. The device is used primarily to program the detonators with a specific delay time and also register the 
detonator’s unique identifier. The device is often able to perform diagnostics on the detonators confirming 
continued communications and that any self-testing (for example by the microcontroller) has been successfully 
executed.! 
The EIS programming and testing units incorporate inherently safe principles. For example, they are incapable 
of generating sufficient voltage to initiate a detonator, even in fault conditions. Similarly they do not contain the 
‘Arm’ and ‘Fire’ sequence commands. Programming and testing can be performed manually or via blast design 
software, which facilitates more complex blast designs. After programming/testing and the evacuation of the 
blast area, the firing unit can be connected to the detonators. The connection of the firing unit to the 
communications line is shown in Figure 4. 
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The firing unit provides sufficient voltage and current to charge the detonators’ firing capacitors up to a level 
which can reliably initiate the blast. The firing unit typically enforces additional checks, over and above those 
already performed by the programming unit. Once the required final tests are concluded successfully, the firing 
unit can be put into an ‘Armed’ state from which the blast can be initiated. The blast can be aborted by the 
operator or by the EIS itself, at any time before the fire command has been issued.  The ‘Abort’ command 
results in the detonators being placed into a safe state with their firing capacitors discharged and incapable of 
firing.  
 
  
Figure 4. Firing unit connected to detonators 
 
 
Figure 5. Firing unit operated remotely via RF communications 
 
The firing unit can be connected to the detonators by a lead wire used for communication and for charging the 
firing capacitors. In some cases this is not practicable and therefore the firing unit is connected to a remote 
devic  over a Radio Frequency (RF) link as shown in Figure 5. This configuration requires an operator (albeit 
fo  a sh rt exposure time) to connect a device which is capable of generating blast voltages to the 
communications line whilst the operator is closer than would be considered safe. Therefore, these systems 
incorporate additional measures to prevent the firing sequence being sent prematurely. Some EIS incorporate 
limited data logging, such that a record of the blast can be kept. For example, some systems allow a blast to 
proceed with a limited number of detonators unable to initiate if this is deemed safe and acceptable by the 
operator. The system can keep a record of which detonators were not functional.  
 
 
Issues Associated with EIS and their Assessment 
EIS have a good track record for reliability and safety since their deployment into the marketplace. However, as 
with any engineered system, zero risk is unattainable and there are a number of failure modes, which 
manufacturers and Explosives Notified Body’s need to understand and assess. The main undesirable outcomes 
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stored within the firing capacitor to be rapidly delivered across the initiation element. The firmware running on 
the microcontroller enforces a protocol designed by the manufacturer to avoid unintended initiations and to 
prevent misfires. The protocol used is manufacturer specific and typically involves a number of unique 
commands that execute the firing sequence, with various ‘health checks’ being reported back from the detonator 
at each stage.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Detonators connected to integrated programming/testing unit via a communications line 
 
EIS typically include a firing unit, programming and/or testing unit and electronic detonators, often 
programming and testing functions are integrated into the same device. The programming/testing device is 
connected to either a single detonator or a group of detonators via the communications line as shown in Figure 
3. The device is used primarily to program the detonators with a specific delay time and also register the 
detonator’s unique identifier. The device is often able to perform diagnostics on the detonators confirming 
continued communications and that any self-testing (for example by the micr controller) has been successfully 
executed.! 
The EIS programming and testing units incorporate i herently safe p inciples. For example, they are incapable 
of generating sufficient voltage to initiate a detonator, even in fault conditions. Similarly th y do not contain the 
‘Arm’ and ‘Fire’ sequence commands. Programming and testing can be performed manually or via blast design 
software, which facilitates more complex blast designs. After programming/testing and the evacuation of the 
blast area, the firing unit can be connected to the detonators. The connection of the firing unit to the 
communications line is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 5.9. Electrical response characteristics of Atlas Electric Detonators (from Atlas 
Powder Company, 1987). 
= IR^ (5.2) 
where is the voltage of the power supply in volts (V) , and I is the current in 
amperes (A) . 
The power supply must have a sufficient capacity to feed the circuit with the re-
quired current and voltage. To compute the power needs (in watts, W) of the series 
circuit, use the equation 
P = UI (5.3) 
or, when Ohm's Law is substituted, 
o r 
(5.4) 
P = I'R . (5-5) 
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Series circuit 
R i ^2 " 3 
U l y g U 3 PTTT 
c nnection line 
Figure 5.10. Series circuit. 
Paral lei I circuit 
Figure 5.11. Parallel circuit. 
Parallel Circuit 
For the parallel circuit (Figure 5.11), the blasting circuit resistance is 
and the total current flowing is 
nm Um 
FIGURE 40: INITIATION SYSTEM SET-UP (ELECTRICAL, NONEL, ELECTRONIC) 
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Table 5.6. Delay times for N O N E L detonators. 
NONEL MS NONEL LP 
Period Nominal Tupper Period Nominal Tl ower Tupper 
number delay (ms) (ms) (ms) number delay (ms) (ms) (ms) 
3 75 62.5 87.5 0 25 12.5 50 
4 100 87.5 112.5 1 100 50 150 
5 125 112.5 137.5 2 200 150 250 
6 150 137.5 162.5 3 300 250 350 
7 175 162.5 187.5 4 400 350 450 
8 200 187.5 212.5 5 500 450 550 
9 225 212.5 237.5 6 600 550 650 
10 250 237.5 262.5 7 700 650 750 
11 275 262.5 287.5 8 800 750 850 
12 300 287.5 312.5 9 900 850 950 
13 325 312.5 337.5 10 1000 950 1050 
14 350 337.5 362.5 11 1110 1050 1170 
15 375 362.5 387.5 12 1235 1170 1300 
16 400 387.5 412.5 14 1400 1300 1500 
17 425 412.5 437.5 16 1600 1500 1700 
18 450 437.5 462.5 18 1800 1700 1900 
19 475 462.5 487.5 20 2075 1900 2250 
20 500 487.5 550 25 2500 2250 2750 
30 3000 2750 3250 
35 3500 3250 3750 
40 4000 3750 4250 
45 4500 4250 4750 
50 5000 4750 5250 
55 5500 5250 5750 
60 6000 5750 6250 
NONEL UNIDET 
Period Nominal Tlower Tupper 
number delay (ms) (ms) (ms) 
SL 0 0 
SL 17 17 14 20 
SL 25 25 22 28 
SL 42 42 37 47 
SL 67 67 61 73 
SL 109 109 102 116 
SL 176 176 167 185 
U 400 400 391 409 
U 425 425 416 434 
U 450 450 441 459 
U 475 475 466 484 
U 500 500 491 509 
Quality inspection acceptance criteria: 
Tupper X ^ ^^ g^  
S 
X — TlQujev > 1.50 
where X = batch mean delay time, 
and S = standard deviation. 
Sub tituting X with nominal 
delay gives 
Smax — 
Tupper 
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4 3 3 3 3 4 
Figure 5.15. Example of coupling with connecting units and N O N E L MS. 
the cord. The hookup should sequence the initiation of charges in the drillholes in such 
a way that, if a failure occurs in the transmission in the NONEL tubing or in the E-cord 
trunkhne, the initiation of all charges with intended delay times shorter than that at 
which the failure occurred will detonate. The detonators with shorter delays should be 
reached by the initiating shock or detonating wave before those with longer delays. In 
this way one can ensure that in the case of a transmission failure, or the omission of 
a connection, all charges detonating up to the point of failure have broken out their 
burden of rock, and the remaining charges are in the undisturbed rear part of the blast. 
It is very difficult and risky to re-drill or recharge a blast where some charges have 
detonated behind undetona ed, cha ged drillholes. 
Figure 5.16 demonstrates the easy hook-up procedure in a tunnel blast. The 
NONEL tube  from several holes are bundled together, and a simple clove hitch is 
form d around them with a detonating cord. Alternatively, a special bunch connector 
can b  used. 
Where suitable, c mbinations of detonating cord and non-electric shock-tube sys-
tems can be used. A description of a system provided by Ensign-Bickford, follows. The 
Primadet Noiseless Trunkline Delays (NTD) are used as surface delays; they are hooked 
up in such a way that they initiate detonating cord downhnes (F gure 5 17). The direc-
tion NTD's are connected to the blastholes determines in what sequence the shotholes 
will detonate. The NTD's have delay times ranging from 5 to 200 ms. 
The best solution is definitely to use an in-the-hole delay time considerably greater 
than the total surface-delay time. The NONEL UNIDET s stem (Figure 5.18) has an 
in-the-hole delay equal to 450, 475, or 500 ms which often is enough. However, Hansson 
[1985] reports about an extended NONEL UNIDET system where the in-the-hole delay 
was 2000 ms allowing a mass blast of 1713 holes in the top and bottom crown pillars at 
the Research Mine of Luossavaara, Sweden. The surface delays were 17, 25, and 42 ms 
and total surface delay was 1897 ms, i.e., 103 ms less than the in-the-hole delay. The 
delay times were accurate, with a low scattering and low probability for overlapping. 
This could be maintained as the delay charges were taken from the same batch. 
The NONEL UNIDET simplifies the charging work as the same assembly is used 
in all the shotholes. The blasting foreman does not need to decide the delay times until 
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When setting up the system, all detonators are switched off, making it impossible for anyone but the 
responsible person to initiate the detonators. Prior to the blast, the system must be programmed, and can 
be tested on its functioning, without unlocking the main switch. This greatly reduces the chance of misfires, 
since it can be seen in advance whether the system has been set up correctly (Chambers, et al., 2017). Only 
when it has been confirmed that the system functions perfectly, the firing unit/blasting machine can be 
attached. This machine can then be fired by remote control. 
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G.! Internal Standards Sweden 
 
TABLE 42: BOLIDEN REQUIREMENTS ON PEOPLE INVOLVED IN EXPLOSIVES HANDLING AND 
BLASTING 
Topic Rule Source 
Responsibilities 
Employer 
The employer has to assign at least a sprängarbas for any blasting activity and a 
person responsible for the preparation of explosives, and if necessary coordinate.  
C0046, 
general 
Responsible 
Person for 
blasting 
For each activity, a "sprängarbas" has to be assigned. It is his responsibility to 
execute the job professionally and according to the given instructions. 
C00406 
Eligibility of the 
sprängarbas 
-The sprängarbas can both be a shift boss or a specifically for this job assigned 
person that oversees all blasting activities in his assigned area of responsibility. It 
is necessary that this person has participated in the required education, owns a valid 
blasting license and has specific competence for the blasting activity. 
- On top of the previous general requirements, the sprängarbas needs to have 
participated in a course certified by the Council for Blasting Education. 
C0046 
Requirements on 
anyone working 
with explosives. 
-Only competent people may be involved in works with explosives. 
-Theoretical competence has to be documented, for example by certifications from 
the educational institute or internal company education. 
-Anyone working in a blasting job needs to have practiced the particular type of 
blasting job that will be undertaken under supervision of an instructor with a valid 
blasting license.  
C0046 
 
Coordinating 
manager and 
location 
manager11 
The employer needs to appoint a coordinating manager, and if necessary a location 
manager. They must:  
-Have experience in the production/ handling of explosive materials and 
appropriate education.  
-Be in a leading position in the overall organization. 
-Not have a criminal record, this needs to be verified. 
C0046 
 
Storage manager -Needs to have a documented education by a recognised educator. This course 
needs to have a size of around 16 lecture hours. 
-The storage manager needs to be accepted by the local municipality or other 
authority that has issued the storage permit.  
-A deputy storage manager needs to be assigned as well, having the same 
requirements regarding competence. 
C0046, 
C00360 
 
Drivers  Drivers of vehicles with explosive materials need to have the required license. C00360 
 
TABLE 43: BOLIDEN STORAGE AND EXPLOSIVES STANDARDS 
Topic Rule Source 
General Prior to any storage and usage of explosives on site a permit needs to be obtained at 
the municipality where the explosives are used (if several municipalities are involved 
the main use municipality is the relevant authority), together with a transfer permit for 
the supplier to be able to deliver explosives for the municipality where the explosives 
are delivered. If a preparation permit has been obtained from the MSB the MSB can 
also be requested to issue a permit. The permit issuer is responsible for oversight. 
C00360 
Permit 
specific 
storage 
Any explosives storage has to have been inspected by the overseeing authority. The 
permit obtained has to be displayed visibly on the site. 
C00360 
Management 
of storage 
A log has to be kept regarding explosives taken in and out, if preferred electronically. C00360 
Access Access to the storage site needs to be restricted, and should be locked at any time when 
explosives are not brought in or taken out. The key needs to be stored such that 
unauthorised people cannot obtain it. 
C00360 
Waste -Waste has to be treated as explosives, in accordance with law 2010:2011 and ordinance 
2010:1075 on flammable and explosive goods. 
C21286 
                                                      
11 The coordinating manager has overall responsibility for production and shall ensure that all delegated 
location managers shall perform the tasks that the law prescribes. The location manager has responsibility 
for a particular location where explosives are produced. This is necessary when there is no coordinating 
manager present (Reg. nr. C00406). 
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-EWC code 16 04 03: Discarded explosives. Waste containing this substance is 
hazardous waste as H1. 
-Explosives contaminated packaging/material should be regarded as explosive waste. 
Destruction requires permission, in case of doubt contact supplier. 
- Emulsion Waste arising from the deflation / unwinding and then loaded into the 
rated intermediate bulk containers, will be returned promptly to the supplier for 
disposal. 
-In open-pit mining spill of emulsion is suitably handled (destroyed) by shoveling it 
into charged not plugged holes. Spills on the place of filling the emulsion transport 
vehicle shall be disposed of in IBC containers. 
 
TABLE 44: BOLIDEN STANDARDS ON PREPARATION AND TRANSPORTATION 
Topic Rule Source 
Permission to 
prepare 
A certain explosive material may only be prepared when permission has been given 
by the supplier of the explosive. 
C00406 
Person 
responsible 
The person responsible for mixing of blasting agents a specific education has to have 
been completed a specific education done in collaboration with the 
manufacturer/supplier. This person needs to be at least 18 years old. 
C00360 
Special 
explosives 
When explosives and initiation systems that are not listed in Chemsoft, testing has to 
have been undertaken in a local chemical facility in accordance with relevant 
regulations. 
C00360 
Production 
standards 
The responsible person is responsible for the production of explosives according to 
the requirements in LBE 2010:1011 and MSBFS 2016:3.  
C00406 
Task 
description 
The task description for the responsible person shall be clear, and his responsibilities 
and powers shall be described. 
C00406 
Transportation 
general 
Transportation shall always be carried out in such a way that any damage to people, 
animals, property or the environment does not occur. Vehicles and other 
transportation equipment shall be such that they can handle impacts.  
C00360 
Packaging Explosives shall be packed safely for transport. If not indicated otherwise in 
accompanying documents shall the explosive materials be packaged in outer- and 
inner packaging. 
C00360 
Vehicle, 
conduct 
during 
transport 
The vehicle transporting explosive materials shall: 
-be designed such that cargo cannot fall off; 
-keep explosive materials and detonators at least 1 meter apart, or keep them 
separated with a wall; 
-have yellow warning lights, orange shields on the front and back and shields with the 
most dangerous explosives classes transported attached on both sides of the vehicle; 
-have sprinkler installations, two hand-held powder extinguishers (6kg of type 43A 
233BC) and have a spark arrestor in the exhaust. 
Open fire, smoking etc. are not allowed in the vicinity of the explosive goods. 
C00360 
 
TABLE 45: BOLIDEN STANDARDS ON EQUIPMENT 
Topic Rule Source 
Charging 
materials 
-Charging materials shall be made such that they don't cause initiation or damage the 
detonator or ignition cord. A charging rod shall be smaller than 10mm of the diameter 
of the blasthole in order not to damage the conductor. 
-Only operators that have been educated by the manufacturer or their representative, 
may use charging equipment meant for pumpable emulsions. 
C00371 
Charging 
apparatus 
and 
production 
equipment 
The charging apparatus and production equipment can only be used when they have 
been verified by a third-party control agency or a certifying body accredited for this type 
of checks and in this test show to: 
-give reliable security against unintended fire or explosion; 
-avoid unnecessarily intensive working positions and movements, and; 
-workers working with the equipment are not hurt by noise, vibrations or rotating parts. 
C00371 
 On those occasions an emptying or cleaning the loading equipment must occur, for 
example, when repairing or servicing: 
-The remaining amount of emulsion in loading equipment emulsion tank, should be 
pumped into IBC containers approved for transport on public roads under ADR Class 
(1.1).  Note that the equipment must be checked by the director to make explosives 
before Hot Works is done. 
C21286 
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-loading equipment rinsed in the cleaning area, which collects the emulsion residue and 
dirt can be done in a way, validated. 
 Over filling and suction hoses for matrix and fumigants must be kept clean and must 
be handled so that risk of wrinkling is avoided. 
C21286 
 Every time an overflow hose is used, the hose condition is checked and if any damage 
exists, have the hose replaced immediately with a new one. 
C21286 
 Links must be kept clean and their lids should be used, to avoid gravel, stone or other 
foreign objects from entering the hose. 
C21286 
 Ensure all connections between pump, tank / IBC and loading equipment are well 
connected, so that no risk of emulsion spillage may occur. - IBC containers must always 
have the filler cap screwed on. 
C21286 
 Emulsion tank shall have inspection / man-doors closed. C21286 
 Intermediate bulk containers shall be stored in one of the director designated location 
and shall under no circumstances, be used for purposes other than storage of emulsion 
/ explosive waste. 
C21286 
Maintenance 
of charging 
vehicles 
Prior to maintenance of charging vehicles, they have to be completely cleaned from any 
explosive materials. No maintenance can commence before an official Proof of 
Cleaning has been documented. 
-The maintenance manager on call has responsibility that cleaning is done specifically 
for the type work to be done on the vehicle. This has to be done in accordance with 
C26895, on instructions for reparation and maintenance of charging vehicles.  
-When cleaning the pumping system, the Proof of Cleaning of the manufacturer be 
issued by the manufacturer or his representative.  
-Staff working on the vehicle has to be informed on the rules applicable to both the 
vehicle and the area where the work is done. 
-The Proof of Cleaning shall be archived for at least 30 days by the responsible manager. 
-These rules apply to any vehicle working with or transporting explosives. 
C26898 
 
TABLE 46: BOLIDEN STANDARDS ON CHARGING 
Topic Rule Source 
General Charging shall be executed such that the risk for unintended initiation is effectively 
avoided. 
C00371 
Charging 
environment 
-Charging in warm environments shall be avoided since sensitivity of the explosive 
increases with higher temperature. If it is unavoidable special measures have to be 
taken. 
-In case of risk for thunderstorms charging with electrical initiation systems have to be 
interrupted, if necessary warning systems have to be in place. 
C00371 
Drilling  -Charging near drilling shall be avoided. 
-Only the operator may be in the drilling unit, no one may be in front of the unit with 
horizontal or overhead drilling. 
C00371 
Cleaning of 
blastholes 
-Try to flush blockings with pressured water, if this is not available use pressurized air, 
if possible with spooling water on it. Move the hose in carefully. The hose can only be 
made of copper, brass, plastic or other materials allowed by the AV. It is not allowed 
to use rock drills or any other iron objects in holes where explosives have been charged 
previously.  
C00371 
Unfinished 
charging  
If charging a blasthole has been stopped before a detonator has been inserted the 
blasthole shall be marked with yellow paint. 
C00371 
Spillage Spillage and other rests shall be dealt with as quickly as possible and made harmless in 
such a way that people or the environment are not exposed to danger. Limit spreading 
to for example sewage systems or groundwater. Follow instructions by the supplier. 
C00371 
Size of charge No larger quantities of explosive are allowed to be used than that which is safe. Issues 
that need to be taken into account for this judgment are the characteristics of the rock, 
vegetation, number of free faces, location and distribution of the charge, characteristics 
of the explosive and risks for the area round.  
C00371 
Charging itself -Charging shall be done with care. The size of cartridges shall also be of such diameter 
that they can easily be inserted in the blasthole.  
-Cartridges shall be inserted without violent jabbing, such they fill the hole. 
-Chargers should not stand in front or bended over the blasthole opening. 
C00371 
Frozen 
charges 
When frozen charges have to be thawed the supplier has to contacted on the way how 
to do this. 
C00371 
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Smoke from 
blasthole 
In case smoke comes from the blasthole the charging activities have to be stopped 
immediately, staff has to bring itself in safety and simultaneously warn people in the 
area. 
C00371 
Interruptions With shift changes shall the outgoing shift explain the incoming shift about the 
progress of the work. When charging has commenced for a blasthole, this shall be 
completed before the end of the shift. 
C00371 
Oversight -Charges that have not been fired shall be marked, in a manner known to all staff, or 
guarded until it is fired.  
-If charging is partially finished and has to wait until the next working day the area has 
to be guarded or blocked for unauthorised access, if the working place can be accessed 
by unauthorised people.  
C00371 
 
TABLE 47: BOLIDEN POST-BLASTING STANDARDS 
Topic Rule Source 
Pre-drilling 
inspections 
-Clean rock surface to be bored shall be cleaned, possibly with water. If the surface 
is still covered by rocks or other materials these have to be cleaned so it can be 
verified that no explosive materials are left. 
-Undetonated blastholes have to be looked for. If holes are found of more than 
15cm deep with an invisible bottom, it can be checked with a charging rod if there 
are explosives left. If there is any doubt or reason to assume that explosives are 
left after this test, the hole has to be cleaned with water. 
C00411, 
§1, 2 
Undetonated 
Charges/Misfires 
Explosive materials that cannot be used immediately for blasting have to be 
collected. Misfires have to be made harmless as soon as possible and otherwise 
marked and reported to the management.  
C00411, 
notes, 
C00371 
Cleaning 
undetonated 
charges 
Flushing pipes for cleaning of undetonated charges should be made of the 
prescribed materials such as copper, brass, plastic etc. It is not allowed to use 
objects made of iron/steel to clean. 
C00411, 
notes 
Undetonated 
detonators 
Detonators that are still left in a blasthole can only be taken out when they are 
loose. 
C00411, 
§7 
Explosive 
remains 
Explosive materials or explosive initiation materials that are found shall be treated 
in accordance with the requirements of the AV. In case explosive materials have 
penetrated the drilling rod it has to be marked and reported to the driller. It has 
to be cleaned using nothing else than wood, copper or water. Before it has to be 
verified that no remaining explosive materials are left. 
C00411, 
§3 
Difficulties in 
drilling/blasting 
If certain rock cakes and has a lot of misfires, alternative drilling plans have to be 
available so that a next phase of drilling does not hit on pre-existing blastholes, 
thereby minimising the risks of drilling in explosive remains. 
C00411, 
§4 
Undetonated 
blasthole drilling 
It is forbidden to drill in undetonated blastholes C00411, 
§4 
Start of drilling Drilling always has to start with flushing water switched on. C00411, 
§5 
Drilling without 
prior checks 
If drilling has to be done in an area where no satisfactory prior check for misfires 
could be done, the drilling has to be operated from a sheltered location. 
C00411, 
§6 
Reporting 
requirements 
Misfires have to be reported as deviation in Boliden's reporting system. C00411, 
notes 
Doubt on action 
to take 
In case doubt arises around the correct way to deal with the problem the 
responsible boss has to be contacted to take a decision. 
C00411, 
notes 
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H.! Examples Boliden Safety Documents 
  
FIGURE 42: FLOW-CHART BLASTING PROCEDURE AITIK 
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FIGURE 43: BLASTING MAP AITIK 
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I.! Introductory Email Interviews 
 
Kankberg email, 28 March 2017, Kent Hedin, Production Manager at Kankberg Mine 
-Brytningsmetoder som används i de olika gruvorna 
•! Vi håller bara på med igensättningsbrytning med gråberg som återfyllnadsmaterial. 
-Vilka olika typer av explosiv (och hjälpare) används 
•! Kankberg använder Austin Indetshock, Firex eltändare, Primer X-pipe 25g, stubin riocord 5g, 
emulsion levererar Forcit. 
-Vilka typer av tändledningar, sprängkapsel och stubin används 
•! Se ovan. 
-Vad för en lagring för explosiv används 
•! Godkänt sprängförråd under jord. 
-Hur många människor jobbar med explosiv och deltar i sprängarbeten, och utförs jobbet (delvis) av 
entrepenörer? 
•! Uppskattningsvis 1-2 personer/dygn är inblandade i laddningsarbete. 
-Allmän sprängingsförfarande; hur ofta spränger ni, ska den hela gruvan utrymmas eller bara en del? 
•! Varje natt, skjuttid 01:00, då är gruvan utrymd, uppstart 06:00 igen. 
 
 
Garpenberg email, 30 March 2017, Kent Hedin, Chief Mine Planning Engineer at Garpenberg 
Mine 
-Brytningsmetoder som används i de olika gruvorna 
•! Skivpall, igensättning och ortdrivning 
-Vilka olika typer av explosiv (och hjälpare) används 
•! Emulsion, primer (X-pipe) 15mm, SLP-primer och 1 kg Booster 
-Vilka typer av tändledningar, sprängkapsel och stubin används 
•! Nonelkapslar, elektronikkapslar, 5g Cord och krutstubin 
-Vad för en lagring för explosiv används 
•! Sprängämnesförråd, 3 stycken i gruvan 
-Hur många människor jobbar med explosiv och deltar i sprängarbeten, och utförs jobbet (delvis) av 
entrepenörer? 
•! 12 laddare på ort och 12 laddare på skivpall 
-Allmän sprängingsförfarande; hur ofta spränger ni, ska den hela gruvan utrymmas eller bara en del? 
•! Spränger två gånger per dygn, kl.16.05 och 04.05. Hela gruvan ska vara utrymd 
 
 
Aitik email, 27 February 2017, Torbjörn Krigsman, Blasting Engineer at Aitik Mine:  
-Brytningsmetod? 
•! Pallsprängning 
-Vilka olika typer av explosiv (och hjälpare) används? 
•! Aitik använder nonelsystem för upptändning (1000ms fördröjning i kapslarna ) För att få igång 
sprängämnet apteras en 1,7 kg booster på tändaren. 2 st booster-tändare placeras i vart borrhål 
(311 mm) som sedan fylls med Emulsionssprängämne (ca 1000 kg) av vår leverantör Forcit. Vid 
sk. Förspräckning används en produkt kallad Riogur. 
-Vilka typer av tändledningar, sprängkapsel och stubin används? 
•! Se ovan. 
-Vad för en lagring för explosiv används? 
•! Tändmedel, booster och annat sprängämne (dynamit och riogur) förvaras i ett godkänt 
sprängförråd på plats i Aitik 
-Hur många människor jobbar med explosiv och deltar i sprängarbeten, och utförs jobbet (delvis) av 
entrepenörer? 
•! Laddpersonalen jobbar K2 och är 3 personer/skift (boostersätter, kopplar och spränger salvorna. 
-Allmän sprängingsförfarande; hur ofta spränger ni, ska den hela gruvan utrymmas eller bara en del? 
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•! Vanligtvis spränger vi 1-2 ggr/vecka kl. 19:00 Farligt område minst 1200 m. utryms innan 
sprängning. Skickar med en checklista för salvsprängning samt en sk. Sprängkarta för 
sprängningen i morgon tisdag 28/2 som exempel på hur det kan se ut. 
 
 
Tara email, 8 March, Pascal Walsh, Health & Safety manager at Tara Mine.  
  
-Mining techniques applied in Tara 
•! Open Stoping and Drift and Slash technique. 
-Types of explosives used (including boosters, in what conditions do you use different types of 
explosives).  
•! Emulsion + gas agent, use Non-L primed. 
-What detonators, ignition systems, fuses etc. you use.  
•! Bunch connectors-primer chord connected to an electric detonators to initiate explosion (with 
rio primers) 
-What kind of storage do you have to store explosives and other blasting materials?  
•! We have secured magazines in the mine with very restricted access. We have reserve station with 
restricted access. 
-How many people are involved in charging and blasting tasks? Is (part of) the work carried out by a 
contractor?  
•! Charging and blasting the operation could have up to 22 people in charging and blasting. Yes 
contractors are also involved in charging and blasting. 
-General blasting procedure (do you blast daily or with another frequency, do you evacuate the entire 
mine or just an area?)  
•! Blast twice (2 times a day) Morning and evening. The mine is empty except for blasting team. 
-Have you developed your own safety policy based on Irish safety legislation?  
•! Yes, we use the European legislation as adopted into Irish Law and general our own procedure 
to comply. 
 
 
Kevitsa email, 22 February 2017, Arto Suokas, Mine Superintendent at Kevitsa Mine 
-Mining techniques applied in Kylylahti 
•! Open pit mining, bench height 12 m. 165 and 225 mm dia blastholes. Vertical 24 m long dia 165 
mm holes in presplit. Subdrilling about 1.5 m. PF 1.1 – 1.9 kg/m3. Stemming height 3.5 – 4.5 m, 
8-25 mm gravel used as stemming. 
-Types of explosives used (including boosters, in what conditions do you use different types of explosives) 
•!  Fortis Extra emulsion, 500 g and 1000g primers. Secondary blasting with Senatel. Presplit with 
Maxam 45 mm continuous packaged product. 
-What detonators, ignition systems, fuses etc. you use 
•! NONEL detonators and surface delays. Two primers and dets per hole. 
-What kind of storage do you have to store explosives and other blasting materials? 
•! Steel containers modified to comply with Finnish legislation for packaged products and 
detonators. Insulated and heated storage tanks for emulsion. 
-How many people are involved in charging and blasting tasks? Is (part of) the work carried out by a 
contractor? 
•! We do D&B planning ourselves. 36 drillers of our own, contractor has 12 drillers. Orica is our 
blasting contractor, they have 2+11 people on site. 
-General blasting procedure (do you blast daily or with another frequency, do you evacuate the entire 
mine or just an area?) 
•! Evacuate the whole pit. 300 m safety distance for equipment, 500 m for blasters. Blast 1-3 times 
a week. 
-Have you developed your own safety policy based on Finnish safety legislation? 
•! Yes. 
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Kylylahti email, 22 February 2017, Jari Kolehmainen, Manager Health & Safety at Kylylahti Mine 
 
-Mining techniques applied in Kylylahti 
•! Sublevel stoping backfilled with waste rock or crf. 
-Types of explosives used (including boosters, in what conditions do you use different types of explosives) 
•! Main explosive is Kemiitti 810, in some cases we use also Anfo, but ratio is app. 90-10 to Kemiitti. 
Both in drifting and long holes we use also some pipecharges for smooth wall blasting and in 
waterholes. 
As a booster, we use Forprime. 
-What detonators, ignition systems, fuses etc. you use 
•! Both millisecond non-electronic and electronic detonators, supplied by Forcit. 
-What kind of storage do you have to store explosives and other blasting materials? 
•! Storages are mined or after-use tunnels. 
-How many people are involved in charging and blasting tasks? Is (part of) the work carried out by a 
contractor? 
•! All together ~10 people, in one shift there’s normally two miners doing blasting works. After 
blasting the smoke check is partly done by contractor. Shift supervisor is of course important part 
of the blasting tasks and smoke checks. 
-General blasting procedure (do you blast daily or with another frequency, do you evacuate the entire mine 
or just an area?) 
•! Blasting is performed daily (17:45) and we evacuate entire mine. 
-Have you developed your own safety policy based on Finnish safety legislation? 
•! Yes, safety policy has been developing like any other thing during life of mine. It is mixture of 
Australian, Finnish and now Swedish safety cultures. And of course it’s based Finnish legislation. 
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J.! Notes Field Trips 
 
1.! Kankberg 
Ari Juhainen (sprängarbas/Shift Boss) 
•! Ari is sprängarbas and superintendent.  
•! Blasting is carried out along SOP's. SOP's are developed at Bolidens central office. Standardized for all 
tunneling operations. 
Chargers 
•! Separated explosives storage. Access with a personal code. Suppliers of explosives cannot enter the storage 
area without someone from Boliden.  
•! Charging is almost always done alone, sometimes with one person working from the platform and one from 
the ground. Always a radio is taken along, sees other people during lunch. 
•! Inspections of the quality of charging are not carried out by the sprängarbas. 
 
2.! Aitik 
Torbjörn 
•! Rock types are similar throughout the mine, therefore no need for separate charge weights etc. 
•! For each blasting round a new blasting plan is drawn up, primarily based on the geometry of the rock to be 
blasted. The drilling plan is developed by the mine planning department. 
•! Around 2 benches per year are excavated. 
•! Maximum distance between drillholes is 7.1 meters for blasting to be effective. 
•! Keys for the explosives storage are in the custody of the chargers. These are physical keys. 
•! Spring weather can be a challenge, with melting water causing more unstable slopes and different conditions. 
•! Stemming is carried out by a contractor. 
•! Problem existed with the boosters in autumn 2016.  
•! In general, very few misfires; 14 misfires out of 17,800 drillholes during 2016 
•! Special exception with regards to rock surface cleaning requirement. Because it is recorded where drillholes 
where located on each level, drilling can be planned such that new holes will always be located on a different 
coordinate. Also, there will be a few months between the blasting of a new block. Therefore, the mining 
authority has granted an exception to the general rule that a rock surface always needs to be cleaned before 
the next blast. 
Chargers 
•! 2/3 chargers are sprängarbas, always at least 1 required. Blasting plan is developed by blasting engineer 
(Torbjörn), but sometimes chargers make calculations in the field. 
•! Special driver's license is required to drive the car with explosives. Explosives car has separate department 
for primers and for detonators.  
•! Explosives packaging cannot go together with regular old paper waste, has to be burned at end of each shift. 
•! Maximum of 50 booster charges per day, because of weight primers (health requirements). 
•! Emulsion charging is done completely by Forcit. Stemming is done by Boliden staff. 
•! If charging/blasting takes place in pit with one road sometimes tractor is taken along to ensure that one still 
can get out.  
•! Single detonator and primer are used in side holes if rocks cannot fly into the pit into the side. 
•! If it is dark, a headlamp is used for lighting.  
•! A lot of misfires occurred during autumn 2016, it was found this was caused by failure of the boosters in 
these conditions. Therefore, a switch in boosters. 
•! Operators of loading equipment is trained in spotting misfires. If these are spotted, chargers are called, 
they will blast the misfire if possible. If not possible it is hauled and dumped on a separate site.  
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3.! Kevitsa 
Materials that serve as sources for the study of explosives and blasting safety practices at Kevitsa are the following: 
•! These notes 
•! Notes comparing specific legislative requirements 
•! Provided documents such as guidelines, SOP's, safety instructions etc (insofar translatable from Finnish). 
•! Videos of successful and unsuccessful blasts 
Arto Suokas (Mine Superintendent) 
ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP  
•! Orica has TLS-service, they therefore also have their own charging safety procedures.  
•! Arto is the Blasting Foreman. 2 D&B engineers. Drill&Blast design is carried out by Boliden. 
•! In the end blasting is the responsibility of Boliden, but delegated powers to Orica.  
•! Communications between Orica and Boliden after blasting, after e.g. misfires and 
overbreak/underbreak, in order to improve services.  
•! Chief mining engineer is in the rend responsible for safety.  
 
TYPES OF DOCUMENTS USED 
SOP’s. Orica has own SOP’s. Internal guidelines. 
HOW SAFETY POLICIES ARE DRAFTED 
Safety documents are primarily in Finnish, for workers. SOP’s are developed by the superintendent/chief mining 
engineer, a safety officer. Best group also involves operators and specific engineers. It is important that the SOP’s are 
easy to explain and understand. 
There is an ongoing revision of SOP’s and checklists, also in order to translate things to English. 
ENFORCEMENT OF SAFETY STANDARDS 
Mine inspector comes from Toukes (Centre for Safety, National Body) Deals with chemical, safety, blasting safety, 
mine administration. Also, responsible for approval of storage. 
Safety department responsible for preparing inspector visits. 
Permitting regarding dust, noise etc. relatively loose because remote. Ongoing mining permit of which general 
approval for blasting forms part. No specific permits necessary again. Orica has its own permit to use explosives. 
TRAINING 
People without a license can work under supervision. 3hr induction for all workers, then test, then you get ID-card 
and driving permit. Orica has its own trainings and rules. Mention about blasting and safety distances in each training. 
Superintendent and some of Orica have senior license, rest regular ones. At least 1 senior license is necessary for each 
activity. Orica does all the checks on its own employees. 
RISK ASSESSMENTS 
Storage, blast and operations are all risk assessed before new starts. Not separate assessments for each blasting in 
regular cases. Always assessment with deviating circumstances (e.g. snow, ice). Then drilling only at night and charging 
immediately the day after. Blast asap. 
Orica has its own checklists, this is in SOP’s. Orica has assessment for each operating phase. These are communicated 
with global operations. 
INCIDENT REPORTING 
•! Health & Safety responsible for managing and investigating incidents. In general H&S people serve as 
internal consultants, separate from daily operations. Analysis of LTI’s, kpi’s etc.  
•! Reactive indicators are well-analyzed, leading indicators more difficult to develop. 
•! Lots of small incidents like tripping and falling, also during charging activities and with drillers. No issues 
with blasting however, except for misfires.  
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•! No LTI’s known following blasting activities (except for the mentioned tripping issues perhaps). 
•! Concerns with misfires; there was an increase of misfires since last year. This was primarily due to contour 
drilling, also issues with misfires in previously excavated quarries (then used for mine development works). 
Other cause for misfires are cut wires. Misfires one of the biggest risks. 
•! Incident last week: driller drilled a hole, when lifted the drill bit, a primer was lying next to the hole. Matter 
with contour blasting (again).  
•! Presumed reasons for misfires: Cold weather casing wasn’t think enough in contour blasting, tie-ups, flyrock 
causing wire-cutting leading to cut-offs. Misfires from previous operations, cannot change that anymore. 
Delay hooked up/damage to tube. 
•! 1-4 misfires per month, decreases 2015-2016, now increase. Due to contour blasting. Blasts around 3M 
tons/month, 750 tons/blasthole. Therefore 1-2 misfire per million ton mined. Drilled 977376 holes, 72000 
holes with 45 misfires, i.e. 1/1600. 
•! Procedure with misfires; loading in the particular area is halted. Person with blasting license picks up the 
misfire, gives coordinates, brings it to the storage area in a box with a pipe. If no one with a blasting license 
is in the area the area is blocked off until there is someone to pick it up. Orica blasts misfires along with 
regular blasts. Each misfire is treated as a deviation for reporting. 
•! Case of misfire in split-up. Blast cut-off? Connections of splices caused detonation in a wet-hole (pre-blast?) 
•! Power lines have been hit by flyrock a few times.  
•! Sometimes breaches of danger zone during blasting. 3 years ago, a fuel truck drove out of the pit just before 
blasting. 
•! Centuri-system is used for safety issues, like everywhere in Boliden. 
 
EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS USED 
NONEL-system is usually used, electronic detonation is trialed. No vibration problems (remote location), trialing of 
electronic detonation is primarily done to improve fragmentation and wall control.  
TRACK & TRACE 
Orica is both importer and end-user, so system functions differently with e.g. not an xml-file for the end-customer, 
it’s easier with one user. However, track & trace system is implemented, and in the future will be fully digital. All 
materials are imported from other EU-countries.  
STORAGE  
Orica has their own licenses for the storage. Storage containers and emulsion tanks, together with all explosive 
materials are owned by Orica.  
•! Soon a new storage to deal with the track&trace requirements.  
•! Orica sends an invoice twice a month; this specifies exactly what explosive materials have been used and 
how much are in store.  
•! Separate container for pre-split explosives. 
 
BLASTING PLANNING 
•! Never blast at the same end of the pit, always at other ends.  
•! Planning is done Thursday-Wednesday, this leaves room for weekend works. 
•! Notice is given two days before the blast.  
•! Group meeting each day, 15-20 minutes with a large crew (also maintenance and processing). If blasting 
relevant discussed, primarily for evacuation. Later more specifically with just the mine people. 
•!  
CHARGING 
•! Portable lighting towers are used during wintertime. Cap lamps are used as well. Always for charging and 
loading areas. Boliden supplies them to Orica. 
•! Charged area is fenced off. No guards needed since whole mine has fence around it. Safety berm is used 
when next to a busy haul road. This is risk assessed.  
•! Guidelines of Orica are followed.  
•! Drill-blast cycle is usually very quick. The main limit is the detonators, should officially be used within 2-4 
weeks, depending on circumstances. Emulsion stays well for 3 months. 
 
BLASTING PRACTICE 
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Ground conditions sometimes cause excitement. Spring conditions are difficult. 
Evacuation 30 minutes before the blast, there are guards at all the entrances. 
If not possible to protect equipment, two dump trucks moved to protect against flyrock, with bucket turned upwards. 
Then always first assessment if it is possible to postpone the blast. 3 of such occasions in the last 2 years.  
 
Pre-blasting check is left to Orica, to check set-up. Items external to the blast itself are checked by Blasting Foreman 
(Boliden). Also checks for wall control.  
1. Check if equipment is in the designated location.  
2. Drive around the blasting area to look for people.  
3. Orica sets up a receiver and later transmitter around 10-15 minutes before the blast.  
4. Guards are in place half an hour before the blast until after. 
 
Post-blasting check is carried out together with Orica. The Blasting Foreman is responsible for the check. 
1. Check for fumes  
2. Check how rock breaking went.  
3. Report deviations  
4. Shiftboss needs to keep guards until the fumes have cleared out. 
 
DRILLING 
Drilling tasks partially carried out by Boliden, partially by contractors (for overburden). Drilling is usually carried out 
near charging locations. In the future contractor may be phased out for loading/hauling and drilling tasks (5 year 
contract awarded by First Quantum). Drillers receive training to spot misfires. 
•! Safety distance between drilling and charging (2 lines/10m). If drillers have to go back in charging field to 
fix a hole/new hole, always still 5m distance and always under Orica supervision. 
•! 3-4 rows at the edge of the blast are left free when drilling nearby to avoid issues with flyrock. Drilling is 
then done after blasting.  
•! Using collar pipes immediately afterwards helped a lot. With weak rock sometimes still problems however. 
In general, luckily good rock quality. 
LOADING & HAULING 
•! Training for loading/hauling people: They get training on the job, Orica gives a presentation on spotting 
misfires every two years. Before people start working they have an induction of several hours including items 
on blasting and misfires and a mine tour. 
•! Cleaning is carried out after loading when toes left (special blasting), before production drilling starts again. 
CRUSHING 
Oversize in crushers is not a problem currently. Small equipment is used in such cases to break rock. Hydraulic 
rockbreaker is used for oversize in the open pit. 
SPECIAL BLASTING 
Special blasting, of toes, boulders etc., is carried out by another contractor, because Orica is expensive. For this, 
electric detonators are used, since they are much quicker to work with and check resistance. They have mats on top. 
Sometimes powerlines and equipment nearby, therefore mats are used. Power lines do not cause problems with 
electrical interference. For oversize blasts NONEL is used.  
OTHER CONTRACTORS 
Contractors are always responsible for their own people. In the past some “cheap cowboys”, but they have improved 
well. Actually contractors have better safety record than own Boliden staff. Same safety reporting standards, but 
recorded separately from own staffs. Hartikainen (big contractor) has even own safety manager.  
ONGOING IMPROVEMENTS 
No major differences compared to working under First Quantum (until 2016). Still, ongoing gradual improvements. 
Orica has been there from the start and also communicates with other Orica operations. 
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CONTACT WITH OTHER BOLIDEN MINES 
There is a working group in Boliden for transferal of blasting practices. Discussions with Aitik and technical office. 
•! Some geologists and hard rock engineers stay in touch with Kylylahti. 
•! Safety department is in touch with Bolidens office.  
•! No benchmarking with underground mines so far, but could be useful for the future. 
 
Tony Vaarala (Blasting Engineer)  
DESIGN PARAMATERS 
•! Pattern sizes 
•! Waste: 4.6m, square pattern, Ore: 3.3*3.9m 
•! It is tried to have bigger spacing to improve drillers and chargers capacity 
•! Currently only different pattern size for ore/waste, otherwise no geological differences based on 
rock types.  
•! Problem with slow stemming works, increase in pattern size would also make it easier to work 
therefore. 
•! Stemming: 
•! 6.5 m if inclined blast holes 
•! 3.5m stemming for regular holes 
•! 4.5 stemming for last holes, and a bigger diameter 
•! Emulsion around 450 kg, 250-280 for overburden. 
•! 165mm and 225mm drill bits used. 
•! Wall control/fragmentation main priority blasting engineer. 
 
MISFIRES 
No drilling closer than 1 meter from previous drillings to avoid hitting misfires. Avoiding misfires sometimes difficult 
during winter. Important to ensure that initiation of detonators goes far enough before the wires are broken. 
DANGER ZONE 
For machines, it can be checked whether minimal distances can be less due to proper blast design.  
Safety distances: 300 m for machines, 500 meters for people. Machines are kept outside the throw direction if possible. 
DESIGN&BLAST PROCESSS 
•! Surpac is used for drill&blast planning. Blast master is made outlining different blasting fields. The 
mine planner specifies the amount of rock to be blasted.  
•! Exact drill designs are not specified immediately, usually only around 1-2 weeks in advance, when 
it is also planned when a particular field will be blasted.  
•! Orica software also used for some blast designs aspects. 
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•! Feedback from Orica after the blast, including in the form of an excel file specifying the exact 
quantities of emulsion used. Broken holes have also been marked. 
 
Thomas Tervetuoala (Charger for Orica)  
BLASTING TECHNIQUES 
•! Different emulsion densities, near the pre-splitter thicker emulsions used.  
•! 3.5-meter stemming, 4.5 meter near the pre-split in order not to break the wall.  
•! Delays are connected to each detonator near the hole with NONEL immediately. 
•! Usually around 300-400 holes per day are primed, loaded and stemmed.  
•! Sometimes working with IKON-detonators, as trial. Work is more complicated.  
•! Cardboard pipes are used to avoid hole collapses, this has worked pretty well in avoiding misfires. 
LICENSES 
Everyone has a C-license and a blasting license, except for trainees and summer workers. 
 
EQUIPMENT USED 
Shovel for stemming; three different loading trucks for emulsions. Several hiluxes for personal transport. 
 
SHIFTS 
7x12 hour shifts (8 on Sunday), 7 days off. Usually 6 people per shift, currently 8 because summer workers 
are trained. During the summer holiday weeks 4 permanent workers+2 summer workers. Only day shifts, 
whereas drillers work 24/7. Around one blasting fielded charged per day.  
 
EMULSION STORAGE 
Two permanent and one temporary storages, of around 1100 tons each.  
 
STORAGE 
•! Explosion-sensitive materials are separate in a fenced off open area, with containers for each 
separate type of explosive materials. The detonators are stored on one site of the storage field, the 
primers on the other. Distances based on Finnish legislation. 
•! Every charger has a key to Orica containers on the general storage site.  
•! Sub-contractors have their own storage containers within the storage facility.  
•! When explosives are taken out from the storage this is reported. Bookkeeping is done on paper 
forms; in the future new storage will be built to facilitate electronic track & trace systems.  
•! The storage is checked monthly, in order to see that the materials stored match the records. 
 
MAINTENANCE/CLEANING 
All maintenance/cleaning of charging equipment is undertaken by Orica people, on site, at their own 
facility, where also the breakroom and emulsion storage is located.  
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4.! Tara 
Materials that serve as sources for the study of explosives and blasting safety practices at Tara Mine are the following: 
•! These notes 
•! Notes comparing specific legislative requirements 
•! Provided documents such as guidelines, SOP's, safety instructions etc. 
 
Dessie Rogers (Health & Safety Officer) 
ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP  
Miner-Shift Boss-Head of Section-Mine Manager 
TYPES OF DOCUMENTS USED 
•! Statements; drafted by a safety officer, reviewed by safety manager, signed by the general manager. Legal 
requirement. 
•! More detailed SOP's and safety guidelines. In any case always a scope, purpose and definition included in 
the document. 
•! It is necessary that documents are simple and easy to understand for all people involved. 
•! Shift bosses not only need to know the relevant safety documents drafted by Boliden, but also the underlying 
legal documents (such as the 1972 Mines (Explosives) Regulations and 1965 Mines & Quarries Act).  
 
HOW SAFETY POLICIES ARE DRAFTED 
•! Generally, three people involved, always three-stage process (Draft-Review-Approval). People involved e.g. 
head of section, safety officer and shift boss, but can have different compositions. 
•! External watchdog for changing legal requirements; when requirements change new rules & procedures will 
always be developed. 
•! In some cases, regulations are copied from Sweden. Skeptical about wide application however, due to mine-
specific environment and requirements. 
•! No external review of procedures. Development is separate from Sweden. 
 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Centuri-system used to manage all rules & procedures, risk assessments etc. Accessible to all Boliden people involved. 
ENFORCEMENT OF SAFETY STANDARDS 
•! Shift bosses visit activities at least twice a shift. 
•! Heads of section may go down as well. 
•! Mine Inspector visits twice a year, specifically interested in explosives. 
•! Department of Justice specifically checks explosive standards once a year. 
 
INCIDENT REPORTING 
•! AIRS (Accident Investigation Reporting System) is used to report incidents. No significant accidents related 
to blasting or explosives recorded (i.e. no personal injury, no trespassing, no damage to equipment), except 
for misfires. Why would this go well?  
•! Underground mine, so trespassing practically impossible, and very effective evacuation possible. 
•! Very strict rules on storage and handing over explosives (powderman/magazine vs reserve station system 
does not exist in this way in Sweden) 
 
EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS USED 
•! NONEL-cables, Emulsions based on oxidisers/gaser agents used. 1 detonator and primer per hole. 
•! Kimiit-"rockets" used for overhead charging 
•! Electronic IKON-detonation system used for raises in production stopes; this is done in order to improve 
blasting reliability and precision, since these raises are critical for further mine production. 
•! For special smaller chargers, sometimes powder cords used 
•! Large cartridges used misfires, large boulders in production blasting and in the crusher. In the crusher, 
sometimes just detonator sufficient as well. 
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ORDERING EXPLOSIVES 
Explosives are ordered using Maximo. Track & Trace system has been implemented since April 2015. With delivery 
SP-file of all files delivered. Both complete boxes, sub-packaging and individual items are registered.  
When brought to the mine site, the explosives transport is accompanied by the police. Only after formal transfer to 
the powdermen and when the explosives are brought into the mine from surface they leave the materials in the custody 
of Tara. Surveillance cameras on critical sites checking transfers.  
Emulsion transports don’t need police surveillance etc. Are also stored on surface. Responsibility of Orica. 
STORAGE  
•! Difference between magazine and reserve station: magazine is the long-term storage, only accessible by 
powdermen. Reserve station stores a maximum of two day loads of explosives, shotfirers can also collect 
the explosive materials from the powder men from this station, but normally the powdermen are 
responsible to bring the explosives to the blasting site, where they can be handed over formally.  
•! The magazine can only be accessed with permission from G4S (security) in Dublin. 
•! Access to magazines and storages have copper bars that can be held to decharge static electricity. 
Temperature and moisture levels are regulated.  
•! Not aware of the Stores for Explosives Order 2007, might be because this is about the design of new 
storages. Tara's storages where built 38 and around 15 years ago respectively. 
•! Emulsion storage on the surface, maintained by Orica. Trucks bring in materials, are weighed when 
entering and exiting to determine the amount delivered. After that powdermen are responsible to bring 
tanks on trailers underground with a tractor.  
•! Underground emulsion storage is newer, it is not a problem that it is close to a haul road because the 
agents are insensitive. 
 
SCHEME OF TRANSIT 
Scheme of Transit is the "Bible" when it comes to handling and moving explosives into the mine. Note on the 
procedure of leaving unfinished charges in emergency cases; "barricade" is nothing more than hanging up a chain; 
apart from that just get out of there asap. 
Central terms:  
•! Transfer: Magazine to reserve station 
•! Hand-over: From reserve station (via powderman) to the shotfirer. 
•! Logs of transfer/handover: Have to be stored for 10 years. In some quarries this just a picture of the 
explosives used, in Tara done by the track&trace system.  
BLASTING PRACTICE 
•! Two 10,5 shifts per day; blasting at 6:50 and 19:10, 1.5 hours for the blast and ventilation. 
•! Chargers usually charge several development headings per shift. 
•! Production charging may take several shifts, although usually finished in one. In total, usually 4 
production chargers active. 
•! Some development works by contractors; they have their own shotfirers. They can also place orders 
with the powder men for explosives.  
•! Production blasting all carried out by Boliden. 
•! Development drill holes 5m depth, with ø 45mm; production stopes up to 20m depth, with ø 65mm 
•! Chargers generally work in pairs; apart from that always communication equipment with them. 
•! Electronic detonators used for production raises to be sure of exact programmable delays. Orica does 
the programming once a week. 
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•! Shift boss keeps the blasting machine; people usually present at blast are a shotfirer for Tara, a shotfirer 
for the contractor, the shifts and in case of ICON-blasting someone of Orica. The shotfirer is 
responsible for all pre-blasting checks.  
 
 
Figure 44 shows the way in which stopes are extracted; first a drift is made through the stope; then a raise is blasted 
upwards. Because this raise is difficult to blast and of crucial importance ICON-detonators are used to blast. The 
stope can then be blasted, with blasting sequence starting from the raise and driving backwards. There is room for a 
back-up raise on the other side of the drift, in case the first raise would not go well.  
Nicola (Blasting Engineer)  
•! Mine planners develop drilling plans of stopes. Blasting plans worked out by blasting engineer.  
•! For development drill/blasting plan always the same. 
•! Drill core analysis is delivered to blasting engineer; also blast plans are brought back after blast to 
check. Usually no big differences in charges based on geology, primarily based on stope 
dimensions. 
•! Ground vibration reductions priority; most common reason for complaints. 
Thomas (Powderman)/Observations 
By day 3 powdermen per shift, at night 1. Responsibilities:  
•! Transfer of explosives from suppliers on surface to Tara, bringing these explosives into the magazine. 
•! Bring the oldest items in the magazine to the reserve station if needed there. 
•! Package explosives; standard package for development blasts, custom complete packages for production 
stopes. These custom packages are based on the blasting plans provided by the blasting engineer. 
•! Significant incident in Lisheen Mine (another lead-zinc mine in Ireland) several years ago; miner was 
unrolling copper wire in one hand, held a detonator in the other hand. Due to a release of static electricity 
detonator exploded, hand was blown off. For that reason, detonators that require a much higher current are 
now used in Tara.  
•! Major troubles with central track & trace system of Boliden. Therefore, own system is used now, but this 
system is also not flawless. Errors with processing scans, sometimes causing delays in explosive deliveries. 
IT should improve. 
•! Doors to the reserve station can be kept open when there are people there.  
•! All cars carrying explosives have red lights on them. 
•! Primers are prepackaged in the same room as the detonators. 
Franky (Charger)/Observations 
•! Production drift is charged row by row. 
•! Lower holes are blocked to prevent inflow. 
•! No marked off area during lunch break. 
FIGURE 44: STOPE EXTRACTION METHOD 
FIGURE 45: FIRST CUT 
DEVELOPMENT DRIFT 
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•! Working sequence: Clean-prime-push in detonator/primer-insert emulsion hose, pushes detonator/primer 
in.  
•! Stick used is made of wood. 
•! Connection of detonators is done at the end of the shift. 
•! Pump on the truck monitors how deep the hose is in the hole, and what amount of emulsion has been 
pumped in. The system follows the blasting plan. 
Orica 
•! Responsibilities of Orica at Tara: Supplying emulsions, training chargers to use emulsion pumps, cleaning 
and maintenance of equipment. Pumps on Tara trucks are still owned by Orica. 
•! Not involved in blast design or selection of detonators/primers. 
•! Included in incident reporting systems. 
•! If different safety standards Tara Mine/Orica; highest standard prevails. Generally, safety standards related 
to working with emulsions are drafted by Orica. 
•! Risks associated with emulsions: Equipment/materials catching fire underground, which causes toxic fumes. 
•! Stones in the pump can cause a hotspot-confined mixes in the pump might cause an explosion (very small 
chance though); therefore, training on this topic, keep the hoses clean. 
•! Mixing with other materials that may lead to explosive substances. 
•! Equipment offers the opportunity to tailor the nitrate-gas component and oxidiser to specific needs for the 
blast; higher share of nitrate-gas component ensures more powerful blasts. 
•! From previous experiences, ICON-detonators are very effective in ensuring safe and reliable blasting; system 
is not sharp before this is requested; virtually no misfires since failures can be detected immediately; perfect 
quality of blasting, thereby better fragmentation and reduced vibrations. Expensive though (!30/det instead 
of !6/det). 
•! Why do surface mines let emulsion contractors charge holes themselves (see Kevitsa, Aitik), and 
underground miners not? Probably more economical to let emulsion trucks just drive into the mine directly, 
not possible with underground mines. 
  
 172 
K.! Misfire Reporting Sheet 
 
 
 
  
T 
6 Tara Mines Misfire Reporting Sheet: 
BOLIDEN ^g^g j^.^g^ Misfire Reporting Sheet 
To be completed in tlie event ofany misfire: 
Location of Blast: 
09/04/2014 
Blast Type Product ion Deve lopment 
Number o f Holes : 
Length o f Holes (metres) 
Did t he explosive? Remain in the hole or was it e jected 
Indicate Posit ion oflVlisfire in re lat ion t o t he deve lopment blast 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
If it was a produc t ion blast d raw a sketch o f misfire(s) loca t ion : 
Name of shiftboss who discovered the Misfire (PRINT): Signed: 
Duty Captain (PRINT): Signed: 
Title Doc. No. Rev. No. Page No. 
Misfire Procedure T2933 2 3(3) 
The electronic version of this document is the latest version. It is the responsibility ofthe individual to ensure that any paper material is 
the cuiTent version. Printed material is uncontrolled documentation 
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L.! Tables with Australian and US Data 
 
TABLE 48: QUEENSLAND BLASTING INCIDENT DATA 
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TABLE 49: US DATA 
 
FIGURE 46: PIE-CHARTS BLASTING INJURIES CAUSES US 
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M.! Tables with Statistical Data Boliden 
 
TABLE 50: YELLOW AND RED INCIDENTS PER SWEDISH MINE 
 
Note: Only underground Swedish mines and Tara have been included in the above data 
 
 TABLE 51: INCIDENTS FOR ALL MINES 
&& D+*+>& L& M#$E%,&
'%$-&
L& :#C$&
(+/%,&
L& N8(+/%,& D$%#&
O%P.(&:#C$(+/%,Q&
L&
R%)E8,)+'(%&
9%$)8,)&
*$ ).+",$ $      
S8.CB%,*#*+8,& &$ )."*,$ $      
9#.>#-+,-& &$ )."*,$ $      
!*8$#-%& &)$ ".**,$ #$ &#.#-,$ &$ ".'',$ +$ *&.)',$
7$#,)E8$*#*+8,& '$ *.&&,$ "$ &&.&&,$ $  *$ '.*#,$
S$+((+,-& +$ %.%+,$ *$ '.'#,$ *$ (.)(,$ *$ '.*#,$
T"#$-+,-&& &*$ '.)#,$ %$ +.%%,$ $  %$ -.+(,$
T"#$-+,-&UVC+EB%,*& $      '$ &%.&#,$
N(#)*+,-& ")$ &#.++,$ #$ &#.#-,$ *$ (.)(,$ *$ '.*#,$
N(#)*+,-FUA#.C#*+8,&
9$8.%/C$%&
&)"$ "%.++,$ "$ &&.&&,$ $  &$ *.#%,$
UPE(8)+A%)&W%;*& $  *$ '.'#,$ $  #$ &'.-(,$
98)*X'(#)*+,-& &&$ ".#",$ %$ +.%%,$ $  *$ '.*#,$
:+);+$%& *-$ &&.%(,$ "$ &&.&&,$ "$ &+.&+,$ $  
T$C)"+,-& &$ )."*,$ &$ *.-+,$ $  "$ &).'%,$
W8#/+,-& &'$ #.%%,$ &$ *.-+,$ &%$ '(.)(,$ %$ -.+(,$
T#*%-8$=& YR%/Y&.#)%)&
5K&
R%)E8,)+'(%&9%$)8,)& *$
S8.CB%,*#*+8,& )$
9#.>#-+,-& )$
!*8$#-%& %$
7$#,)E8$*#*+8,& #$
S$+((+,-& *$
T"#$-+,-& %$
T"#$-+,-&UVC+EB%,*& )$
N(#)*+,-& &'$
N(#)*+,-FUA#.C#*+8,&
9$8.%/C$%&
*#$
UPE(8)+A%)&W%;*& +$
98)*X'(#)*+,-& "$
:+);+$%& ($
T$C)"+,-& )$
W8#/+,-& #$
 175 
N.! Sample Database Incident Reporting 
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O.! Suspected Causes of Incidents in Underground Mines 
 
 
 
FIGURE 48: DELIVERY INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 47: STORAGE INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 49: TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 51: DRILLING INCIDENT CAUSES FIGURE 50: CHARGINGEQUIPMENT INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 52: CHARGING INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 53: BLASTING PROCEDURE INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 54: BLASTING INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 55: POST-BLASTING INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 56: MISFIRE INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 57: LOADING INCIDENT CAUSES FIGURE 58: CRUSHING INCIDENT CAUSES 
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P.! Suspected Causes of Incidents in Surface Mines 
  
FIGURE 61: RESPONSIBLE PERSON INCIDENT 
CAUSES 
FIGURE 60: TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 59: STORAGE INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 65: DRILLING INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 62: CHARGING INCIDENT CAUSES 
FIGURE 64: CRUSHING INCIDENT CASES 
FIGURE 63: LOADING INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 66: BLASTING PROCEDURE INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 67: BLASTING INCIDENT CAUSES 
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FIGURE 69: POST-BLASTING INCIDENT CAUSES 
  
FIGURE 68: MISFIRE INCIDENT CAUSES 
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Q.! Fault Trees 
 
FIGURE 70: FLYROCK FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
Minimum cuts: 
{B5} 
{C1 C2 C3 A1 A3 A4 A5} {N1 A1 A3 A4 A5} {B1 A1 A3 A4 A5} {B2 A1 A3 A4 A5} {B3 A1 A3 A4 A5} 
{C1 C2 C3 A1 A2 N3 A4 A5} {N1 A1 A2 N3 A4 A5} {B1 A1 A2 N3 A4 A5} {B2 A1 A2 N3 A4 A5} {B3 A1 A2 N3 A4 A5} 
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FIGURE 71: MISFIRE FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
Minimum cuts:  
{N1 B1 M1 M2 O1}, {N1 B2 M1 M2 O1}, {N1 B6 C1 C2 M1 M2 O1}, {N1 N2 M1 M2 O1} 
{M3 B1 M1 M2 O1}, {M3 B2 M1 M2 O1}, {M3 B6 C1 C2 M1 M2 O1}, {M3 N2 M1 M2 O1} 
{M4 B1 M1 M2 O1}, {M4 B2 M1 M2 O1}, {M4 B6 C1 C2 M1 M2 O1}, {M4 N2 M1 M2 O1}  
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FIGURE 72: TOXIC FUMES FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
 
Minimum cuts: 
 
{V1 P1 P2 O1} {V1 A4 A1} {V1 A4 A3} {V1 A4 A5} {V1 P3} 
{V2 P1 P2 O1} {V2 A4 A1} {V2 A4 A3} {V2 A4 A5} {V2 P3} 
{B4 P1 P2 O1} {B4 A4 A1} {B4 A4 A3} {B4 A4 A5} {B4 P3}
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FIGURE 73: EARLY DETONATION 
 
Minimal cuts: 
{B4} {H1} {H2}  
{S1 S2 S4} {S3 S4} 
{C1 C3} {C2 C3}  
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R.! Results Fault Trees 
 
TABLE 52: RESULTING VALUES FAULT TREES 
  B4 A4 O1 V
1 
V
2 
P3 A5  A3 C3 B5 H1 H2 M
1 
M2 N2 P1 P2 S4 A1 
Fumes 4 9 3 4 4 3 3 3               3 3   3 
I(I) 2 2,25 1,5 2 2 1,5 0,75 0,75               0,75 0,75   0,002929688 
Misfires   12          12 12 3     
I(I)   0,75          0,
75 
0,75 0,75     
Flyrock   10         10 5 2 1                 10 
I(I)   0,625         0,625 0,3125 0,03125 1                 0,625 
Early 
Detonation 
1        2  1 1      2  
I(I) 1        1  1 1      0,75  
SUM 3 2,875 2,25 2 2 1,5 1,375 1,0625 1,03125 1 1 1 0,
75 
0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,627929688 
 
  C1 C2 N1 B1 B2 M3 M4 S1 S2 S3 A2 N3 B3 B6 
Fumes                             
I(I)                             
Misfires 3 3 4 3 3 4 4       3 
I(I) 0,046875 0,046875 0,25 0,1875 0,1875 0,25 0,25       0,046875 
Flyrock 2 2 2 2 2           5 5 2   
I(I) 0,03125 0,03125 0,125 0,125 0,125           0,15625 0,15625 0,125   
Early Detonation 1 1      1 1 1     
I(I) 0,5 0,5      0,25 0,25 0,25     
SUM 0,578125 0,578125 0,375 0,3125 0,3125 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,15625 0,15625 0,125 0,046875 
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S.! Cause Statistics 
TABLE 53: ELEMENT STATISTICS 
Component # labda (/year) Column1 Upper limit /shift 
A1: Blast area security measures implementation 5 0,5 39% 40% 5,46E-04 
A2: General mine area security measures: 0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
A3: Awareness of blasting evacuation rules: 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
A4: Checks on presence in wide blasting area: 2 0,2 18% 19% 2,62E-04 
A5: Security systems for mine evacuation: 3 0,3 26% 27% 3,65E-04 
B1: Blast design: 3 0,3 26% 27% 3,65E-04 
B2: Detonator & initiation system reliability: 4 0,4 33% 34% 4,60E-04 
B3: Detonator & initiation system performance: 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
B4: Explosives & emulsion selection: 0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
B5: Danger zone estimation: 3 0,3 26% 27% 3,65E-04 
B6: Pre-blast checks: 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
B7: Missing cover: 6 0,6 45% 46% 6,24E-04 
C1: Charging procedures: 0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
C2: Charging execution: 5 0,5016 39% 40% 5,47E-04 
C3: Charging execution oversight 0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
C4: Charging equipment- wrong/insufficientexecution 3 0,3 26% 27% 3,65E-04 
C5: Charging equipment- wrong information 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
E1: Explosives outside dedicated area 11 1,1 67% 67% 9,17E-04 
H1: Detonators transported together with explosives  0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
H2: Vehicles/road issues  3 0,3 26% 27% 3,65E-04 
H3: Scanning/bookkeeping 4 0,397 33% 33% 4,57E-04 
H4: Traffic violations/general irresponsible transport 7 0,7 50% 51% 6,95E-04 
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H5: Emulsion handling 8 0,8 55% 55% 7,59E-04 
H6: Packaging/handling safety barriers 0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
M1: Misfire handling rules (Blasting Foremans) 0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
M2: Misfire handling execution (Blasting Foremans) 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
M3: Misfire handling rules & training  1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
M4: Misfire handling execution for operators  1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
N1: Unexpected geology 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
N2: Unexpected blast characteristics, 3 0,2603 23% 24% 3,25E-04 
N3: External people moving into mine site 0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
N4: Misfire unnoticed since hidden 2 0,2 18% 19% 2,62E-04 
O1: PPE usage  2 0,2 18% 19% 2,62E-04 
O2: Protective gear on equipment 1 0,09 9% 10% 1,40E-04 
P1: Post-blast inspection rules  0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
P2: Post-blast measurements/inspections execution  3 0,3 26% 27% 3,65E-04 
P3: Post-blast return timing decision  1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
S1: Detonators and explosives stored separately  2 0,2145 19% 20% 2,78E-04 
S2: Detonator storage stops external effects  0 0 0% 3% 4,11E-05 
S3: Storage conditions  3 0,33 28% 29% 3,95E-04 
S4: Storage inspections 0 0,026 3% 5% 6,78E-05 
U1: Misfire unclear 14 1,4 75% 76% 1,03E-03 
S5: Access to Storage 14 1,386 75% 75% 1,03E-03 
V1: Ventilation capacity  5 0,5 39% 40% 5,46E-04 
V2: Ventilation execution  3 0,3 26% 27% 3,65E-04 
Y1: Blockage blasting rules 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
Y2: Blockage blasting execution 1 0,1 10% 11% 1,51E-04 
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T.! Reliability Bowtie Models 
 
1.! Early Detonation Bowtie Reliability Model 
 
  
FIGURE 74: EARLY DETONATION STORAGE 
FIGURE 75: EARLY DETONATION TRANSPORT 
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2.! Incomplete Detonation Bowtie Reliability Model 
 
  
 
 
FIGURE 76: INCOMPLETE DETONATION BOWTIE RELIABILITY MODEL 
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3.! Blast Effects Bowtie Reliability Models 
 
  
FIGURE 77: FLYROCK RELIABILITY BOWTIE MODEL 
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  FIGURE 78: FUMES BOWTIE RELIABILITY MODEL 
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U.! Root Cause Analyses using 5-Why Technique 
 
 
 
FIGURE 79: 5-WHY'S TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 4 MOST CONCERNING COMPONENTS 
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V.! GHS 
 
 
TABLE 54: GHS-TABLE WITH SYMBOLS 
 
IATG 01.50:2015[E] 
2nd Edition (2015-02-01) 
 
 
4 
Hazard 
Division Description Pictogram
9 Signal Word 
Hazard 
Statement 
1.1 Ammunition that has a mass explosion hazard. 
 
 Danger  Mass explosion hazard. 
1.2 
Ammunition that has a 
projection hazard but not a 
mass explosion hazard. 
 
 Danger 
 Severe 
projection 
hazard. 
1.2.1 
Ammunition that has a 
projection hazard but not a 
mass explosion hazard. 
(More hazardous items of HD 1.2, which 
give large fragments over an extended 
range). 
  Danger   
1.2.2 
Ammunition that has a 
projection hazard but not a 
mass explosion hazard. 
(The less hazardous items of HD 1.2, which 
give smaller fragments of limited range). 
  Danger   
1.2.3 
Ammunition that exhibit at 
most an explosion reaction 
during sympathetic reaction 
testing and a burning 
reaction in bullet impact and 
heating tests.10   
  Danger   
1.3 
Ammunition that has a fire 
hazard and either a minor 
blast hazard or a minor 
projection hazard or both, 
but not a mass explosion 
hazard. 
 
 Danger 
 Fire, blast or 
projection 
hazard. 
1.3.1 
Ammunition that has a fire 
hazard and either a minor 
blast hazard or a minor 
projection hazard or both, 
but not a mass explosion 
hazard. 
(The more hazardous items with mass fire 
hazard and considerable thermal radiation). 
  Danger   
1.3.2 
Ammunition that has a fire 
hazard and either a minor 
blast hazard or a minor 
projection hazard or both, 
but not a mass explosion 
hazard. 
(The less hazardous items that burn 
sporadically). 
  Danger   
                                                     
9 The examples shown also include the Compatibility Group. 
10 This is a ‘new’ HD and is derived from NATO AASTP-3, Edition 1, Change 3. Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the 
Hazard Classification of Military Ammunition and Explosives. August 2009 
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IATG 01.50:2015[E] 
2nd Edition (2015-02-01) 
 
 
5 
Hazard 
Division Description Pictogram
9 Signal Word 
Hazard 
Statement 
1.4 Ammunition that presents no significant hazard. 
 
 Warning 
 Fire or 
projection 
hazard. 
1.5 
Very insensitive substances, 
which have a mass 
explosion hazard. 
 
 Danger  May mass explode in fire. 
1.6 
Extremely insensitive articles 
which do not have a mass 
explosion hazard. 
 
 No Signal 
Word 
 No hazard 
statement. 
Unstable 
Explosive 
Any explosive in an unstable 
condition. 
No pictogram 
assigned as the 
transport of 
unstable explosive 
is not permitted. 
 Danger  Unstable explosive. 
 
Table 1: Hazard Divisions11 
 
6.1.1. Fire Divisions (LEVEL 1) 
The six fire divisions, which equate to the hazard divisions, should be indicated during storage and 
transportation by one of four distinctive symbols in order to be recognised by the fire-fighting 
personnel approaching the fire scene.  Hazard Division symbols may also be used for this purpose. 
A fire division number is shown on each symbol.  Due to similar fire-fighting hazards, the Fire 
Division 1 fire symbol and number are also used for Fire Division 5 and the Fire Division 2 fire 
symbol and number are also used for Fire Division 6.  The symbols in Table 2 shall be used when 
fire divisions are indicated during storage and transport:  
Fire Division Symbol Remarks 
1.1 
 
  
1.2 
 
  
1.3 
 
  
                                                     
11 GHS Annex 1. 
